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Abstract
In the first paper of my dissertation I study the size and source of exchange-traded
funds’ (ETFs) price impact in the most ETF-dominated asset classes: volatility (VIX)
and commodities. I show that the introduction of ETFs increased futures prices.
To identify ETF-induced price distortions, I propose a model-independent approach
to replicate the value of a VIX futures contract. This allows me to isolate a non-
fundamental component in VIX futures prices, of 18.5% per year, that is strongly
related to the rebalancing of ETFs. To understand the source of that component, I
decompose trading demand from ETFs into three main parts: leverage rebalancing, cal-
endar rebalancing, and flow rebalancing. Leverage rebalancing has the largest effects.
It amplifies price changes and introduces unhedgeable risks for ETF counterparties.
Surprisingly, providing liquidity to leveraged ETFs turns out to be a bet on variance,
even in a market with a zero net share of ETFs. Trading against leverage rebalancing
delivers large abnormal returns and Sharpe ratios above two across markets.
The second paper analyses the impact of the ECB’s Corporate Sector Purchase Pro-
gramme (CSPP) announcement on prices, liquidity and debt issuance in the European
corporate bond market. I find that the quantitative easing (QE) programme increased
prices and liquidity of bonds eligible to be purchased substantially. Bond yields dropped
on average by 30 bps (8%) after the CSPP announcement. Tri-party repo turnover rose
by 8.15 million USD (29%), and bilateral turnover went up by 7.05 million USD (72%).
Bid-ask spreads also showed significant liquidity improvement in eligible bonds. QE was
successful in boosting corporate debt issuance. Firms issued 2.19 billion EUR (25%)
more in QE-eligible debt after the CSPP announcement, compared to other types of
debt. Surprisingly, corporates used the attracted funds mostly to increase dividends.
These effects were more pronounced for longer-maturity, lower-rated bonds, and for
more credit-constrained, lower-rated firms.
The third paper (co-authored with Christian Julliard, Zijun Liu, Seyed E. Seyedan and
Kathy Yuan) studies the determinants of repo haircuts in the UK market. We find
that transaction maturity and collateral quality have first order importance. We also
document that counterparties matter in determining haircuts. Hedge funds, as borrow-
ers, receive significantly higher haircuts. Larger borrowers with higher ratings receive
lower haircuts, but we find that these effects can be overshadowed by collateral qual-
ity. Repeated bilateral relationships also matter and generate lower haircuts. We find
evidence supporting an adverse selection explanation of haircuts, but limited evidence
in favor of lenders’ liquidity position or default probabilities affecting haircuts.
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Chapter 1
Passive Funds Actively Affect
Prices: Evidence from the
Largest ETF Markets
Karamfil Todorov1
1.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a surge in passive investing.2 Investors are increasingly putting
money into funds that track a given benchmark index instead of actively managing a
portfolio. The market for one particular type of these funds, ETFs, has grown con-
siderably. As of 2018, ETFs were managing $5 trillion globally compared with only
$0.2 trillion in 2004.3 ETFs are progressively being used by retail and institutional
investors to obtain a cost-efficient exposure to portfolios of assets or asset strategies.
1I am grateful to Igor Makarov, Christian Julliard, Dimitri Vayanos, Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Ron
Anderson, Thummim Cho, Dirk Jenter, Dong Lou, Ian Martin, Martin Oehmke, Daniel Paravisini,
Cameron Peng, Andrea Tamoni, Andreas Uthemann and Kathy Yuan for their useful advice and
comments. I am also thankful to the scientific committees of the BlackRock Applied Research Award
and the 7th SUERF/UniCredit Foundation Research Prize for selecting this paper as the winner in
these competitions. I am also grateful to seminar participants at the London School of Economics, the
Bank of England, BIS, BlackRock, Boston College, CEMFI, HEC Paris, Indiana University, PIMCO,
UniCredit, University of Florida, University of Houston, University of Maryland, University of Notre
Dame, and Washington University in St. Louis for their helpful feedback. I thank the Systemic Risk
Centre at the LSE for providing the data on variance swaps sourced from Markit under license.
2Passive funds do not pick the assets to invest in, but simply follow their benchmarks (as opposed
to active funds). Since some benchmarks involve more frequent rebalancing, passive funds are not the
same as pure buy-and-hold investors.
3Source: Morningstar and own calculations.
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On the one hand, commoditization of assets through ETFs makes investing simple and
cost-efficient, thereby attracting new capital and possibly increasing liquidity. On the
other hand, commoditization could reduce price informativeness and create systemic
risks if the presence of large investors with similar objectives leads to synchronized
trading, especially during extreme market times. The increasing presence of ETFs in
various asset classes has led to a growing number of market participants and academics
expressing concerns about the potential distorting impact on underlying assets. The
fear is that “too much money is in too few hands”.
Assessing the impact of ETFs on prices is difficult because it is hard to distinguish
between noise and fundamentals of the underlying asset. The existing literature has al-
most exclusively focused on equity markets, where fundamental values are complicated
to measure. Most papers have tried to quantify non-fundamental price distortions due
to ETFs by looking at price reversals or variance ratios. In the research presented
here, I use the beneficial setting of the futures market, where non-fundamental price
distortions are easier to measure. I construct a unique data set to identify the size and
source of the ETF impact on prices in the most ETF-dominated asset classes: volatility
(VIX) and commodities.4
These ETFs have two beneficial features that make them a useful laboratory to quantify
the effects of ETFs on prices. First, ETFs in VIX and commodities hold a much larger
share of the market compared to equities. The fraction of ETFs in the market for
VIX futures often exceeds 30%, whereas it is less than 2%5 in the Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) 500 Index. Several episodes from the VIX market in 2018 (and from the oil
market in 2020) suggest that large ETF-induced trading can actively move prices and
exacerbate price changes in turbulent times.6 Second, using the specifics of futures
contracts, I directly test whether the ETF-influenced futures price is informative about
the fundamental spot value, or is more influenced by less fundamental premiums. The
setting of the futures market also allows me to test specific predictions about the price
impact of ETFs on the slope of the futures curve.
This paper documents and studies several new ETF-related phenomena. First, I show
that ETFs put pressure on prices of underlying assets in VIX and commodity markets.
4Some of the exchange-traded products (ETPs) analyzed in this research are structured in the form
of an exchange-traded note (ETN) rather than an exchange-traded fund. The institutional differences
between the two structures are immaterial since ETPs’ exposure is transmitted to the underlying
futures market irrespective of the legal structure of the product as I show in section 1.5.3. I use the
term ETF (instead of ETP) to refer to a general exchange-traded product throughout the paper as the
term is more familiar to the general public.
5On average, for the period 2009–2018. The average proportion of the US stock market held by all
equity ETFs is close to 6% for the same period.
6See, e.g., Pagano et al. (2019), FT (2018), Reuters (2018), FT (2020) and Bloomberg (2020).
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Trading demand from ETFs (called ETF demand hereafter) is strongly related to fu-
tures prices at a daily frequency. The effects are robust to a large set of controls and
to different sub-periods.
Second, I show that ETF price impact is not related to price discovery but manifests
itself through an increase in the non-fundamental part of prices. To identify ETF-
induced price distortions, I propose a model-independent approach for replicating the
fundamental value7 of a VIX futures contract. I simply use the definition of variance
and construct a synthetic futures contract from option prices on the S&P 500 Index and
VIX. One advantage of my framework is that I make no parametric or distributional
assumptions: the results are also valid in the presence of jumps. This is an important
strength of my approach, given that VIX futures often experience large spikes. The
synthetic futures contract is not directly influenced by ETF demand since there are no
ETFs in the market for options. The price of the replicated contract was close to that
of the traded one before the introduction of ETFs but diverged consistently thereafter.
I show that the difference between the prices of the two contracts is strongly related
to ETF demand and call this difference the ETF futures gap (EFG). The EFG is
also related to measures of funding and market liquidity: bid-ask spreads and the TED
spread (spread between 3-month LIBOR in USD and the interest rate of Treasury bills).
The size of the gap is 18.5% per year, on average.
Third, to study the source of the gap in VIX futures prices, I analyze trading by ETFs
and propose a novel decomposition of their demand into three major components:
calendar rebalancing, flow rebalancing, and leverage rebalancing. Calendar rebalanc-
ing arises because futures are finite-maturity instruments as opposed to stocks, and
ETFs have to gradually roll expiring contracts into longer-dated ones to maintain their
exposure. ETFs sell portions of the first-month futures and buy portions of the second-
month futures on a daily basis, thereby rolling their exposure from the first to the
second contract. Flow rebalancing is driven by fund flows: ETFs have to scale up their
exposure in case of inflows, and scale it down in case of outflows. Leverage rebalanc-
ing arises due to the maintenance of a constant daily leverage by leveraged ETFs and
is a new type of mechanic institutional demand. The three types of rebalancing are
not specific to futures-based ETFs but can be generalized to ETFs in all asset classes,
including equity and fixed income. Calendar rebalancing is analogous to the roll due
to benchmark exclusion/inclusion for equity ETFs, or due to maturing bonds for fixed
income ETFs. Flow and leverage rebalancing for equity and bond ETFs have similar
interpretation to that for VIX and commodity ETFs.
7Throughout the paper, fundamental value denotes a value that is a more precise measure of the
fundamental spot price at maturity compared to the observed, ETF-influenced futures price.
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I show that leverage rebalancing introduces a source of convexity that is not easy
to hedge and exposes ETF counterparties (called arbitrageurs hereafter) to variance.
This type of rebalancing has the largest impact on the EFG. Calendar rebalancing
inherits part of the non-linearity of leverage rebalancing and also mechanically exposes
arbitrageurs to the risk of widening price discrepancies since arbitrageurs have to close
futures positions before expiration. Calendar rebalancing puts upward pressure on the
second-month futures price and downward pressure on the first-month price. Flow
rebalancing has a direct effect on prices and also an indirect effect by changing the
size of ETFs, and the amount of their calendar rebalancing in future periods. Flow
rebalancing moves prices in the direction of flows: inflows increase prices, whereas
outflows decrease them. The short-term price impact of the three types of rebalancing
translates into longer-term price deviations.
Given that the EFG is most sensitive to leverage rebalancing, I next analyze the risks
faced by an arbitrageur who trades against this type of ETF demand. The impact
of large leverage-induced trading by institutional investors on systemic risk and prices
is an important, yet under-researched question. ETFs provide a useful laboratory to
study this question on a daily basis. I show that leverage rebalancing amplifies price
changes and introduces unhedgeable risks for ETF counterparties. Leveraged ETFs
mechanically have to buy the underlying asset after price increases and sell it after price
decreases. This creates a potential feedback channel for prices: ETF demand and price
changes reinforce each other, pushing prices away from fundamentals. Trading against
leveraged ETFs is, in essence, providing liquidity to investors with short horizons, who
follow momentum-like strategy. Due to leverage rebalancing, the potential distorting
effect of ETFs on prices can be large even in a market with a zero net share of ETFs.
A prominent real-world example of this effect was the VIX market in February 2018.
The net market share of ETFs then was close to zero, but the potential price impact
due to leverage rebalancing was 60% of the total market size for the first two futures
contracts. The amount of leverage rebalancing has been growing in the last decade not
only for VIX and commodities but also for some equity and bond indices.
I propose a simple strategy to understand the risks of trading against leverage rebal-
ancing, and document a novel ETF-related anomaly. I form a portfolio that sells short
a pair of ETFs with opposite leverages L (e.g., L = 2 and L = −2), to approximate
liquidity provision to leveraged ETFs. A natural guess could be that such a strategy
should have a zero return since the profit (loss) from selling the long fund is canceled by
the loss (profit) from selling the inverse fund. Surprisingly, I show that the returns on
such a strategy are not zero, but are consistently positive across markets. The portfolio
delivers annualized returns of 21% in the VIX market, and 43% in the gas market, with
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Sharpe ratios of 0.89 and 2.59, respectively. Theoretically, trading against opposite-
leveraged ETFs should be negatively exposed to large jumps in the underlying asset.
However, empirically, the downside risk is almost never realized. A more puzzling ob-
servation is that the strategy is exposed to a “right-way risk” since it benefits from ETF
tracking errors in crisis times when liquidity dries up and the market breaks down. To
the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first to quantify the risks of trading against
leveraged ETFs and the first to show that their tracking errors co-move with extreme
market times, thereby benefiting liquidity providers.
The main conclusions of this paper are validated in a large set of robustness tests. I
verify the major results using several measures of futures basis and spread to address
concerns about time to maturity, the absolute level of prices, or other factors driving
the relationship between ETF demand and futures prices. I conduct several tests to
verify that the ETF futures gap and its relationship to the trading demand from ETFs
are robust features of the data. The empirical evidence shows that the gap is unlikely to
be driven by the absence of a continuum of option strikes, truncation errors, differences
in margin requirements, or hedging pressure in the options market. A potential concern
is that price discovery takes place in the ETF-influenced market, and therefore the gap
exists because of fundamental information about the realized spot rather than non-
fundamental price pressure due to ETF demand. To address this concern, I test which
futures contract is a better predictor of the fundamental spot price at maturity. The
empirical evidence shows that the ETF-influenced futures contract is a poor predictor,
whereas the synthetic futures constructed from options is a better one.
My main results have several implications. First, they illustrate that price is strongly
related to ETF trading demand, when ETFs constitute a large share of the market. In
turbulent times, significant leverage-induced rebalancing contributes to extreme market
movements and creates a feedback effect on prices. Thus, synchronized trading by
ETFs actively moves prices away from fundamentals. This result contributes to the
policy debate on the desirability of commoditization. Going forward, the evidence of
ETF impact on prices in VIX and commodity markets can be useful for predicting
the potential effects of ETFs on stock and bond markets, should these funds develop a
larger share of these traditionally studied asset classes.
Second, my results lead to a more nuanced view of the information content of VIX
and the VIX futures premium (the average relative difference between the current
futures price and the realized spot price at expiration). VIX and its derivatives are
often perceived as a barometer of financial stress by large financial institutions and are
used as an input in stress-tests and various risk models. The VIX futures premium
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is frequently interpreted as a measure of investors’ risk aversion and future economic
uncertainty. However, my results suggest that the prices of VIX futures contracts are
significantly disrupted by non-fundamental mechanical ETF demand. I show that the
VIX futures premium has increased since the introduction of ETFs, particularly, for the
most ETF-influenced futures contracts: one and two months. Prices for these contracts
are less informative about the realized spot price and are influenced more by premiums.
Third, my findings show how to decompose trading demand from ETFs and study
different aspects of their price impact. I also demonstrate how to quantify the potential
distorting impact of leverage rebalancing and how to capture the risk premium of
trading against this rebalancing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I summarize the relevant
literature. Section 1.3 describes the data set. Section 1.4 presents the results on ETF
impact in the VIX market. Section 1.5 describes the decomposition of ETF demand.
Section 1.6 analyzes in detail ETFs’ leverage rebalancing. Section 1.7 presents the
results for commodity markets, and section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
The research presented here contributes to the literature in four main areas: stud-
ies on ETFs, VIX and the variance risk premium (VRP), futures markets, and limits
to arbitrage. First, it is related to studies on ETFs. A major drawback of the ex-
isting ETF literature is that it is almost exclusively focused on equities, where these
funds are a relatively small proportion of the market (less than 6%, on average) and
where non-fundamental price deviations are hard to measure. Ben-David et al. (2018)
study the volatility effects of ETFs in stocks and argue that ETF arbitrage transmits
noise trader risk to underlying securities. Malamud (2015) demonstrates that ETFs
may create a transmission mechanism for non-fundamental shocks to the underlying
securities. Cheng and Madhavan (2009) show that the returns on leveraged ETFs
are path-dependent. Tuzun (2012) finds that the rebalancing of leveraged ETFs can
increase the volatility of constituent stocks, whereas Ivanov and Lenkey (2018) find
evidence that these effects are offset by ETF flows. Bessembinder (2015) studies the
impact of ETF flows. Recently, Sushko and Turner (2019) document the increase in the
share held by ETFs in several markets and study the impact for liquidity and volatility.
The greater presence of ETFs in VIX and commodity markets makes them a natural
candidate for studying the impact of ETF demand on prices and risk premiums. And
yet, ETFs in VIX and commodity markets have received little to no attention in the
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literature to date. A related paper by Dong (2016) studies the price impact of VIX
ETFs and finds that dealers pass hedging pressure to underlying futures. Similar to
the research presented here, Dong (2016) uses a result from Carr and Wu (2006) to
estimate the fair value of a VIX futures. However, he does not establish that the fair
value relates more closely to fundamentals than the VIX futures price, and does not
rule out alternative explanations to ETF demand. The paper also does not study the
source of the premium in VIX futures prices. In particular, it ignores the impact of
leverage rebalancing. Another gap in the existing ETF literature is that, to the best of
my knowledge, none of the studies has decomposed the demand from ETFs to analyze
different aspects of their price impact. The research presented here aims to fill this gap
by examining different types of trading demand by ETFs in the largest ETF-dominated
markets.
Second, my paper contributes to the literature on VIX and the variance risk premium.
Cheng (2019) analyzes the VIX premium and finds that, in turbulent times, dealers and
asset managers reduce their long volatility positions, whereas hedge funds reduce their
short volatility positions. Barras and Malkhozov (2016) find that the VRP inferred
from equity prices is different from the one inferred from option prices. They claim
that the difference is driven by the financial standing of intermediaries. Dew-Becker
et al. (2017) study variance swaps data and find that news about future volatility is
unpriced, but investors are willing to pay a large premium to hedge realized volatility.
Mixon and Onur (2015) study volatility markets and claim that the long volatility bias
of asset managers acts to put upward pressure on VIX futures prices. Alexander and
Korovilas (2012) find that ETFs increase the volatility of VIX futures. Eraker and Wu
(2017) develop a model with diffusive and jump shocks to explain the large negative
returns on VIX ETFs. However, most papers ignore the impact of ETFs on prices of
underlying futures or rely on some parametric assumptions to calculate risk premiums.
In the research presented here, I show that the mechanics of ETF rebalancing distorts
futures prices, and I measure the resulting gap in a model-independent way.
Third, my research adds to the extensive literature on futures markets. In the normal
backwardation theory of Keynes (1930) hedgers push down futures price. Fama and
French (1987) find evidence of time-varying expected premiums in several commodities.
Koijen et al. (2018) explore the predictive power of carry across several asset classes.
Mou (2011) studies commodity roll. Tang and Xiong (2012), and Basak and Pavlova
(2016) study the financialization of commodities due to institutional flows. Singleton
(2013) argues that flows from institutional investors have contributed significantly to
the increase in oil prices prior to 2008. In contrast, Gorton et al. (2013) find no
evidence that the positions of participants in futures markets predict risk premiums
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on commodity futures. Most studies on hedging pressure in futures markets use lower-
frequency data (quarterly or weekly) on investors’ positions to analyze price impact.
However, hedging pressure is more likely to be pronounced over short time horizons in
the current era of high-frequency trading. Using ETFs to analyze the impact on prices
allows the capture of these transitory price effects, since trading demand is observed on
a daily basis. The research presented here shows that in markets with a high proportion
of ETFs, the demand from these funds is strongly related to the futures premium.
Fourth, my paper also adds to the extensive literature on limits to arbitrage and slow
moving capital. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) develop a simple model with noise trader
risk and show that arbitrage could persist. Garleanu et al. (2009) show that dealers
provide liquidity in option products and charge for the unhedgeable risks they take
due to the impossibility of trading continuously, and due to transaction costs. Gromb
and Vayanos (2018) develop a theoretical framework in which financially constrained
arbitrageurs exploit price-discrepancies across segmented markets. In the research pre-
sented here, I document segmentation in the VIX futures market and develop a simple
model to illustrate how price discrepancies can exist and persist.
1.3 Data and institutional details
I construct a unique data set on ETFs and their underlying securities in VIX and com-
modities: US natural gas, silver, gold and oil.8 The data comes from several sources.
Daily prices, flows, holdings, assets under management, volume of trading, and other
characteristics of ETFs come from the websites of the sponsors, from the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP), and from Bloomberg. Daily data on futures prices,
open interest, and volume of trading is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE). Daily data on S&P 500 Index options comes from OptionMetrics and ETF
borrowing fees are from Interactive Brokers. Weekly data on positions in futures con-
tracts is from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), monthly data on
variance swaps quotes comes from Markit Totem. The analyzed period is generally
January 2000 to December 2018; however, some of the data is only available for a
shorter time period.
8In the Appendix, I provide some results for leverage rebalancing of equity, fixed income and foreign
exchange ETFs.
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1.3.1 The presence of ETFs in different markets
Figure 1.1 shows the proportion of ETFs in the total market capitalization for several
markets. The black lines on the graphs show that the proportion of ETFs periodically
exceeds 30% of the total market capitalization for VIX and natural gas.9 The share
of ETFs in equities is much smaller and constitutes less than 2%, on average, for
most equity indices. Table 1.1 summarizes the proportion of ETFs in the total market
capitalization and in daily trading volume across several markets.
[Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1 about here]
The numbers illustrate that, even though ETFs constitute a smaller share of the equity
market, the average daily trading volume of ETF shares is large in relative terms: for
the S&P 500 Index, it exceeds 18% of the trading volume in constituent shares. In
the VIX market, the average daily trading volume exceeds twice that of the underlying
futures contracts. In the following analysis, I focus mainly on VIX ETFs and ETFs in
the markets for natural gas, silver, gold, and oil.
1.3.2 Institutional details
Unlike most equity ETFs that physically invest in the underlying assets, VIX and com-
modity ETFs obtain price exposure by entering into positions in futures contracts.10
Most ETFs follow a benchmark based on the first two futures contracts.11 They grad-
ually roll their exposure from the first-month contract to the second-month contract
(daily for VIX and over a period of 5 days each month for commodity markets). Some
ETFs also aim to maintain a constant daily leverage ratio, L, which can also be negative
(for inverse ETFs). For example, if the benchmark return is 5%, a double-leveraged
(L = 2) ETF should return 10%, whereas an inverse ETF (L = −1) should return -5%.
I explain in detail the exact trading motives of ETFs when I analyze the decomposition
of ETF demand in section 1.5. I also show that leverage rebalancing can exacerbate
market movements and analyze the risks of trading against leveraged ETFs in sections
1.5.2 and 1.6. ETFs are limited to trade in the futures contracts in a mechanical way
to minimize their tracking errors. This can lead to a reduction in price informativeness
and an increase in the futures premium.
9Also for oil in April 2020.
10This is how VIX, gas, oil, and many silver and gold ETFs invest. Some silver and gold ETFs hold
physical silver or gold: I exclude these from the analysis since they do not rebalance on a daily basis,
but physically hold the assets.
11There are also VIX ETFs that invest in fourth to seventh-month futures contracts but their share
is much lower. I analyze these in section 1.12.10 in the Appendix.
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1.3.3 Summary statistics
Figure 1.12 in the Appendix shows the term structure of futures prices for several
markets. The term structure of VIX futures is in contango (futures larger than spot)
78% of the time. The picture for the gas market is similar. Generally, after the
introduction of ETFs, the futures curve shifts upwards and becomes more concave for
VIX and gas.
[Table 1.2 about here]
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for the VIX market. The distribution of VIX
futures is positively-skewed, particularly for short maturities. The return on the largest
long VIX ETF (VXX) is -17 basis points (bps) per day: short-selling the ETF generates
an annualized return of nearly 54%, consistent with the idea that investors are willing
to pay a premium to hedge against volatility shocks. The average slope of the short end
of the futures term structure steepened after the introduction of ETFs. The first-month
futures basis12 went up from 0.06 to 0.79, and the spread between the second and the
first-month futures contracts increased from 0.46 to 1.10. The increase is also large if I
exclude the 2008–2009 financial crisis from the sample. The slopes of other parts of the
curve that are not influenced by ETFs, are little changed. The plot in Figure 1.2 shows
that the realized VIX futures premium (the return for an investor who sells short a fully
collateralized VIX futures contract and holds it until maturity Ft,T−FT,TFt,T ) has increased
since the introduction of ETFs for the most ETF-influenced maturities. The rise is
particularly pronounced for one and two month futures contracts. The increase is even
more striking if I include the 2008–2009 financial crisis (Figure 1.13 in the Appendix).
These results provide initial evidence that the introduction of ETFs is related to the
increase in premiums embedded in VIX futures prices.
[Figure 1.2 about here]
1.3.4 Types of traders in the futures market
Empirically, ETFs are usually net buyers of futures contracts, whereas managed money
(usually hedge funds) takes the opposite side of the trade. Figure 1.3 shows the weekly
positions of different types of investors in VIX and gas markets. The graphs show that
12For convenience, I call Ft,T −St basis throughout the paper. Since the VIX futures term structure
is in contango most of the time, it is more convenient to work with Ft,T − St rather than St − Ft,T . T
is maturity, Ft,T is time t’s price of a futures contract expiring at T , St is time t’s spot price.
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leveraged money (mostly hedge funds) is consistently short VIX futures after 2009,
whereas asset managers and dealers are mostly net long.13 In the gas market, dealers
(swap positions) are, on average, net long futures, whereas managed money takes the
opposite side and provides liquidity. The bottom left panel of Figure 1.3 shows that
dealers’ positions for VIX match pretty closely the net positions of ETFs over time:
the correlation is around 84%. For gas, ETF positions can be identified with net swap
positions as shown in the bottom right panel. Since ETFs constitute a smaller share
of the market for silver, gold, and oil, their net positions cannot be identified very
precisely with net swap positions. In the next section, I study the impact of ETFs on
prices in the largest ETF-dominated market.
[Figure 1.3 about here]
1.4 The impact of ETFs on futures prices in the VIX mar-
ket
In this section, I analyze the impact of ETFs on futures prices in the VIX market, as
this market has the largest proportion of ETFs, and sees ETF trading volume dwarf
that of the underlying asset.
1.4.1 Details on VIX
VIX is an important asset for investors because it provides a natural hedge against
market downturns. V IX2t is a portfolio of options that measures risk-neutral expec-
tation of realized variance of the S&P 500 Index return (assuming no jumps) over
the next month: V IX2t = E
Q
t (Rvart,t+30).14 In a world with jumps, V IX2t mea-
sures risk-neutral entropy of the S&P 500 Index return as Martin (2015) demonstrates:
V IX2t = logE
Q
t Rt→t+30 − EQt logRt→t+30, where Rt→t+30 is the gross return on the
S&P 500 Index over the next 30 days. Thus, by construction, VIX increases in tur-
bulent times when volatility spikes and aggregate economic uncertainty increases. An
important feature of the market for VIX futures, which distinguishes it from traditional
futures markets, is that there is no cost-of-carry relationship because the spot asset is,
in essence, not physically tradable. Since the portfolio of options underlying the VIX
13The names of the different groups of traders are the same as in the classification in the Traders
in Financial Futures (TFF) report by the CFTC. Leveraged funds typically consist of hedge funds and
other proprietary traders.
14As realized variance is a consistent estimator of quadratic variation (see, e.g., Cheng, 2019).
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calculation is changing almost continuously, in practical terms it is impossible to trade
VIX due to large transaction costs. The simplest way to get exposure is by trading
VIX futures.
The market for VIX derivatives has grown considerably over the past decade and has
become the largest market for volatility for short maturities (see, e.g., Mixon and Onur,
2015). As of 2018, the total notional value of VIX futures exceeded that of variance
swaps for maturities of less than one year. The total dollar volatility exposure (in terms
of vega) of VIX futures was close to $8 billion (bn) per month. Part of the massive
increase in volatility investing was due to the rise of ETFs, which provided a simple
and cost-efficient way to invest in VIX.
The inception of ETFs was a market innovation that allowed many retail investors
who could not easily trade volatility before (due to margin requirements or the need to
manage futures expiration dates), to enter the VIX futures market. Data from Thomson
Reuters Institutional Holdings shows that the fraction of institutional holdings in VIX
ETFs was less than 24%, on average, for the period 2009–2018. Figure 1.14 in the
Appendix shows the large increase in open interest of VIX futures after the introduction
of ETFs, particularly for the first and second-month contracts. The case of VIX provides
a useful laboratory to study the effects of commoditization of trading strategies and
the consequences of letting retail investors enter more sophisticated markets. The
lessons learned from the VIX market can be useful to predict the effects of larger ETF
presence in other markets that were less accessible to retail investors before, e.g., less-
liquid corporate bond markets. The excessive inflow of new capital through ETFs could
have pushed VIX futures prices away from their fundamental values. This problem is
particularly pronounced for VIX given the inability of investors to replicate the futures
contract by trading the spot.
1.4.2 Futures price – fundamental or not?
The benefit of studying futures-based ETFs is that I can directly test whether the
underlying futures price contains more information about fundamentals, or is biased due
to non-fundamental noise. I do this by testing whether the futures price is informative
about the fundamental spot price at maturity, or is influenced by premiums.
Historically, the market for VIX futures has been in contango most of the time as
shown in Figure 1.12 in the Appendix. First, I analyze whether the contango predicts
fundamental spot price changes to maturity, or is more informative about the non-
fundamental futures premium. Using the identity Ft,T − St = Ft,T − FT,T + ST − St
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and without making any assumptions, I check whether time t’s basis Ft,T −St predicts
subsequent changes of the spot VIX St until maturity T (fundamental information),
or the futures Ft,T (non-fundamental premium), or both. The left panel of Figure 1.4
illustrates the idea. I run two simple predictive regressions:15
ST − St = α1 + β1 · (Ft,T − St) + 1,t, (1.1)
FT,T − Ft,T = α2 + β2 · (Ft,T − St) + 2,t. (1.2)
By subtracting equation (1.2) from equation (1.1), we see that β1− β2 should be equal
to one. Table 1.3 shows the results from the two regressions. The estimates show that
a larger basis (higher futures compared with spot) predicts negative change for short-
maturity futures, i.e. the futures will drop at expiration. The estimates are the largest
in absolute value for one month and are monotonically decreasing for longer maturities.
In contrast, the basis for short-maturities does not predict spot changes.
[Figure 1.4 and Table 1.3 about here]
The picture is the opposite for the basis for longer maturities: it positively predicts
subsequent spot changes. The front end of the VIX futures’ curve could be influenced
by ETFs, whereas the long end of the curve would not be, since ETFs trade mostly
in the first and the second-month futures. The fact that the basis for one and two
months predicts futures but not spot, and in contrast a longer-term basis predicts spot
but not futures, shows that short-term basis could be influenced by non-fundamental
risk premiums that are unrelated to fundamental realized spot changes. These results
are consistent with the findings of Aït-Sahalia et al. (2018) who show that only risk on
the short-end of the term structure of variance swaps is priced. Next, I use the high
frequency of ETF positions and futures price changes to study whether ETF demand
is related to the fact that ETF-influenced futures maturities are less informative about
fundamentals.
1.4.3 ETF demand impact on futures prices
To see if the premium in VIX futures prices is related to ETFs, I study the effect of
ETF rebalancing demand on different parts of the futures curve. I run the following
15Running regressions (1.1) and (1.2) with ST − St, FT,T − Ft,T and Ft,T − St scaled by the time
to maturity of the futures yields similar results. The results are also unchanged if I control for lags of
VIX, time to maturity of the futures, liquidity, open interest, and other factors. To address the concern
that the mean-reversion of volatility is driving the results, I run the regressions for the period before
ETFs and find statistically significant predictive power of one and two-months basis for spot prices. In
the Appendix (Figure 1.15), I present the results of similar regressions for other futures markets.
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regression:16
bt,i = α+ β1D$,allt,i + β2bHt,i + γCtrlt,i + t,i, (1.3)
where bt,i is either the absolute basis for maturity one month (bt,1 = Ft,T1 − St), or
the spread between two subsequent futures (most results are with the second-month
spread: bt,2 = Ft,T2−Ft,T1). In some specifications bt,i is the relative basis or the relative
spread (bt,1 =
Ft,T1−St
St
, bt,2 =
Ft,T2−Ft,T1
Ft,T1
). St is the spot price, Ft,T1 is the price of the
first futures contract and Ft,T2 is the price of the second one. I use basis as the main
dependent variable, instead of the raw futures price, to isolate price movements mostly
related to premiums as opposed to the spot price. I analyze separately first-month basis
and spread, instead of first and second-month bases (as in Mixon and Onur, 2015) to
disentangle the local effects of ETF demand on different parts of the curve. Since the
second-month basis is the first-month basis plus spread (Ft,T2 − St = Ft,T2 − Ft,T1 +
Ft,T1 − St = bt,2 + bt,1), using the second-month basis as the dependent variable could
capture some of the effects of ETF demand on the first-month basis. Therefore, I focus
on spread and control for first-month ETF demand, to isolate the residual price impact
between the first- and the second-month contracts. In the Appendix (Table 1.13), I
also present the results for the second-month basis.
D$,allt,i is the net dollar demand from all ETFs for maturity i at time t computed as
the sum of changes in dollar holdings from t − 1 to t for all ETFs. To isolate the
effect of a larger share of ETF demand from a pure increase in the size of the overall
market, I normalize the demand from ETFs by market capitalization. I use the scaled
demand as the main explanatory variable: D
$,all
t,i
Mkt capt,i
= D
all
t,i
OIt,i
, where Dallt,i is demand in
terms of number of contracts and OIt,i is the open interest for futures with maturity i.
Running the main regressions with Dallt,i instead of
Dallt,i
OIt,i
also produces statistically and
economically significant estimates.
bHt,i is the basis or spread of a hedge asset. The hedge asset is a synthetic VIX futures
contract with the same maturity as the traded one but not influenced by ETF demand
– section 1.4.4 explains in detail the exact replication. It absorbs any asset-specific
shocks. Ctrlt are controls for spot price,17 open interest, days to maturity, return
on the benchmark, variance of the benchmark, and liquidity differences between the
futures and the hedge asset. I measure liquidity differences by the difference in relative
bid-ask spreads between the futures contract and the hedge asset. Other measures of
16The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (see, e.g., Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and the
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (see, e.g., Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) tests showed that basis, EFG,
and demand from ETFs are all stationary.
17I perform a robustness test replacing spot VIX with VSTOXX (the VIX analogue for the EURO
STOXX 50 index) similar to Mixon and Onur (2015) and find similar results to the ones in the main
text.
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liquidity produce similar results. When the dependent variable is bt,2, I also control for
D$,allt,1 . If ETF demand has an impact on futures prices, β1 6= 0.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 1.4. For comparison, I standardize all
independent variables. Columns 1 and 6 show that one standard deviation rise in ETF
demand as fraction of total market capitalization (2.42% for the first-month futures
contract and 5.73% for the second) increases the front-month basis by 0.26 volatility
points (33% in relative terms given the mean for the period before ETFs) and the
spread by 0.17 volatility points (15% in relative terms). The estimates change slightly
once I include several controls as seen from columns 2 and 7. The fact that β1 > 0 is
evidence of the impact of ETF demand on the price of underlying futures contracts.
[Table 1.4 about here]
One concern about using absolute basis and spread is that, on average, spot VIX and
VIX futures were lower in 2014–2018 than they were in 2009–2013. Thus, absolute
quantities in different time periods may not be comparable. Columns 3 and 8 of Panel
A present the results with absolute basis scaled by St and spread scaled by Ft,T1 –
essentially, measuring the slopes of different parts of the futures curve. Using relative
basis and spread would also allow me to compare the results across several markets
in section 1.7. The estimates show that one standard deviation rise in ETF demand
increases the basis by 1.41% and the spread by 0.48%, respectively. Using absolute ETF
demand instead of demand scaled by market capitalization, gives even higher estimates,
as shown in columns 4 and 9. Another possible concern is that the relationship between
futures prices and ETF demand could be driven by different time to expiration. Scaling
the relative basis and spread by days to maturity (columns 9 and 10 of Table 1.14 in
the Appendix) shows that this is not the case: the coefficients are still positive and
highly statistically significant.
One potential problem with the contemporaneous regressions is that both bt,i and
D$t,i
Mkt capt,i
depend on contemporaneous futures returns rF1t and rF2t (as I show in section
1.5). Columns 5 and 10 present the results of a regression where D$,allt,i is calculated
using lagged returns on the two futures and the ETF benchmark instead of the con-
temporaneous ones. The coefficients are still positive and statistically significant but
lower in magnitude. This is mostly driven by the fact that the benchmark return is not
very persistent, and is slightly negatively correlated at the first lag.
The effects of ETF demand are significant only for the respective maturities in which
ETFs invest, but there is limited evidence of significant changes in the slopes of other
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parts of the curve: the estimates for the spreads of third, fourth, fifth and sixth-month
futures contracts are mostly insignificant.18
1.4.4 The ETF futures gap
Panel A of Table 1.4 illustrates that an increase in ETF demand pushes up short-term
basis and spread. Although the OLS regressions control for a large set of observable
characteristics, the estimates could be biased due to endogeneity if both ETF demand
and futures prices are influenced by a fundamental omitted variable. To address this
concern, I disentangle the non-fundamental component of prices and analyze whether
the effect of ETF demand manifests itself through an increase in that component.
One of the benefits of analyzing the VIX market is that I can directly measure devia-
tions in the futures price due to ETF demand by constructing a synthetic VIX futures
contract from a market with no ETFs, and comparing its price to the price of the
ETF-influenced VIX futures contract. The idea is simple. I calculate EQt (ST ) (Q is
the risk-neutral measure) from option prices without making any parametric or distri-
butional assumptions. By comparing Ft,T and EQt (ST ), I can isolate the component of
the VIX futures premium that is different between the futures market and the options
market. Then, I test directly which of the two futures prices (the ETF-influenced one
Ft,T , or the synthetically constructed one EQt (ST )) is a less-biased estimate of the fun-
damental spot price at expiration. To illustrate the approach, note that basis can be
decomposed as follows:19
Ft,T − St = Ft,T − EQt (ST )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ETF futures gap
+ EQt (ST )− ST︸ ︷︷ ︸
Realized V IX premium
+ ST − St.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spot V IX change
(1.4)
The right panel of Figure 1.4 illustrates the split. The decomposition shows that time
t’s basis consists of the ETF futures gap (EFG), the realized VIX premium (RVP),
and the realized spot VIX change. The element of interest in this decomposition is
the EFG. This component is different from zero if there is market segmentation or
other frictions. I show that ETF demand manifests itself through an increase in this
non-fundamental part of the futures price in sections 1.4.4.3 and 1.4.4.4.
18The results for VIX ETFs investing in midterm maturities of the futures (section 1.12.10 of the
Appendix) show that their demand is significant for bt,5, bt,6 but less significant for bt,4 and bt,7.
19Note that spread can be decomposed as follows: Ft,T2 − Ft,T1 = Ft,T2 − St − (Ft,T1 − St) =
(EFGt,T2 − EFGt,T1) + (RV Pt,T2 −RV Pt,T1) + (ST2 − ST1).
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1.4.4.1 Calculating the EFG
To calculate the EFG for maturity T1, I measure EQt (ST1) = E
Q
t (V IXT1→T2) using the
definition of variance:20
VarQt (V IXT1→T2) = E
Q
t
(
V IX2T1→T2
)
−
(
EQt (V IXT1→T2)
)2
⇐⇒ EQt (V IXT1→T2) =
√
EQt (V IX2T1→T2)−Var
Q
t (V IXT1→T2).
(1.5)
The first term under the square root can be calculated using portfolios of S&P 500
Index options with maturities T1 and T2 = T1 + 30 days that replicate V IX2t→T1 and
V IX2t→T2 , respectively:
(T2 − T1)EQt (V IX2T1→T2) = (T2 − t)(V IX2t→T2)− (T1 − t)(V IX2t→T1)
⇐⇒ EQt (V IX2T1→T2) =
(T2 − t)V IX2t→T2 − (T1 − t)V IX2t→T1
T2 − T1 .
(1.6)
Alternatively, one can use variance swap prices to estimate EQt (V IX2T1→T2). By using
the definition of VIX as a measure of risk-neutral entropy of the S&P 500 Index return,
it is straightforward to show that the result is also valid with jumps (the proof is in the
Appendix, section 1.12.1). Full details about the empirical calculation of the synthetic
VIX futures are in sections 1.12.1 – 1.12.4 of the Appendix.
The second term under the square root in equation (1.5) can be found using a static
portfolio of out-of-the-money (OTM) VIX options and applying a result from Bree-
den and Litzenberger (1978) similar to Martin (2017) (derivation details are in the
Appendix, section 1.12.2):
VarQt (V IXT1→T2) = 2Rf,t→T1
(∫ Ft,T1
K=0
putt,T1(K)dK +
∫ ∞
K=Ft,T1
callt,T1(K)dK
)
.
(1.7)
An important point is that the decompositions in (1.5), (1.6), and (1.7) rely on no
parametric or distributional assumptions about the S&P 500 Index or VIX.
[Figure 1.5 about here]
Figure 1.5 shows the dynamics of the EFG for maturities at 1–4 months.21 The graphs
illustrate that the EFG for one month and two months was close to zero before 2009, but
20Similar to Carr and Wu (2006) and Dong (2016).
21Unfortunately, there are often no VIX options with expirations of five, seven, and eight months
and it is thus impossible to calculate VarQt (V IXT1→T2) without interpolating the volatility surface.
The quality of the options data for six months and nine months is also often poor. For these reasons,
the graphs show the EFG for 1–4 months.
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fluctuated strongly after that and was mostly positive for two months. The first-month
EFG is 13.2% per year, and the second-month EFG is 23.7% per year, on average, for
2007–2018. The weighted average EFG from one and two months futures contracts is
18.5% per year. The plots indicate that the introduction of ETFs, especially leveraged
ETFs, is positively correlated with the increase in the short-term gap.
1.4.4.2 Possible explanations for the EFG
Several factors could explain the EFG. First, there is a discretization error when com-
puting VarQt (V IXT1→T2) in equation (1.7), since a continuum of strikes is not observable
in practice, and the integral is approximated with a sum. However, due to the con-
vexity of call and put option prices, this error would bias the risk-neutral variance
downwards, pushing the EFG even higher. Therefore, my calculations would underes-
timate the true gap. I perform several robustness checks to deal with truncation and
discretization errors as described in section 1.12.3 of the Appendix.
The second possible explanation is that, in order to replicate EQt (V IX2T1→T2) and
VarQt (V IXT1→T2), it is necessary to trade deep OTM options with high bid-ask spreads.
Lack of liquidity in those options and higher transaction costs could explain part of
the gap. One way to solve this problem is to replace the portfolios of options replicat-
ing V IX2t→T1 and V IX
2
t→T2 with forward variance swap prices. Using variance swaps
instead of option portfolios produces similar estimates of the EFG, even after control-
ling for jumps. Figure 1.16 in the Appendix displays the results using this approach.
Moreover, if liquidity differences were the main reason for the gap, then the gap should
have already been positive before the introduction of ETFs. However, the plots show
that the gap was close to zero or even slightly negative before ETFs were introduced.
Furthermore, if liquidity differences were the main reason for the gap, one would expect
longer-dated and less liquid maturities to have more pronounced gaps. The dynamics
of EFG for maturities at 3 and 4 months shows that this is not the case. To account
for market liquidity, I include relative bid-ask spreads in the EFG regressions.
Another plausible explanation for the gap could be the difference in margin require-
ments between futures and options markets. The margin-based explanation alone would
struggle to explain why the gap takes both positive and negative values, since margins
are unlikely to be higher in the futures market than in the options market (typically,
futures margins are much smaller). However, funding constraints could explain some
of the time variation in the EFG. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Gromb and Vayanos
(2002) show that when arbitrage capital is scarce, price gaps can exist and persist.
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Investors may scale back positions during crisis times and might be reluctant to en-
gage in arbitrage if fearful of undesired liquidation of positions at a loss, in situations
where the price discrepancy widened. Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) argue that price
discrepancies between two identical assets should depend on the shadow cost of capital.
Based on these theories, I include the TED spread (similar to Barras and Malkhozov,
2016) as a control in the EFG regressions to account for funding liquidity constraints.
[Figure 1.6 about here]
The fourth possible reason for the gap is the presence of ETFs in the VIX futures
market, but the lack of such funds in the market for options or variance swaps. As I show
in section 1.11.3 in the Appendix, the daily rebalancing of ETFs can bias futures prices
since ETF counterparties demand a premium for providing liquidity and trading in the
opposite direction. Figure 1.6 shows that the EFG and the rebalancing demand from
ETFs move together. Due to the mechanics of ETF rebalancing, prices in the futures
market can be different from the same prices in the options/variance swaps market
before the expiration of the futures. However, at maturity T1, both EQT1(V IXT1→T2)
and FT1,T1 are equal to V IXT1→T2 .
1.4.4.3 Regressions of the EFG
Panel B of Table 1.4 presents the estimates from a regression of the EFG on ETF
demand:
EFGt,i = α+ β1D$,allt,i + β2EFGt−1,i + γCtrlt,i + t,i. (1.8)
I add lagged EFG to account for auto-correlation and TED spread to control for fund-
ing liquidity constraints. The results from columns 1 and 5 show that one standard
deviation rise in ETF demand as a proportion of market capitalization is related to a
contemporaneous increase in the EFG by 1.21% for the first month and by 0.57% for
the second month. ETF demand explains 24–26% of the daily variation in the EFG.
After controlling for several variables, the regression estimates decrease to 0.97% and
0.45%, respectively (columns 2 and 6), but are still strongly statistically significant.
The effects are robust to using demand not scaled by open interest (columns 3 and 7),
and are greater in magnitude. One standard deviation rise in the ETF demand cal-
culated with lagged returns predicts 0.77% increase in the first-month gap and 0.38%
in the second-month gap as seen from columns 4 and 8. The positive and statistically
significant estimates show that the rebalancing of ETFs increases the non-fundamental
component of prices. The EFG is related to liquidity changes: the first-month gap to
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market liquidity, whereas the second-month gap to funding liquidity. A standard devi-
ation rise in relative bid-ask spreads increases the first-month gap by 0.88%, whereas
a standard deviation rise in TED spread substantially raises the second-month gap by
1.46%. These results suggest that part of the gap could be due to arbitrageurs’ inabil-
ity to close positions easily in times of crisis when liquidity dries up, or could be due
to funding constraints consistent with Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) and Gromb and
Vayanos (2002).
Table 1.16 and Table 1.17 in the Appendix present some robustness checks. The results
show that ETF demand has a greater effect in periods of high volatility, as seen from
columns 1–2 and 4–5 of Table 1.16. The impact of ETF demand is robust to controlling
for the returns on the Fama–French five factors and momentum. Columns 7–8 show
that the gap was related to liquidity before the introduction of ETFs. Table 1.17 shows
that the positive effect of ETF demand is robust to adding lagged demand. There is
some evidence of reversals as shown by the negative estimates on the lagged demand
from columns 3 and 4.
I also check whether current ETF futures gaps are related to realized futures returns.
Table 1.18 in the Appendix shows that a higher EFG decreases realized returns: a 1%
increase in the EFG decreases the realized return by 22 bps for the first-month futures
contract and by 144 bps for the second.
1.4.4.4 EFG – fundamental or not?
The existence of the ETF futures gap is evidence that the risk-neutral measure imputed
from option prices (Q) gives a different forecast of the realized spot price at maturity
compared to the risk-neutral measure from the futures market. However, a priori,
the mere presence of the gap does not mean that the futures price Ft,T is a poor
estimate of the fundamental value. It is entirely possible that price discovery takes place
in the ETF-influenced market, and therefore, the gap exists because of fundamental
information about the realized spot instead of non-fundamental price pressure in the
futures market. However, if that was the case, the ETF-influenced futures would be
a better predictor of the realized spot price at maturity. Testing this prediction is
straightforward.
[Figure 1.7 about here]
The empirical evidence shows that the ETF-influenced futures contract is a poor pre-
dictor of realized spot changes, whereas the synthetic futures contract EQt (ST ) is a
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better predictor. Figure 1.7 shows the time series of the mean squared error (MSE)
from a prediction of realized VIX based on EQt (ST ) and Ft,T . The plots show that
the MSE of the synthetic futures contract is almost always below that of the traded
futures contract. Table 1.19 in the Appendix shows that the basis of the synthetic
futures contract is a better predictor of realized spot changes than the basis of the
traded futures contract. The coefficient for the first-month futures of 0.25 is highly
statistically significant compared to the insignificant estimate of 0.02 from Table 1.3.
The estimate for the second futures of 0.55 is also highly statistically significant and
larger compared to the insignificant coefficient of 0.27 from Table 1.3. These facts sug-
gest that the EFG arises due to non-fundamental price pressure, consistent with the
findings for basis from Mixon and Onur (2015). Compared with their paper, I test the
price pressure hypothesis more thoroughly by estimating the non-fundamental part of
basis and testing directly whether it reflects information about the fundamental value.
A potential concern is that, even though ETF demand does not directly influence
the VIX options market, prices of options could be disrupted if investors hedge the
futures exposure with options. To test this, I run regressions of basis (EQt (ST1) − St)
and spread (EQt (ST2)− EQt (ST1)) calculated using the synthetic futures price, on ETF
demand. If ETF price pressure affects the synthetic futures price (directly or indirectly),
the coefficient on ETF demand should be statistically significant. The results from
Table 1.20 in the Appendix show that this is not the case. This fact illustrates that
ETF demand manifests itself through an increase in the non-fundamental component of
prices (EFG) and has no impact on the more fundamental, synthetic futures contract.
Another concern is that maybe the EFG arises due to price pressure in the VIX options
market after 2009, and ETF demand just happens to be correlated with this pressure.
To address this concern, I add the hedging pressure from the options market as a
control in the EFG regressions (the last two columns of Table 1.17). I measure the
pressure in terms of delta-hedging. For each day, I calculate the delta-hedging demand
as −∑Mj=1 ∆t,jOIt,jFt,Ti , whereM is the total number of options on the futures expiring
at Ti, ∆t,j is the Black-Scholes delta of option j, and OIt,j is the total open interest for
option j. The minus in front of the expression captures the idea that if the total delta
in the options market is positive, the hedging demand would be negative (agents would
sell the underlying to hedge the positive-delta option position). I also calculate gamma-
hedging demand to account for second-order effects. The estimates from columns 5 and
6 show that the positive and statistically significant effects of ETF demand are robust
to including the measures of hedging pressure from the options market.
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Anecdotal evidence from my discussions with several hedge fund traders suggests that
hedge funds are replicating the VIX futures with a portfolio of options and trading
the difference between the two. Figure 1.17 in the Appendix illustrates that leveraged
money (mostly hedge funds) is generally short VIX futures after 2011, when EFG starts
to be positive. Table 1.21 in the Appendix shows that a 100% increase in the EFG is
correlated with a $30 million decrease in hedge funds’ positions. In practice, however,
hedge funds usually do not construct the exact replicating portfolio. They trade a
subset of all options to avoid paying large bid-ask spreads in deep OTM options. This
could explain why the ETF demand pressure does not significantly impact the synthetic
futures. During turbulent times, the profit made on the hedge portfolio might not be
enough to offset the losses from the futures market, and hedge funds could be forced
to close down futures positions at a loss. The fact that the gap is strongly related to
measures of funding and market liquidity confirms these facts. In section 1.11.3, I show
that imperfect replication of the futures contract leads to a higher gap.
The existence of the EFG shows that the VIX futures market is segmented from the
S&P 500 Index and VIX options markets. Bardgett et al. (2019) also illustrates that
S&P 500 Index options and VIX derivatives have different information about volatility
at different time horizons, which could be interpreted as evidence of segmentation
between these markets.
1.5 Source of the EFG. Decomposition of ETF demand
To understand the source of the ETF impact on futures prices, I decompose the rebal-
ancing demand from these funds into three major components: calendar rebalancing,
leverage rebalancing and flow rebalancing.
1.5.1 Calendar rebalancing
Since futures have an expiration date, to maintain their exposure, VIX and commodity
ETFs need to roll out of the maturing contracts before these contracts expire and
initiate new positions in longer-maturity contracts. Calendar rebalancing is mechanical
and arises exogenously due to futures expiration. Most ETFs in VIX and commodity
markets are based on a benchmark that is rolling from the first-month futures contract
to the second one over a period of several days. For VIX, the benchmark is a constant-
maturity weighted average position: every day, a typical long ETF invests fraction
αt of its wealth in the first-month futures contract, and 1 − αt fraction in the second
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one, s.t. αtT1 + (1 − αt)T2 ≈ 21 days. T1 is the time to maturity of the first-month
futures contract in business days, T2 is the time to maturity of the second one, and
21 is the typical number of business days in the rebalancing period (month). For
example, suppose that today (t) T1 = 21 days, T2 = 42 days and consider a long ETF:
αt = 1, 1 − αt = 0. Tomorrow, both futures contracts are closer to maturity: T1 =
20 days, T2 = 41 days, so to keep the duration of the portfolio constant at (roughly)
one month, the ETF allocates wealth as follows: αt+1 = αt − 121 = 2021 , 1− αt+1 = 121 .
After 21 business days, T1 = 0 days, T2 = 21 days, the long ETF has completely
rolled out of the expiring contract and is 100% invested in the new one month contract,
and then the cycle starts again. More information on the benchmark of VIX ETFs is
available in S&P500 (2019).
[Figure 1.8 about here]
Calendar rebalancing of ETFs can be seen from the dynamics of open interest in the
VIX futures market.22 Before ETFs were introduced, the change in open interest did
not have a clear pattern. The left panel of Figure 1.8 shows typical dynamics before the
introduction of ETFs. However, in the post-ETF period, the change in open interest
follows a typical pattern, as shown in the right panel. For example, consider the four-
month VIX futures in November 2012. Open interest spikes as soon as it becomes
a two-months futures contract in January 2013 and ETFs start to buy it. When it
becomes a one-month futures contract in February 2013, ETFs start to sell it and open
interest declines. The increase in the number of contracts for the two-months futures
is roughly equal to the decrease in the number of contracts for the one-month futures.
The hump-shaped dynamics can be well identified with net ETF positions.
Since ETFs passively follow the exact rolling rules of the indices they track in order
to minimize the tracking error, they have a large hedging demand during the rolling
period. If ETF counterparties have a limited capacity to absorb this demand, they
would require a premium to meet ETF trades. That premium would be incorporated
into futures prices.
1.5.2 Leverage rebalancing
Another important feature of futures-based ETFs in VIX and commodity markets is
that many of them are leveraged, or inverse. This means that it is possible to estimate
22Calendar rebalancing is not perfectly predictable as the exact rebalancing amount depends on the
assets under management (AUM) of the ETF, which in turn depend on the contemporaneous realized
return as I show in section 1.5.3.
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the impact of leverage-induced trading on prices. Leverage rebalancing is mechanical
and arises exogenously due to the maintenance of a constant leverage at a high fre-
quency. Leveraged ETFs use derivatives to provide multiples of the daily return on
their benchmarks.23 Inverse ETFs provide short market exposure for investors who
otherwise could be constrained to short-sell. Subsequently, I refer to both leveraged
and inverse ETFs as leveraged ETFs since inverse funds can be thought of as a special
type of leveraged funds with a negative leverage. It is important to stress that the
leverage L is fixed in the prospectus for each fund, and is constant over time. Another
crucial point is that leveraged funds seek to deliver their objective on a daily basis, and
the leverage over longer periods will be different from L due to daily compounding.
A leveraged fund could therefore attract mostly short-horizon investors, as noted in
a typical fund’s prospectus (see, e.g., ProShares, 2019). The proportion of leveraged
ETFs in commodity markets, and in VIX, have risen significantly over the last eight
years. These ETFs are also quite common in equity and fixed income markets.
With a leverage of L, leveraged ETFs aim to return Lrt+1 every day, where rt+1 is the
daily return on the benchmark from t to t+ 1.24 AUM At+1 at time t+ 1 should then
be At+1 = At(1 + Lrt+1). An important feature of leveraged ETFs is that, in order
to maintain a constant leverage, they always have to rebalance in the same direction
as the benchmark. This is true for both long (L > 0) and inverse (L < 0) ETFs.
The derivation is straightforward. At time t, the exposure of a leveraged ETF is LAt.
One period later, the actual exposure is LAt(1 + rt+1), whereas the desired exposure
is LAt+1 = LAt(1 + Lrt+1). Hence, to maintain a constant leverage, the ETF has to
rebalance by
δt+1 = LAt+1 − LAt(1 + rt+1) = L(L− 1)Atrt+1. (1.9)
For example, investing $10 in a double-leveraged (L = 2) ETF means that the ETF buys
$20 worth of futures by borrowing another $10. Suppose that the price goes up by 10%,
then the futures position is worth $22. To maintain the leverage constant at 2, the ETF
has to borrow additional $2 and use it to buy $2(= L(L−1)Atrt+1 = 2·(2−1)·$10·10%)
of futures contracts. This changes the leverage to 2 = 24/12.
23Most leveraged ETFs use swaps to obtain a levered exposure. The swaps’ exposure is transmitted
to the futures market by the swap counterparties. Leverage rebalancing throughout the paper focuses
on the rebalancing to maintain a constant leverage with respect to the benchmark but ignores the
leverage implicit in futures positions for simplicity.
24Leveraged funds seek to deliver L multiplied by the daily performance of the benchmark index
before fees and expenses. With fees and expenses, their effective leverage can be slightly different from
L. The analysis is largely unchanged, however, as L can be replaced with Lˆ = L(1− φ) where φ is the
tracking error due to fees and expenses.
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As L(L − 1) > 0 for any leverage L 6∈ [0, 1], equation (1.9) shows that rebalancing
demand is of the same sign as rt+1. This means that trading demands by long and
inverse ETFs do not offset, but instead reinforce each other. Leveraged ETFs could
magnify price changes, creating a possible feedback channel for prices. To quantify the
potential impact of leverage rebalancing of all N ETFs in a given market, I calculate the
leverage rebalancing multiplier Γt =
∑N
j=1 Lj(Lj − 1)Aj,t. The red line in Figure 1.1
shows Γt as a proportion of the whole market across several assets. This number is
around 0.60 for the VIX market in February 2018, which means that if the benchmark
spiked by 10%, 6% of the total market capitalization would be the additional buying
demand from all ETFs due to leverage rebalancing. The benchmark increased by more
than 90% towards market close on 5 February 2018, which means that more than 54%
of the market was allocated to buying VIX futures contracts following the spike.
Leverage rebalancing is, essentially, a momentum trade, as it involves buying after price
increase and selling after price decrease. Arbitrageurs who trade against ETFs are then
contrarian and carry the risk of meeting ETF demand in case of large price changes.
As I show in the next sections, arbitrageurs demand a premium for bearing this risk. If
there are flows ut+1, the total rebalancing demand by a leveraged ETF from t to t+ 1
becomes δt+1 = L(L− 1)Atrt+1 + Lut+1.
1.5.3 Total ETF demand decomposition
To understand the motives of ETFs’ trading, I calculate the total daily rebalancing
demand by a futures-based ETF with a leverage of L (L = 1 corresponds to a non-
leveraged ETF) during the rolling period of K days (K = 21 for VIX, K = 5 for most
commodity markets). Full derivation details are in section 1.12.5 of the Appendix. In
dollar terms, the total rebalancing demand is:
D$t+1,1 = −
L
K
At(1 + Lrt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
calendar rebalancing
+αtAtL(L− 1)rt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
leverage rebalancing
+ (αt − 1
K
)Lut+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow rebalancing
+
+ αt(1− αˆt)LAt(rF2t+1 − rF1t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
remainder
,
(1.10)
where rF1t+1, r
F2
t+1 are the net returns on the first-month and the second-month futures
contracts, respectively, αˆt =
αtFt,T1
αtFt,T1+(1−αt)Ft,T2
, and rt+1 =
αtFt+1,T1+(1−αt)Ft+1,T2
αtFt,T1+(1−αt)Ft,T2
− 1 =
αˆtr
F1
t+1 + (1 − αˆt)rF2t+1 is the net return on the benchmark. Equation (1.10) illustrates
that the total rebalancing demand can be decomposed into four components: calendar
rebalancing due to the roll from the first-month to the second-month futures contract,
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leverage rebalancing to maintain a constant leverage L, flow rebalancing due to inflows
or outflows, and a remainder. Analogously, the total dollar rebalancing demand for the
second-month futures contract is:
D$t+1,2 =
L
K
At(1 + Lrt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
calendar rebalancing
+ (1− αt)AtL(L− 1)rt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
leverage rebalancing
+ (1− αt + 1
K
)Lut+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow rebalancing
−
− αˆt(1− αt)LAt(rF2t+1 − rF1t+1).︸ ︷︷ ︸
remainder
(1.11)
The total dollar rebalancing of all N ETFs in a given market is: D$, allt+1,1 =
∑N
j=1D
$, j
t+1,1,
D$, allt+1,2 =
∑N
j=1D
$, j
t+1,2.
Calendar rebalancing is exactly the opposite for the first-month and the second-month
futures contracts. In a market where ETFs are net buyers of futures (∑Nj=1 LjAj,t >
0), calendar rebalancing decreases D$,allt+1,1 and increases D
$,all
t+1,2 (except for extreme
realizations of rt+1). Leverage rebalancing is always in the same direction as the realized
return on the benchmark. Inflows (rise in flow rebalancing) increase both D$,allt+1,1 and
D$,allt+1,2, whereas outflows decrease both of them. The effect of the remainder is due
to the fact that the ETF benchmark is a weighted average of the first-month and the
second-month futures contracts. Therefore, the return on the second-month futures
contract can have an impact on prices for the first (and vice versa) through ETF
demand.
On average, in the VIX market, the largest component of rebalancing demand is calen-
dar rebalancing. Flow rebalancing is also large, and sometimes exceeds 75% of the total
rebalancing demand from VIX ETFs, as seen from Figure 1.9. Leverage rebalancing
has been growing since 2012, and represented more than 40% of total demand at the
start of 2018. The remainder has been historically low (less than 5%).
[Figure 1.9 about here]
There are several pieces of evidence that ETFs (irrespective of their legal structure as a
fund or note) follow their benchmarks and rebalance in the way described in this section.
First, anecdotal evidence from my discussions with several ETF managers and autho-
rized participants suggests that ETFs have no incentive to deviate from the benchmark,
as their performance is evaluated based on the tracking error. The compensation for
ETF sponsors arises from fees but not from over-performance or under-performance.
Second, some of the ETFs make their daily holdings publicly observable. The change
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in holdings actually seen matches the one predicted by the rebalancing from equations
(1.10) and (1.11). Third, the implied weekly net positions of ETFs closely follow the
reports from the CFTC, as seen in Figure 1.3, although the match is not perfect be-
cause the CFTC data is weekly and the holdings are aggregated for ETFs and other
dealers.25 Eraker and Wu (2017) also conclude that VIX ETFs track their benchmark
indices fairly well at a daily frequency.
The decomposition of ETF demand developed in this section is flexible, and can accom-
modate various types of ETFs. It can accommodate non-leveraged ETF demand by
setting L = 1 in equations (1.10) and (1.11): for these ETFs, the leverage rebalancing
demand vanishes. The decomposition is not a feature of VIX and commodity ETFs,
but can be used to analyze the impact of ETF demand in other asset classes. All ETFs
have to rebalance due to investor flows and hence, flow rebalancing is present in ETFs
across asset classes. The same holds for leverage rebalancing because leveraged ETFs
are present in equity, fixed income, and foreign exchange markets, albeit with a smaller
proportion. Calendar rebalancing also has a close analogue in equity and fixed income
markets. In VIX and commodity markets, this type of demand arises because futures
contracts expire and ETFs have to substitute the positions with new contracts. Anal-
ogously, equity ETFs have to rebalance in case of inclusions or exclusions of stocks in
the benchmark index. Fixed income ETFs also have to rebalance in a similar way when
underlying bonds expire, or when there is a change in the benchmark index due to the
inclusion or exclusion of bonds. Thus, the effect of different types of ETF rebalancing
can also be studied in other markets. However, it is more beneficial to analyze the
impact of calendar rebalancing in futures-based ETFs, since we can observe the effects
at a daily frequency, than equity or bond ETFs, where this type of rebalancing is much
less frequent.
1.5.4 ETFs can affect prices even in a market with a zero net share
of ETFs
Equations (1.10) and (1.11) illustrate that the composition of the market (the pro-
portion of ETFs with different leverages) matters in determining the total rebalancing
demand and, as a result, the ETF impact on futures prices. For example, consider a
market where the size of all long ETFs is exactly equal to the size of all inverse ETFs
so that the net share of ETFs is zero (∑Nj=1 LjAj,t = 0). However, the net ETF de-
mand in that case will not be zero, even excluding flows. In such a market, there is no
25I describe several robustness checks for the computation of leverage rebalancing in section 1.12.6
in the Appendix.
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remainder or predictable part of calendar rebalancing ( LKAt). The only sources of rebal-
ancing are leverage rebalancing and the leverage-induced part of calendar rebalancing
( 1KAtL2rt+1), both of which can be quite large despite the equal size of all the long
and inverse ETFs. Moreover, since leverage rebalancing is always in the same direction
as the benchmark return, even in an equal-sized market the potential amplification of
price changes can be substantial.
This observation is in contrast to the ordinary view that ETFs have no price impact if
the size of long ETFs is exactly equal to that of inverse ETFs. In fact, providing liquidity
in such a market should be compensated by a large risk premium because the potential
distorting effects of leverage rebalancing are substantial. For example, a market with
$100 of L = 1 ETFs is exactly the same in net demand terms to a market with $100 in
L = 2 ETFs (with a total exposure of 2 · $100) and $100 in L = −1 ETFs. However, the
potential leverage rebalancing in the first market is zero, whereas in the second market,
it is four times the size of the market ($400 = 2 · (2− 1) · $100 + (−1) · (−1− 1) · $100)
multiplied with the realized return on the benchmark. A 10% spike in the benchmark
has no feedback effects in the first market, but leads to an additional buying pressure
of 40% (4 ·10%) of the whole market size due to mechanical leverage rebalancing in the
second market. A prominent real-world example of these effects was the VIX market
in the beginning of February 2018. The net share of ETFs then was close to zero, but
the potential distorting effect due to leverage rebalancing was 60% of the total market
(as shown in Figure 1.1).
1.5.5 Risks posed by ETF demand
Consider arbitrageurs who trade against ETFs in the futures market. If arbitrageurs
are competitive and could hedge perfectly (as in a standard Black-Scholes economy),
ETF demand pressure would have no effect. However, in practice, arbitrageurs cannot
do that as they face incomplete markets because of discrete trading, transaction costs,
jumps in the underlying, and other factors (see, e.g., Garleanu et al., 2009). If arbi-
trageurs cannot perfectly hedge the ETF exposure, they bear non-fundamental risk of
ETF demand shocks on three main fronts.
The first and most important one is leverage rebalancing. This is a relatively new
and under-researched type of rebalancing by institutional investors with a large mar-
ket share. An important observation is that arbitrageurs cannot hedge the leverage
rebalancing of ETFs by matching long and inverse ETF demands, since the two are
of the same sign as rt (since L(L − 1) > 0). In section 1.6, I show that leverage
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rebalancing introduces a source of convexity that is not easy to hedge similar to Gar-
leanu et al. (2009) and hence, exposes arbitrageurs to variance. Intuitively, hedging
the exposure would require frequent trading in a rolling position of one-month and
two-months options on futures, and rebalancing the position on a daily basis (and even
more frequently around market close). Moreover, as I show in section 1.6, in turbulent
times the hedge portfolio would still be imprecise since ETF tracking errors are magni-
fied in those times. Thus, trading against leverage rebalancing exposes arbitrageurs to
unhedgeable risks due to the impossibility of trading continuously in the benchmark,
transaction costs, and tracking errors. Arbitrageurs would require premium for bear-
ing these risks. Leverage rebalancing amplifies price changes by moving prices in the
direction of benchmark returns (rt): positive returns increase Ft,T1 and Ft,T2 , whereas
negative returns decrease both futures prices.
The second area of risk for arbitrageurs is calendar rebalancing. This type of demand
depends on realized returns and is not perfectly predictable. Maintaining a constant
leverage by leveraged ETFs impacts also calendar rebalancing. The non-linear re-
sponse of calendar rebalancing arises because leveraged ETFs track benchmark returns
multiplied with the respective leverage (the term Lrt+1 in the brackets for calendar
rebalancing from equations (1.10) and (1.11)). Hence, calendar rebalancing inherits
the non-linearity of leverage rebalancing (in L, and, in continuous time, in the realized
return rt+1). Thus, part of this rebalancing could also be hard to hedge.
Another feature of calendar rebalancing is that arbitrageurs mechanically bear the risk
of widening price discrepancies and cannot wait until expiration. By trading against
the calendar demand from ETFs, arbitrageurs would typically sell the two-months
futures contract and then buy it back from ETFs once the contract becomes a one-
month futures contract. The right graph in Figure 1.8 illustrates that usually the
increase in open interest for the second-month contract is similar in size to the decrease
in open interest for the first-month contract. This observation shows that the new
contract positions initiated by ETFs when the futures has maturity of two months,
are closed before expiration, once the futures has maturity of one month. This fact
suggests that ETF counterparties also close the futures position before maturity and
bear the risk of widening price gaps. Section 1.11.3 shows that, with a short horizon,
arbitrageurs would require a premium for bearing this risk. Calendar rebalancing would
push up Ft,T2 and push down Ft,T1 over time. Hence, it would decrease the front-month
basis and increase the spread between the first-month and the second-month futures
contracts. Some papers have studied the effects of calendar rebalancing on futures
prices in commodity markets (see, e.g., Tang and Xiong, 2012; Mou, 2011).
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The third area of risk for arbitrageurs is flow rebalancing. The effects of this rebalancing
could be pronounced if inflows happen at times when arbitrageurs are more constrained.
For example, in the case of VIX ETFs, the underlying asset value increases at times
of high marginal utility (when the market crashes). Therefore, inflows to VIX ETFs
when VIX spikes would require arbitrageurs to short-sell VIX futures at a time when
financial constraints could be binding. Risk-averse investors would require a premium
for increasing their short VIX positions at such times. The empirical evidence of fund-
by-fund flows suggests that flows are related to benchmark returns, but the coefficient
is significant at the 13% level only. However, in extreme times, the relationship is more
pronounced. These results are excluded from the paper for brevity.
Flow rebalancing could also have indirect effects through calendar rebalancing. For
example, inflows increase ETFs AUM and raise the amount of calendar rebalancing
that ETFs perform in future periods. Prices could react in anticipation of these effects.
Flow rebalancing would push both Ft,T1 and Ft,T2 in the direction of flows. Inflows
would increase both prices, whereas outflows would decrease them. The impact of
flows on prices has been studied before in the mutual fund literature (see, e.g., Lou,
2012; Warther, 1995). As αt decreases, ceteris paribus, the impact of leverage and flow
rebalancing on the second-month futures contract strengthens, whereas the impact on
the first weakens. The price impact of the three major types of ETF rebalancing is
illustrated in Figure 1.9.
Short-term price impact can translate into longer-term price deviations (futures pre-
mium) through at least two channels. First, leverage rebalancing and flows could make
arbitrageurs’ financial constraints binding. For example, a temporary spike in price
due to leverage rebalancing could trigger financial constraints if arbitrageurs have a
short position from the previous period. I illustrate this idea in section 1.11.3.1 in the
Appendix. In anticipation of this risk, prices can deviate for several periods. Second,
both leverage rebalancing and flows ultimately end up as parts of calendar rebalancing
since they change the AUM of the ETF and these AUM end up rolling from the first-
month to the second-month futures contract. Calendar rebalancing is a lower-frequency
component of price impact. Moreover, it mechanically introduces short-termism of
arbitrageurs since they cannot wait until expiration as explained above. This short-
termism can lead to long-term price deviations as shown in Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
and Gromb and Vayanos (2002).
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1.5.6 Empirical evidence on the impact of demand components
The estimates from columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.5 show the impact of the three major
components of ETF demand on basis and spread. Flows have the highest impact:
one standard deviation rise in flows (2.34% for first-month futures contract and 4.12%
for the second) increases the basis by 1.19% and the spread by 0.68%. The fact that
basis and spread are most strongly related to flows could be because the effect of
flows propagates to calendar rebalancing in next periods. Calendar rebalancing has a
negative impact on the basis but a positive impact on the spread, which is consistent
with the analysis in section 1.5.5. Leverage rebalancing also has a positive impact on
prices: one standard deviation rise (2.92% for first-month futures contract and 4.36%
for second) increases the basis by 0.41%, and the spread by 0.27%. The signs are as
predicted in section 1.5.5.
[Table 1.5 about here]
The estimates from columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.5 show that leverage rebalancing has the
largest impact on the EFG in the VIX market: one standard deviation rise is related
to an increase of 1.17% in the first-month EFG and 0.40% in the second-month EFG.
Calendar rebalancing has a negative impact on the front-month gap and a positive
impact on the second. Flow rebalancing has a positive impact on both maturities: one
standard deviation rise is related to a 0.13% higher first-month EFG and a 0.34% higher
second-month EFG. Given that the EFG is mostly related to leverage rebalancing by
ETFs, it is important to understand why market participants require compensation for
trading against this type of ETF demand. In the next section, I analyze the risks of
leverage rebalancing by ETFs.
1.6 The risk premium of leverage rebalancing
Research shows that leverage-induced trading by retail investors can exacerbate market
crashes and push prices away from fundamentals (see, e.g., Bian et al., 2017, 2018).
The impact of leverage-induced trading by institutional investors on systemic risk and
prices is an important, yet under-researched question. A key constraint of the existing
literature is that leverage ratios of institutional investors like mutual funds or hedge
funds are rarely publicly observable. Leveraged ETFs provide a useful laboratory to
study the effects of leverage-induced trading on a daily basis since these ETFs have a
pre-specified constant leverage.
Passive Funds Actively Affect Prices: Evidence from the Largest ETF Markets 42
To isolate the effect of leverage rebalancing, consider a market where the size of all long
ETFs equals that of all inverse ETFs (∑Nj=1 LjAt,j = 0) and there are no flows. In this
case, remainder, flow rebalancing, and the predictable part of calendar rebalancing all
vanish from equations (1.10) and (1.11), and the only sources of rebalancing are leverage
rebalancing and the leverage-induced part of calendar rebalancing. An example of such
a setting could be the ETF rebalancing during the trading day. To understand the
risks of trading against leverage rebalancing of ETFs in a given market, I construct
a portfolio that shorts ETFs with opposite leverages (to approximate trading against
ETFs), and I rebalance it at the end of each day to maintain a zero-delta position (to
approximate zero net ETF demand ∑Nj=1 LjAt,j = 0). To study the risks of such a
trading strategy, I first derive the dynamics of the AUM for a purely leveraged ETF,
that is, an ETF that has no calendar rebalancing, and does not face any flows.
1.6.1 The dynamics of leveraged ETFs’ AUM
Consider a simple model with the futures-based benchmark (dFtFt ) following a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM): dFtFt = µdt + σdWt, where µ is the instantaneous drift, σ is
the instantaneous diffusion, and Wt is a standard Brownian motion. To maintain a
constant leverage of L, the ETF is trading continuously:26 the fund invests a constant
fraction of wealth L in the benchmark, and the rest (1 − L) at the constant risk-free
rate rf . I allow for price impact (or tracking errors) and denote the effective leverage
by Lˆ = L(1 − φ) where φ ≥ 0 is the price impact coefficient and |Lˆ| ≤ |L|. Section
1.12.7 in the Appendix presents all the derivations. For simplicity, let rf = 0 and let
the fee rate of the fund f = 0. Then the AUM of a leveraged ETF are:
AT = A0(
FT
F0
)Lˆe−
Lˆ(Lˆ−1)
2 σ
2T = A0(1 + rT )Lˆe−
Lˆ(Lˆ−1)
2 σ
2T , (1.12)
As −Lˆ(Lˆ − 1) < 0 for any leverage Lˆ 6∈ [0, 1], both inverse and long leveraged funds
would decrease in value if σ2 is high. The AUM of inverse ETFs will be discounted
more than those of long-leveraged ETFs in cases of high σ2, since −Lˆ(−Lˆ − 1) >
Lˆ(Lˆ − 1), ∀Lˆ > 0. The term − Lˆ(Lˆ−1)2 σ2T is the continuous-time counterpart of the
leverage rebalancing in discrete time from equation (1.9).
26Empirically, ETFs have to deliver L times the daily return on the benchmark and to minimize
tracking errors, leveraged ETFs would ideally like to trade at the closing price of each day. Indeed,
most of the trading is concentrated around market closure (see, e.g., Pagano et al., 2019). Usually,
the ETF transmits the size of the rebalancing order to the broker dealer 15 minutes before market
closure based on the daily return up to that point, and then submits smaller orders at or very close
to market closure. The term “continuous”, therefore, could be a more accurate description of trading
before market close rather than throughout the whole day.
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Equation (1.12) shows that leverage rebalancing exposes the ETF to variance and to
squared realized returns: ∂AT
∂σ2 < 0 and
∂2AT
∂r2T
> 0 (for low σ2).27 Previous papers
on leveraged ETFs have mostly ignored the exposure to squared realized returns, and
emphasized that leveraged ETFs are negatively exposed to variance (see, e.g., Cheng
and Madhavan, 2009). In practice, however, the exposure is not monotonic in variance.
In other words, with continuous rebalancing, leveraged ETFs suffer from high σ2 but
benefit from high r2T during the day: similar to a long-gamma, short-vega options
position. The same model can be applied with dt being one day. In that case, leveraged
ETFs have a positive exposure to r2T over T days, but a negative exposure to daily σ2.
1.6.2 Trading against leveraged ETFs
After deriving the dynamics of the AUM for a leveraged ETF, I next analyze the
consequences for arbitrageurs who trade against leveraged ETFs.
1.6.2.1 Intuition
Consider an arbitrageur who provides liquidity to a pair of equal-sized ETFs with
opposite leverages (e.g., L = 2 and L = −2) by taking the contrarian position to
both ETFs. A natural guess could be that the arbitrageur can perfectly hedge the
position by matching the demand from the long fund with that from the inverse fund.
Surprisingly, however, such a trading strategy would not deliver the desired hedge, since
both the long and the short ETF have a non-linear exposure to the underlying asset:
both are implicitly long-gamma, short-vega. As a result, the arbitrageur would acquire
a short-gamma, long-vega exposure by trading against a pair of opposite ETFs.
[Figure 1.10 about here]
In other words, shorting a pair of opposite ETFs is not a zero-return strategy, but
an implicit bet on variance. If the underlying asset stays still and ends close to the
initial value during the trading period, arbitrageurs collect the vega gains. However, if
the underlying asset drifts steadily in either direction with little volatility, arbitrageurs
could lose money due to the negative exposure to squared realized returns. By trading
against the leverage rebalancing of ETFs, arbitrageurs acquire a short position if the
price increases, and a long position if the price decreases. Figure 1.18 in the Appendix
27For example, with Lˆ = 2 (double-leveraged ETF with no price impact): ∂AT
∂σ2 =
−TA0(FTF0 )
2e−σ
2T < 0 and ∂
2AT
∂r2
T
= 2A0e−σ
2T > 0. The results are similar for other leverages.
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illustrates the intuition with a simple example. If the price drifts steadily up, arbi-
trageurs lose money since they sell the asset and the price keeps increasing. If the price
reverts back to the initial value, they make a profit since they sell the asset and the
price decreases. Figure 1.10 illustrates the idea on a simple binomial tree. Hedging
the variance exposure is presumably not so straightforward, since arbitrageurs would
have to trade some portfolio with a long-gamma, short-vega exposure over the course
of the trading period.28 It would not be cost-efficient to hold such a hedging portfolio.
Therefore, arbitrageurs would require a premium to bear the variance risks of trading
against leveraged ETFs.
1.6.2.2 Theoretical exposure
To proxy for the premium that arbitrageurs earn by trading against ETFs’ leverage
rebalancing, I construct a portfolio that is short a pair of opposite ETFs. At the
beginning of each trading day, I short sell the two ETFs, and then buy them back at
the end of the day. The return on the portfolio is similar to the return for an arbitrageur
who trades against opposite ETFs during the day. The idea is similar to Nagel (2012)
who approximates market makers’ liquidity provision with a strategy that sells stocks
that outperformed the market and buys stocks that underperformed during the day.
Let A be the price (using net asset value (NAV) instead of price gives similar results)
of the long-leveraged ETF (leverage L), B be the price of the inverse-leveraged ETF
(leverage −L). With discrete trading, the return (rSB,T ) of the strategy that short sells
an equal amount of both A and B (sells at prices A0, B0 today and buys them back at
time T in the future) assuming fully collateralized borrowing is:
rSB,T =
A0 −AT
A0
+ B0 −BT
B0
= 2−
(
e(Lˆµ−
Lˆ2σ2
2 )T+LˆσWT + e(−Lˆµ−
Lˆ2σ2
2 )T−LˆσWT
)
(1.13)
The expression in the brackets is a sum of two log-normal random variables. The
moments of the return distribution are:
E(rSB,T ) = 2− (eLˆµT + e−LˆµT )
Var(rSB,T ) ≈ Lˆ2σ2T (e2LˆµT + e−2LˆµT − 2)
Median(rSB,T ) = 2− e
−Lˆ2σ2T
2 (eLˆµT + e−LˆµT ) ≥ E(rSB,T )
(1.14)
28For example, in case of intra-day trading, they would have to trade calendar spreads with short-
term options expiring every few minutes and longer-term options expiring every day.
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The distribution is negatively-skewed. If there was no price impact (Lˆ = L), or the
price impact parameter was the same for A and B, E(rSB,T ) ≤ 0, as ex + e−x ≥ 2 ∀x.
Figure 1.20 shows the theoretical distribution for different µ and σ with daily frequency
(T = 1252). As time T increases, the moments get more extreme: limT→∞ E(rSB,T ) =
−∞, limT→∞Var(rSB,T ) = ∞. Hence, if there is no price impact, for longer holding
periods the strategy leads to large losses, on average, but with very high variance.
1.6.2.3 Empirical evidence
Contrary to the theoretical prediction in the no-price-impact setup, empirically, the
distribution is not only positively-skewed in most markets, but also with a positive
mean. The top left panel of Figure 1.11 shows the returns on the strategy for an
arbitrageur who sells both an L = 1 VIX ETF and an L = −1 VIX ETF.29 The
strategy delivers annualized returns of 21% with a Sharpe ratio of 0.89. This is not
a feature of the VIX market but a general fact also for other assets. The returns
for commodity markets are consistently positive as shown in Figure 1.11: 43% in the
natural gas market, and 18% in the silver market, with Sharpe ratios of 2.59 and 1.86,
respectively. The annualized alphas with respect to a benchmark of the Fama–French
five factors, momentum, variance of the ETF benchmark, and the spot return are
16.6% (6.1 bps per day) for VIX, 42.3% (14 bps per day) for gas, and 18.6% (6.8 bps
per day) for silver as shown in Table 1.22 in the Appendix.30 Constructing a short-both
strategy that mimics arbitrageurs’ liquidity provision delivers high returns and large
Sharpe ratios not only for VIX and commodity ETFs, but also for equity, fixed income,
and foreign exchange ETFs as illustrated in Figure 1.21, Figure 1.22 and Figure 1.23
in the Appendix.
[Figure 1.11 about here]
A more puzzling observation is that the returns of the strategy often jump up instead
of down in case of extreme market movements. For example for VIX, the largest return
was realized during the VIX spike on 5 February 2018, when the ETF benchmark
increased by more than 80% on a single day, yet the strategy obtained 51% positive
return. These facts are inconsistent with what one could expect in a simple GBM
framework with no price impact.
29There is no ETF with L = −2, so I take the pair with the largest possible opposite leverage.
30I also tried other benchmarks reflecting market-specific factors for each asset and intermediary-
based risk factors (see, e.g., He et al., 2017). The alphas were still positive and statistically significant.
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1.6.2.4 Explanation
What happens if I relax the GBM assumption? Even if the drift and the volatility are
time-varying, the strategy would still have a negative expected return (as 2−eLˆ
∫ T
0 µsds−
e−Lˆ
∫ T
0 µsds < 0). In case of a general distribution of the benchmark, the short-both
strategy would still be negatively exposed to higher-order even cumulants as seen from
equation (1.15):
− log(E(AT
A0
))− log(E(BT
B0
)) = −c(1)− c(−1) = −2
∑
n even
κn
n! , (1.15)
where c and κn are the cumulant-generating function (see, e.g., Martin, 2013) and the
n-th cumulant of the log AUM at time 0, respectively. Hence, shorting ETFs would still
be negatively exposed to large price movements, if ETFs track the benchmark perfectly.
I now relax the assumption of no price impact (or no tracking errors) and allow the
funds to have different price impact parameters: LˆA = (1− φA)L, LˆB = −(1− φB)L.
As shown in section 1.11.3 in the Appendix, price impact will be the largest when
arbitrageurs’ risk aversion and variance of the benchmark increase, and leveraged ETFs
could have difficulties keeping their leverage constant at L. In that situation, E(rSB,T )
can be positive as both long and short ETFs cannot track the benchmark perfectly and
they will not have exactly opposite leverages. Figure 1.19 in the Appendix shows that,
for example, for VIX, ETFs with opposite leverages do not behave in exactly opposite
ways to each other.
Running regressions of daily returns on leveraged and inverse ETFs, against the returns
of their respective benchmarks, reveals that most funds underperform the stated return
even with daily data (after controlling for fees), as shown in Table 1.6. For example, the
regression coefficient for the double-leveraged VIX ETF is 1.93<2. A similar picture
is observed for other markets. The coefficients lend support to the hypothesis that
|Lˆ| < |L| and φ > 0. In general, the tracking errors are larger in periods of high
benchmark variance as shown in Table 1.6.
[Table 1.6 about here]
Because ETFs fail to track the benchmark perfectly, especially in turbulent times, the
jump risk due to high r2T may not be realized. Since the tracking errors get magnified
in such times, arbitrageurs benefit, as they are, essentially, short ETFs (they trade in
the opposite direction). As empirical evidence shows, the ETF arbitrage mechanism
is also vulnerable to breakdowns in times of severe market stress. In other words, the
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tracking errors of ETFs co-move with bad states of the world. Providing liquidity to
ETFs in such market conditions would be compensated by a high premium. The short-
both strategy developed in this paper provides a simple and intuitive way to capture
these effects by simply selling opposite ETFs. The high Sharpe ratios of the strategy are
consistent with the analysis in section 1.5.5 as arbitrageurs face significant unhedgeable
risk by trading against leveraged ETFs and are compensated for bearing it.
A potential reason for the spike in strategy returns during turbulent times could be the
increased default risk of the ETF sponsor. Many of the leveraged ETFs are structured in
the form of an ETN, which is an unsecured debt security issued by the ETN sponsor.
Since ETNs are backed by the credit of the issuer, the issuer could have problems
maintaining the leverage ratio due to financial distress. To test this prediction, I include
CDS spreads of the ETF sponsors in the regression. A limitation of the data is that
CDS spreads are available for a small subset of the sponsors. In particular, they are
not available for most commodity and equity ETF issuers (ProShares and Direxion) so
I run the regression only for the VIX market. The results from column 8 of Table 1.22
in the Appendix show that there is limited evidence that CDS spreads are related to
the short-both strategy returns. The coefficients for current and lagged CDS spreads
are insignificant at the 10% level. This observation is consistent with the fact that
leveraged ETNs in a particular market are a usually a small share of the total debt of
the sponsors, and are perhaps unlikely to cause substantial financial distress.
1.6.2.5 Regressions of the short-both strategy
Table 1.7 shows the results of a pooled regression of the short-both strategy returns
from 14 markets including some equity and bond indices. The estimates show that the
returns are related to the leverage rebalancing multiplier (Γ) in a given market. One
standard deviation rise in Γ is correlated with a 7 bps rise (19.3% annualized) in daily
returns for the strategy. The intuition for this finding is that, in markets where ETFs
are large investors, in situations with large volatility spikes, all leveraged funds have to
trade in the same direction, thereby amplifying market movements. The premium for
providing liquidity to ETFs is greater in markets where the total demand for liquidity
is higher, that is, in markets with a large proportion of leveraged ETFs.
[Table 1.7 about here]
Higher intra-day variance of the benchmark has a positive, but lower-magnitude, effect
on returns (5–6 bps). The intuition for this finding is that larger σ2bmk means that there
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are more vega gains to be made. The estimate on r2bmk is negative and significant: one
standard deviation rise in r2bmk decreases returns on the strategy by 2 bps. This is due
to negative exposure to squared realized returns. The coefficient on the interaction
term between Γ and σ2bmk is positive, which suggests that the returns on the short-
both strategy are larger when variance is high and the potential leverage rebalancing
is substantial. The strategy is also related to liquidity: one standard deviation rise in
relative bid-ask spreads is related to a 2 bps increase in daily returns on the strategy.
Returns are not related to the difference between NAV and ETF price (Premium to
NAV), flows, the Fama–French five factors, or momentum.
The analysis in this section shows that the EFG is most sensitive to leverage rebalancing
due to the unhedgeable risks faced by arbitrageurs who trade against this type of
ETF demand. However, the puzzling observation is that the returns of such a trading
strategy are large and are not arbitraged away despite the fact that the jump risk is
often in the favorable direction. Instead of losing money in case of jumps, the strategy
often delivers its largest gains in those turbulent times due to ETF tracking errors. A
prominent example of such situation is the spike in the short-both strategy profits in
the case of the VIX market on 5–9 February 2018. To the best of my knowledge, my
paper is the first to quantify the risks of trading against leveraged ETFs and the first to
show that their tracking errors co-move with extreme market times, thereby benefiting
liquidity providers. Explaining the risk-return characteristics of the short-both strategy
across markets is a beneficial direction of further research on ETFs.
1.7 The impact of ETFs on futures prices in commodity
markets
I next analyze ETFs in several commodity markets with a high proportion of ETFs.
I study whether the presence of ETFs in the markets for natural gas, silver, oil, and
gold has an impact on futures prices. Similar to the approach for the VIX market in
section 1.4, I start the empirical analysis for commodity ETFs by studying the effects
of ETF demand on relative basis and spread. Compared with the VIX market, in
commodity markets it is harder to construct a synthetic futures contract with exactly
the same price at expiration as the traded one. I control for asset-specific fundamental
shocks by including in the regression the closest futures contract with no ETFs traded
for each commodity. For US natural gas futures traded on the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX), I use Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) gas futures (historical
correlation 81% before the ETF introduction). For silver, there was only one liquid
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futures contract specification before 2011,31 so I use the closest precious metal: gold
(historical correlation 93% before the ETF introduction). For US crude oil, I use Brent
oil (historical correlation 99.7% before the ETF introduction). For gold, I use silver
futures. I align contracts so that they are expressed in the same units and account for
differences in expiration dates.
I use relative basis as the dependent variable, instead of the difference between the
ETF-influenced futures price and that of the control contract, due to the concern that
some systematic factors have changed the pricing across US and European markets in
the post-ETF period. In particular, gas prices in the US have fallen substantially after
the increase in shale gas drilling from 2010, and the difference with prices in Europe has
widened. US crude oil prices have also diverged from Brent during the period 2010–
2013 due to local supply factors.32 Thus, using absolute levels of futures prices of the
control asset to isolate the impact of ETFs could capture other changes in cross-market
factors. However, using relative basis and assuming that storage costs have changed in
a similar way for both the ETF-influenced and the control contracts (which is a within-
market factor) is a more realistic assumption, as anecdotal evidence suggests. Moreover,
to account for the above-mentioned changes in cross-market factors, I perform the
following analysis. First, I control for the difference in spot prices between US and
Europe in the respective basis and spread regressions. This difference captures the
systematic change across the two markets, which is not influenced by ETFs as ETFs
trade in the futures contract. Second, I construct a synthetic futures contract and
estimate the impact of ETF demand in a narrow window that excludes the systematic
changes across the two markets as explained in section 1.7.4.
1.7.1 Basis and spread regressions in commodity markets
The results of regression (1.3) for each commodity market are presented in Panel A of
Table 1.8. The estimates show that ETF rebalancing is related to commodity futures
prices. For natural gas, one standard deviation rise in ETF demand as a proportion
of total market capitalization (3.08% for the first-month futures contract and 2.23%
for the second) is related to an increase in the spread by 0.34%, but has no impact on
31In 2011, silver futures contracts were introduced at the Shanghai exchange. Using these futures
as a control asset after 2011 produces similar results to the ones seen with gold. For robustness, I also
rerun the regressions for silver and gold using basis and spread of futures contracts in platinum and
other metals, where there are little to no ETFs. I did this test to address the concern that both silver
and gold undergo the introduction of ETFs, and therefore, might not be a suitable control. The main
results were similar.
32After 2010, increased volumes of crude oil from North Dakota and Canada flowed into Cushing
(where WTI US crude oil is delivered). This led to a build-up in inventories and decreased the price of
US crude oil, widening the spread with Brent.
Passive Funds Actively Affect Prices: Evidence from the Largest ETF Markets 50
the first-month basis. For silver and oil, one standard deviation rise in ETF demand
(1.97% for silver and 0.08% for oil for the two-months contract) is related to an increase
in the spread by 0.01% and 0.48%, respectively, but also has no impact on the basis.
The lower magnitude for the silver market could be related to the fact that the average
relative basis and spread for silver are very small compared with other commodity
markets. For gold, ETF demand has no impact on basis or spread.33 The fact that
ETF rebalancing is also related to price changes in commodity markets illustrates that
the impact of ETFs on prices is a general observation as opposed to being a feature of
the VIX market alone. The observation that ETF demand has no significant impact on
basis could be because the spot price is sometimes interpolated from the futures price
or because in some commodities, it is easier to perform carry arbitrage compared to
VIX.
[Table 1.8 about here]
1.7.2 Decomposition of ETF demand in commodity markets
Flow and leverage rebalancing have the highest impact on basis for commodities (Panel
B of Table 1.8). For gas, the coefficient for flows is slightly larger: one standard
deviation rise in flow rebalancing is related to an increase in the spread by 0.36%,
compared with leverage rebalancing where one standard deviation rise is related to
an increase of 0.29%. For silver and oil, the coefficient for leverage rebalancing is
larger than the one for flows. Calendar rebalancing is mostly insignificant, except for
silver: one standard deviation rise is related to a decrease in the front month basis of
0.01%. The relatively lower effect of calendar rebalancing could be due to the fact that
commodity ETFs follow a benchmark with a rolling period of five days compared with
the daily rolling in the VIX market.34 Moreover, the proportion of ETFs in commodity
markets is lower than in the VIX market. Therefore, calendar rebalancing could be
more predictable and could have less-pronounced effects on prices.
33For robustness, I interpolated the spot price similar to Koijen et al. (2018) to address the concern
that the data on spot prices from Bloomberg could be of a poor quality. The coefficient for basis was
marginally significant in the gas market, for other markets the coefficients were still insignificant.
34The rolling period is usually from the 6th to the 10th business day of each month. This is the
case for ETFs that follow benchmarks based on S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Indices. Some ETFs
follow Dow Jones Commodity Indices and rebalance from the 5th to the 9th day of each month. For
commodity ETFs, the proportion invested in the first-month contract is:
αt =

1, if t < 6th business day
αt−1 − 15 , if 6th business day ≤ t ≤ 10th business day
0, if t > 10th business day
(1.16)
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1.7.3 Difference-in-differences (DD) regressions
In this section, I exploit the staggered nature of the ETF introduction in VIX and
commodity markets, and implement DD regression design. The empirical strategy
exploits the first ETF trading date to construct a before-after comparison between
assets that are part of an ETF benchmark and similar assets that are not influenced
by ETF demand.35 To study the impact of the introduction of ETFs, I run pooled
DD regressions. This methodology allows me to avoid confounding the effects of the
ETF introduction with unobserved shocks to each specific commodity market. The
period after the ETF introduction is defined as the post period (dummy Post). A
futures contract is defined as being part of the treatment group if it is part of an ETF
benchmark. The corresponding dummy variable is Treat:
bt,j = αj + λt + γTreat×Post × Treatj × Postt + t,j , (1.17)
where bt,j is the relative basis or spread of asset j, αj is an individual (futures) fixed
effect and λt is a time fixed effect. I consider 10 assets in total (one futures and one
hedge asset for VIX, gas, silver, gold and oil) for each maturity (one or two months).
I also run a specification with asset-specific trends (α1,jt):
bt,j = α0,j + α1,jt+ λt + γTreat×Post × Treatj × Postt + t,j . (1.18)
To estimate the effects of the ETF introduction, I consider a 60-day window around the
first trading date.36 To the best of my knowledge, no other significant events influenced
exclusively the specific asset, compared with a similar asset with no ETFs introduced
around the event date, so the main driver of changes in asset prices was presumably the
introduction of the ETF. The estimates from column 2 of Panels A and B in Table 1.9
show that the introduction of ETFs increases the first-month basis by 3.62% (82.5% in
absolute value given the control group before-treatment mean of -4.39%), on average,
and the spread by 1.78% (59.1% given the control group before-treatment mean of
3.01%). Figure 1.24 in the Appendix shows that the parallel trends assumption of
the DD specification is largely satisfied. Column 3 of Table 1.9 shows that including
asset-specific trends barely changes the estimates.
35Usually, the announcement date and the first date of trading are less than two days apart for
most ETFs studied. Among others, Tang and Xiong (2012) run a similar DD regression for correlation
measures in commodity markets.
36I use the first trading date of the first ETF introduced in a given market. I do not use introduction
dates of inverse ETFs since usually the introduction of an inverse ETF coincides with that of a leveraged
long ETF, and the net effect on total ETF demand is not clear.
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[Table 1.9 about here]
The control group in the regressions from columns 1–3 consists of all futures contracts
that did not experience ETF demand at a given point in time. One worry is that
futures from different markets could be systematically different and therefore not an
appropriate control group. To alleviate this concern, I also run the regression using
a matched sample: I interact the Post and Treat dummies with a dummy for each
individual asset class. The estimate on the Treat×Post dummy will then be a weighted
average of the individual estimates for each market. The results are presented in column
4. The coefficients are still positive and statistically significant. Maturities longer than
two months are not influenced by the introduction of the ETF, on average: the estimates
on the third and fourth-month futures spreads are not significant, as shown in column
6 of Panels A and B. That is not surprising since ETFs trade in the first and the
second-month futures contracts only.
The magnitude of the coefficients from the DD regressions is consistent with the general
estimates for price impact from Table 1.4 and Table 1.8, and even slightly greater for
some markets. For example, for VIX, the proportion of ETF rebalancing goes up,
on average, by approximately 4.20% of the market capitalization for the first-month
futures contract after the introduction of ETFs. The estimates from Table 1.4 would
then imply an increase in basis of 2.45% (4.20/2.42 · 1.41%) and in EFG of 1.68%
(4.20/2.42 · 0.97%). These are slightly lower than the DD estimates of 3.12% and
1.83%. I also conduct an event-study for realized futures returns in Table 1.23 in the
Appendix and find that the introduction of ETFs decreased realized returns by 1–30
bps for various markets.
1.7.4 Synthetic commodity futures contract
To estimate the price deviation caused by ETFs in a similar way to the calculation of
the EFG in section 1.4.4, I construct a synthetic futures contract using variables that
are successful contemporaneous predictors of the futures price. The two variables that
I chose for the synthetic control are spot price and the relative basis of a similar futures
contract with no ETFs traded (they explain more than 96% of the daily variation in
futures prices across all four commodity markets in the pre-ETF period). To construct
the synthetic futures, I use the sample of data that ends six months before the ETF
introduction (in-sample period) to determine the optimal weights, and then use these
fixed weights in the out-of-sample period to construct the synthetic futures contract. To
avoid confounding the effects of the ETF introduction with other factors, I conduct an
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event study for all commodity markets and VIX in a narrow window of 60 days around
the first ETF introduction date. The dependent variable is the relative difference
(gap) between the ETF-influenced futures price and the synthetic one. The results
from column 5 of Panels A and B in Table 1.9 show that the introduction of an ETF
increased the first-month gap by 2.24%, on average, and the second-month gap by
1.16%.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper shows that ETFs put pressure on prices in the most ETF-dominated as-
set classes: VIX and commodities. The research also proposes a model-independent
approach for replicating the fundamental value of a VIX futures. The method makes
it possible to isolate a non-fundamental part in VIX futures prices of 18.5 % per year
that is strongly related to the rebalancing of ETFs. The paper also provides a de-
composition of ETF demand into three main components: calendar rebalancing due to
the roll from one futures contract to another, flow rebalancing due to inflow/outflow of
money to the fund, and leverage rebalancing due to the maintenance of a constant daily
leverage. The framework is flexible to accommodate various types of ETFs, including
non-leveraged ETFs, equity and fixed income ETFs.
The research presents a simple strategy to understand the risks of trading against the
leverage rebalancing of ETFs. The results show that providing liquidity to leveraged
ETFs turns out to be a particular bet on variance, even in a market with a zero net
share of ETFs. Trading against leveraged ETFs delivers large abnormal returns and
Sharpe ratios for markets with significant ETF presence. The returns spike in turbulent
times, when liquidity dries up.
The results from this research show that passive funds actively affect prices of under-
lying assets in the current era of an increasingly large ETF presence. While ETFs
can increase liquidity and trading volume by attracting new capital (e.g., from retail
investors), they also withdraw liquidity during extreme market times. These effects
could be magnified if ETFs were used by unsophisticated, short-horizon investors. The
recent bankruptcy of the largest inverse VIX ETF in 2018 and the extreme events and
ETF bankruptcies in the oil market in 2020 are prominent examples of such effects.
ETFs are transforming the financial industry and acting more as a “wrapper of views”
rather than a “wrapper of assets” by allowing investors to get exposure to various
trading strategies across traditional, and alternative asset classes. The problem with
fully assessing the consequences of ETFs on underlying assets is that these investment
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vehicles are relatively new and under-researched. Time and future research will show
whether ETFs are the greatest game-changer in the asset-management industry, or
simply another “financial weapon of mass destruction”.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: ETF fractions of total market capitalization (number of futures contracts
multiplied by the futures price) and the potential impact of leverage rebalancing for
VIX, gas, silver, gold and oil. Monthly averages for the two front contracts. The solid
black line shows net ETF fraction (long ETFs minus inverse ETFs) in the total market
capitalization of the first and second futures contracts:
∑N
j=1 LjAj,t/Mkt capt, where
Lj is the leverage of ETF j (Lj<0 for inverse ETFs) and Aj,t are its assets under
management (AUM) at time t. The dashed red line is Γt/Mkt capt: a measure of
the total rebalancing demand by leveraged ETFs (explained in section 1.5.2) scaled
by market capitalization.
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Figure 1.2: Realized VIX futures premium before and after ETFs. The chart shows
the average size of the VIX futures premium for different maturities before ETFs
(excluding the crisis period, June 2004 – September 2008) and after ETFs (January
2009 – February 2018). The premium is calculated as the annualized net return of a
short-seller of a VIX futures Ft,T−FT,TFt,T , where T (Term) is maturity (in months).
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Figure 1.3: Positions of traders. The top two panels show net futures positions of
different types of traders in the VIX and gas market, respectively. The data is from the
Traders in Financial Futures (TFF) reports by the CFTC. The bottom two panels show
weekly net ETF positions and net Dealer/Swap positions in the two markets. “Asset
Mgr” are asset managers (mostly pension funds, endowments, insurance companies and
mutual funds), “Lev Money” are mostly hedge funds and other proprietary traders.
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Figure 1.4: Basis decomposition. Illustrative example. The left panel shows
the decomposition of basis into futures change (Ft,T − FT,T ) and spot change
(ST − St), the right panel – the decomposition into EFGt = Ft,T − EQt (ST ),
Realized VIX premium = EQt (ST )− ST , and spot change. Maturity is in months.
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Maturity
Pr
ic
e 
(vo
la
til
ity
 p
oi
nt
s)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ft, T − FT,T
ST − St
Ft, T − St
Ft, T
ST
St
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Maturity
Pr
ic
e 
(vo
la
til
ity
 p
oi
nt
s)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EFG
Realized
VIX pr.
ST − St
Ft, T
Et
Q(ST)
ST
St
Passive Funds Actively Affect Prices: Evidence from the Largest ETF Markets 59
Figure 1.5: ETF futures gap. Weekly averages. The figure shows the dynamics of
the ETF futures gap (EFG) for maturities at 1–4 months. The first dashed vertical
line depicts the date when the first VIX ETF was introduced, the second shows the
inception date of the first leveraged VIX ETF.
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Figure 1.6: EFG and rebalancing demand from ETFs. The left panel illustrates
the dynamics for the first-month EFG, the right panel for the second-month EFG.
Demand is in million USD. The graphs show a representative sample (December 2014
– February 2015 for the first-month gap, and August 2015 – October 2015 for the
second-month gap) to illustrate the typical pattern.
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Figure 1.7: MSE. The left panel shows the dynamics of the mean squared error from
a prediction of realized spot VIX prices (ST ) based on the synthetic futures EQt (ST )
(red dashed line) and the ETF-influenced futures Ft,T (solid black line) for the first-
month futures. For each t, I calculate the squared errors as (ST − EQt (ST ))2 and
(ST −Ft,T )2. The right panel illustrates the average MSE by days to maturity for the
whole sample. The graphs show that EQt (ST ) is a better predictor of the fundamental
value ST compared to Ft,T .
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Figure 1.8: Open interest dynamics before and after ETF introduction. The left
panel shows typical dynamics of open interest for futures maturities at one, two,
three and four months for the period before ETFs were introduced. The right panel
illustrates typical dynamics after the introduction of ETFs. The emphasized straight
lines show the usual cycle of open interest. The graphs show a representative sample
(July 2007 – December 2007 and October 2012 – May 2013) to illustrate the typical
pattern.
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Figure 1.9: Decomposition of ETF demand. The top left panel illustrates the dy-
namics of VIX ETFs’ demand decomposition. Demand is in absolute values. The
top right panel and the two bottom panels show the effects of change in calendar,
leverage, and flow rebalancing on the futures curve: assuming ETFs are net long VIX
futures (
∑N
j=1 LjAj,t > 0). The blue line illustrates the curve before the impact of the
rebalancing demand, the red and green ones after it. Maturity is in months, futures
price in volatility points.
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Figure 1.10: Trading against opposite ETFs. The figure shows the profit dynamics
of liquidity provision to opposite ETFs using a binomial tree example. The graph
illustrates the dynamics of the ETF benchmark and the corresponding profits for an
arbitrageur who sells short a pair of opposite ETFs (L = 2 and L = −2). For each
period, the parameters of the tree are u = 1.05 and ud = 1. Red areas indicate nodes
where the arbitrageur loses money, and green ones show where the arbitrageur makes
profit. More color-intense nodes indicate larger losses or profits.
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Figure 1.11: Intra-day returns on the short-both strategy for several markets. E(R)
is the average annualized return, SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio, and SR, fee is
the annualized Sharpe ratio after subtracting borrowing fees. The dotted blue line
shows the cumulative return on the long ETF (leverage L), the dashed red line the
return on the inverse ETF (leverage −L). The solid black line shows the returns on
the strategy that sells short the long and the inverse ETF. VIX: L = 1; silver: L = 2;
gas, gold: L = 3.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Share of ETFs in market capitalization and in trading volume. The
table shows the average fraction (over time) of ETFs in total market capitalization
and in volume of trading for several markets. The fraction in total market capital-
ization is calculated as dollar size of all ETFs divided by the dollar capitalization of
the benchmark index. ETF fraction in trading volume is calculated as ETF trading
volume divided by the trading volume of the benchmark index. The data is at a daily
frequency, from the first ETF trading date in a given asset to February 2018.
Market Long ETFsfraction (%)
Inverse ETFs
fraction (%)
Net ETFs
fraction (%)
ETFs fraction in
trading volume (%)
VIX 40.89 16.42 24.47 206.68
Natural Gas 17.52 3.81 13.71 18.31
Silver 10.12 2.01 8.11 35.11
Gold 4.74 0.40 4.34 9.69
Oil 4.12 1.57 2.55 1.34
Nasdaq 1.96 0.01 1.95 35.98
S&P 500 1.02 0.03 0.99 18.82
Financials 0.14 0.07 0.07 24.83
Real estate 0.14 0.09 0.05 2.80
Basic materials 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.93
Russell 2000 0.07 0.06 0.01 11.85
Utilities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Consumer service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Treasuries 7-10 years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for the VIX market. S is spot VIX, FT1 , FT2 , ... FT9 are the first, second ... ninth generic futures. All prices
are in volatility points. Basis is FT1 − S, spread is FT2 − FT1 . rV XX is the daily return on the first long VIX ETF (ticker VXX), EFGT1 and
EFGT2 are the ETF futures gaps for the first and second-month contracts, respectively. The numbers for rV XX , EFGT1 and EFGT2 are in %,
except skewness, kurtosis and number of observations. The pre-last row presents the estimate (β) from a regression on spot VIX. The data is at
a daily frequency, from June 2004 (January 2009 for rV XX) to February 2018. The “bef. ETFs” period is prior to 29 January 2009. The “bef.
ETFs, excl. crisis” period is prior to 15 September 2008.
S FT1 FT2 FT3 FT4 FT5 FT6 FT7 FT8 FT9 Basis Spread rV XX EFGT1 EFGT2
Mean 18.57 19.11 20.00 21.01 21.46 21.72 22.07 22.73 22.52 21.75 0.54 0.83 -0.17 1.04 3.61
Mean, bef. ETFs 18.87 18.93 19.38 20.80 21.16 20.91 20.99 22.75 23.00 23.41 0.06 0.46 -0.84 0.09
Mean, bef. ETFs, excl. crisis 16.70 17.15 17.96 19.24 19.68 19.62 19.76 21.05 21.22 21.70 0.45 0.81 -0.51 0.38
Mean, after ETFs 18.42 19.21 20.31 21.10 21.57 22.03 22.45 22.73 22.43 21.27 0.79 1.10 -0.17 1.54 4.44
Std. dev. 9.13 8.34 7.53 7.10 6.67 6.34 6.10 5.98 5.69 5.37 1.79 1.76 3.20 10.28 5.27
Min 9.14 9.60 11.32 12.22 12.97 13.47 13.97 14.43 14.32 10.25 -23.31 -21.10 -14.25 -49.38 -21.10
Max 80.86 67.95 59.77 54.67 50.58 47.07 45.26 45.00 44.45 44.46 4.98 5.45 33.44 43.47 36.00
10% 11.43 12.20 13.13 14.08 14.53 15.12 15.47 16.12 16.70 16.74 -0.64 -0.55 -3.47 -9.51 -2.43
50% 15.60 16.22 17.50 18.88 19.62 19.88 20.25 21.02 20.50 20.00 0.69 1.01 0.00 0.29 3.28
90% 28.27 28.10 29.39 30.48 30.40 30.70 30.80 31.00 30.80 29.62 2.01 2.35 28.33 11.71 9.98
Skewness 2.57 2.26 1.87 1.55 1.32 1.18 1.06 0.96 1.13 1.54 -4.72 -3.96 1.45 0.44 0.28
Kurtosis 11.84 9.50 7.35 5.95 4.88 4.25 3.79 3.50 3.93 5.32 43.71 32.9 13.53 14.09 5.10
β with respect to VIX 1.00 0.90 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.42
Observations 3,442 3,442 3,397 3,095 3,053 3,091 3,040 2,771 2,552 1,858 3,442 3,397 2,260 2,550 2,641
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Table 1.3: Predictive power of basis. The table presents the results from a predictive
regression of spot or futures price changes on basis with daily frequency. St is spot
price, Ft,T is futures price for maturity T . Here and in all subsequent tables standard
errors are computed using the Newey-West (see, e.g., Newey and West, 1987) estimator
with three lags. The major results were unchanged with more lags. *,**, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels here and in all following
tables. Daily frequency, February 2009 – December 2017.
Panel A: Spot VIX on basis: ST − St = α1 + β1 · (Ft,T − St) + 1,t
T=1m T=2m T=3m T=4m T=5m T=6m T=7m T=8m
β1 0.02 0.27 0.64∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.17) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.27
Observations 2,156 2,139 2,115 2,013 2,075 2,051 2,031 1,849
Panel B: VIX futures on basis: FT,T − Ft,T = α2 + β2 · (Ft,T − St) + 2,t
T=1m T=2m T=3m T=4m T=5m T=6m T=7m T=8m
β2 -0.98∗∗∗ -0.73∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.02 0.01
(0.23) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
R2 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations 2,156 2,139 2,115 2,013 2,075 2,051 2,031 1,849
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Table 1.4: Impact of ETF demand in the VIX market. The table presents regression
results for the basis, spread, and ETF futures gap (EFG). Panel A shows results for the
first-month basis (bt,1), and the spread between the first-month and the second-month
futures contracts (bt,2). Columns 1–2 and 6–7 present the regressions for absolute basis
and spread, columns 3–5 and 8–10 for relative basis and spread. D$,allt,i is the ETF
demand for the i−th futures contract. Columns 4 and 9 use raw demand, whereas all
other columns use demand scaled by total market capitalization. Columns 5 and 10 use
ETF demand computed using lagged returns on the benchmark and the two futures
contracts (by replacing rt+1, rF1t+1, r
F2
t+1 with rt, r
F1
t , rF2t , respectively, in equations
(1.10) and (1.11) for a given time t + 1). Panel B presents the results for one and
two-months gaps (EFGt,1 and EFGt,2). Columns 3 and 7 use raw demand, whereas
all other columns use demand scaled by total market capitalization. bHt,i is the relative
basis of a hedge asset (synthetic futures contract constructed from options), rbmk,t is
the return on the ETF benchmark, σ2bmk,t is intra-day variance of the ETF benchmark
(calculated using 5-minute intervals), OIt,i is open interest for futures i, St is spot
price. Liquidity (Liqt,i) is the difference in relative bid-ask spreads (Ask−BidMid ) between
the hedge asset and VIX futures contract. TEDt is the spread between 3-month
LIBOR in USD and the interest rate of Treasury bills. αt is the fraction of ETF
wealth invested in the front-month futures contract. All independent variables are
standardized. Daily frequency, February 2009 – December 2017.
Panel A: Impact on basis and spread
Dependent variables bt,1, abs bt,1, rel bt,2, abs bt,2, rel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
D$,allt,1 0.26∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.09 -0.21 -0.29
(0.12) (0.03) (0.13) (0.16) (0.04) (0.08) (0.18) (0.26)
D$,allt,2 0.17∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.12) (0.15)
D$,allt,1 (rt−1) 1.25∗∗∗ -0.12
(0.31) (0.02)
D$,allt,2 (rt−1) 0.37∗∗
(0.18)
bHt,i 1.29∗∗∗ 5.21∗∗∗ 5.22∗∗∗ 5.56∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 5.64∗∗∗ 5.82∗∗∗ 5.80∗∗∗
(0.24) (1.18) (1.18) (1.20) (0.05) (1.13) (1.12) (1.13)
rbmk,t −0.42 −1.65 −1.85 −1.84 −0.21∗ −0.85 −1.20 −1.13
(0.36) (1.60) (1.66) (1.66) (0.12) (0.62) (1.03) (1.00)
σ2bmk,t −0.13∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗ −0.78∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.48∗∗ −0.58∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗
(0.04) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.03) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23)
OIt,i 0.18∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ −0.06 0.61∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.04) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
St −0.85∗∗∗ −2.75∗∗∗ −2.69∗∗∗ −2.99∗∗∗ −1.03∗∗∗ −4.03∗∗∗ −3.97∗∗∗ −4.20∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.11) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Liqt,i 0.13∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.05) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
αt 0.11∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.17 −0.18 −0.18
(0.04) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.04) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Observations 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922
R2 0.07 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.09 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.44
Panel B: Impact on EFG
Dependent variables EFGt,1 EFGt,2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D$,allt,i 1.21∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.40) (0.63) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
D$,allt,i (rt−1) 0.77∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗
(0.26) (0.12)
EFGt−1,i 6.03∗∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ 3.92∗∗∗ 3.93∗∗∗ 4.09∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.73) (0.72) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22)
rbmk,t 0.60∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
σ2bmk,t 1.31 1.52 0.85 -0.40 -0.40 -0.66
(0.89) (0.94) (0.83) (0.57) (0.57) (0.58)
OIt,i 1.62 1.92 1.18 -1.14 -1.22 -0.42
(1.53) (1.54) (1.53) (1.16) (1.16) (0.85)
St 0.10 0.29 -0.02 -0.36∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.61) (0.66) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Liqt,i 0.88∗∗ 0.92∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.02 0.00 0.16
(0.41) (0.41) (0.37) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
TEDt 0.51 0.36 1.28 1.46∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗
(0.97) (0.96) (1.06) (0.41) (0.42) (0.40)
αt 0.62∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ 0.18
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Observations 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,895 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,816
R2 0.24 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.26 0.58 0.58 0.62
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Table 1.5: Impact of ETF demand components on futures. Calendar rebalancing,
leverage rebalancing, flow rebalancing, and remainder are calculated based on equa-
tions (1.10) and (1.11). All independent variables are standardized. Controls include
basis or spread of a hedge asset (synthetic futures constructed from options), time
to maturity, variance of benchmark, return on benchmark, spot price, open interest
and liquidity measured by bid-ask spreads. bt,1 is relative basis, bt,2 is relative spread.
EFGt,1 is the ETF futures gap for one month, EFGt,2 for two months. Depen-
dent variables are in %. All demand components are scaled by market capitalization.
The estimates on the four components do not exactly add up to the estimate for to-
tal demand from Table 1.4 because the variables are standardized. Daily frequency,
February 2009 – December 2017.
Dependent variables bt,1, rel bt,2, rel EFGt,1 EFGt,2 EFGt,1 EFGt,2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Calendar rebt,i -0.65∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ -0.28∗ 0.17∗
(0.11) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10)
Leverage rebt,i 0.41∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.13) (0.32) (0.10)
Flow rebt,i 1.19∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08)
Remaindert,i 0.14 -0.60 -0.31 -0.38
(0.14) (0.52) (0.30) (0.42)∑N
j=1 LjAj,t−1 -0.39
∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.19) (0.10)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,936 1,913 1,890 1,819 1,890 1,819
R2 0.55 0.36 0.48 0.61 0.29 0.38
Table 1.6: Regressions of leveraged ETFs’ returns on benchmarks. The table shows
the estimates of the regression rETF,t = α + βrbmk,t + t for several markets and
leverages. The last two rows of estimates present the results for the subsamples of
high (above median) and low (below median) variance of the benchmark, respectively.
Daily frequency, from the first leveraged ETF inception date in a given market to
December 2018.
Dependent variables VIX Gas Silver Gold
L=2 L=-1 L=3 L=-3 L=3 L=-3 L=3 L=-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
α -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
β 1.93∗∗∗ -0.92∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ -2.84∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ -2.70∗∗∗ 2.88∗∗∗ -2.89∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 1,790 1,803 1,786 1,786 1,853 1,853 1,853 1,853
R2 0.97 0.73 0.94 0.92 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.86
β, high var 1.91∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗ -2.80∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ -2.64∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗ -2.84∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
β, low var 1.94∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ -2.90∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗ -2.75∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗ -2.92∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
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Table 1.7: Pooled regressions of the short-both strategy returns (rSB). The sample
consists of 14 markets, for the period from the first leveraged ETF introduction date in
a given market to December 2018 (daily frequency). The markets are: VIX, gas, silver,
oil, gold, S&P 500 Index, Nasdaq Composite, financials, real estate, basic materials,
Russell 2000, utilities, value stocks and mid-term Treasuries. Standard errors are
double-clustered by market and time. All independent variables are standardized. Φ =∑N
j=1 LjAj/Mkt cap is the net fraction of ETFs scaled by total market capitalization,
Γ =
∑N
j=1 Lj(Lj − 1)Aj/Mkt cap is ETFs’ leverage rebalancing multiplier scaled by
total market capitalization. Premium to NAV is the relative difference between ETF
price and NAV, Volume is the fraction of ETF trading volume in total trading volume.
Flow is the net flows to all ETFs in a given market, Liquidity is based on relative bid-
ask spreads. Rf is the risk-free rate, RM − Rf , HML, SMB, CMA, RMW, Mom are
the Fama–French five factors and momentum. Refer to Table 1.4 for definitions of
other variables.
Dependent variables rSB (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Φ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.007
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Γ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
σ2bmk 0.053∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Γ× σ2bmk 0.015∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.010∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
r2bmk -0.024∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
rbmk 0.0001 -0.006 -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Premium to NAV -0.140 -0.140
(0.097) (0.096)
Volume -0.042∗ -0.043∗
(0.025) (0.024)
Flow 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Liquidity 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Rf 0.053
(0.052)
RM −Rf 0.009
(0.007)
HML -0.010
(0.009)
SMB 0.013
(0.010)
CMA 0.011
(0.008)
RMW 0.013
(0.019)
Mom -0.012
(0.008)
Observations 28,263 25,724 20,468 20,468
R2 0.367 0.602 0.659 0.640
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Table 1.8: Impact of ETF demand in commodity markets. Calendar rebalancing,
leverage rebalancing, flow rebalancing, and remainder are calculated based on equa-
tions (1.10) and (1.11). All independent variables are standardized. bt,1 is relative
basis, bt,2 is relative spread, bHt,i is the relative basis or spread of a synthetic futures
contract: all in %. Controls include time to maturity, variance of benchmark, return
on benchmark, spot price, open interest, and liquidity measured by bid-ask spreads.
In the regressions for bt,2, I control for the demand for the first-month contract. For
gas and oil, I also control for the difference in spot prices of the control asset versus
the traded contract. Daily frequency, from the first ETF introduction date in a given
market to February 2018.
Panel A: Total effect
Dependent variables Gas Silver Oil Gold
bt,1 bt,2 bt,1 bt,2 bt,1 bt,2 bt,1 bt,2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D$,allt,i -0.03 0.34∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗ 0.50 0.48∗∗ -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.11) (0.01) (0.00) (0.39) (0.23) (0.01) (0.01)
bHt,i 6.92∗∗∗ 4.39∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.92) (0.19) (0.01) (0.01) (0.42) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,182 2,231 2,096 2,103 2,097 2,083 2,054 2,167
R2 0.29 0.27 0.83 0.67 0.31 0.53 0.39 0.47
Panel B: Split on components
Dependent variables Gas Silver Oil Gold
bt,1 bt,2 bt,1 bt,2 bt,1 bt,2 bt,1 bt,2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Calendar rebt,i -0.78 0.07 -0.01∗ 0.00 -0.48 0.56 -0.03 -0.02
(0.56) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (0.41) (0.02) (0.01)
Leverage rebt,i -1.20 0.29∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.42∗ 0.53∗ -0.02 0.00
(1.12) (0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.24) (0.29) (0.02) (0.00)
Flow rebt,i 0.93 0.36∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ 0.37 0.30∗∗ -0.01 0.00
(0.68) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.29) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01)
Remaindert,i 1.95 0.53 0.00 0.00 -0.56 0.55 0.03∗ 0.01
(1.84) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.67) (0.02) (0.01)
bHt,i 7.12∗∗∗ 4.78∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(1.21) (0.50) (0.01) (0.01) (0.52) (0.28) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,134 2,218 2,067 2,072 2,066 2,037 2,012 2,115
R2 0.35 0.32 0.67 0.62 0.60 0.67 0.42 0.50
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Table 1.9: DD estimates. The table shows the estimates from regressions (1.17) and
(1.18) with a 60-day window around the first ETF introduction date for VIX, gas,
silver, gold, and oil markets. bt,1 is relative basis, bt,2 is relative spread between the
second-month and the first-month futures contracts. bt,3 is relative spread between the
third-month and the second-month futures contracts, bt,4 is relative spread between
the fourth-month and the third-month futures contracts. Column 4 is for the matched
sample. Column 5 shows the results of an event study for EFG. Since the dependent
variable is difference between two prices, I run an event study as opposed to DD re-
gression because the scale of prices for various markets is different. Panel A shows
the results for the first-month basis, the first-month EFG and the third-month spread.
Panel B shows the results for the second-month spread, the second-month EFG and
the fourth-month spread. Standard errors in columns 1–4 and 6 are double-clustered
by asset and time. Standard errors in column 5 are computed using the general-
ized method of moments (GMM) as synthetic futures for commodities are based on
estimated regression coefficients. Refer to Table 1.4 for variable definitions.
Panel A: first-month basis, EFG, and third-month spread
Dependent variables bt,1 EFGt,1 bt,3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rbmk -23.88
(22.60)
σ2bmk 4.64
(4.02)
OI 33.71∗
(19.55)
S -1.13
(1.09)
Liq 25.77
(28.31)
Treat 2.21
(1.95)
Post -1.83 2.24∗
(1.76) (1.27)
Treat × Post 3.87∗∗ 3.62∗∗ 3.12∗∗ 2.75∗∗ 1.32
(1.86) (1.78) (1.55) (1.32) (1.19)
Asset FE No Yes Yes No No Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No No Yes
Asset × Time FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,189 1,198 1,198 1,198 599 1,198
R2 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.15 0.13
Panel B: second-month spread, EFG, and fourth-month spread
Dependent variables bt,2 EFGt,2 bt,4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rbmk 9.30
(27.65)
σ2bmk 4.91
(7.10)
OI 7.12
(6.41)
S -4.41
(4.22)
Liq 2.04
(7.14)
Treat -5.12
(4.97)
Post -1.10 1.16∗∗∗
(2.04) (0.35)
Treat × Post 1.74∗∗ 1.78∗∗ 1.83∗∗ 1.84∗∗ 0.07
(0.85) (0.87) (0.89) (0.89) (0.11)
Asset FE No Yes Yes No No Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No No Yes
Asset × Time FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,185 1,197 1,197 1,197 592 1,197
R2 0.24 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.13 0.11
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1.11 Appendix A – Model of ETFs and arbitrageurs
In this section, I present a theoretical framework to explain the main empirical findings.
I show that ETF demand has an impact on prices in a finite-period economy with a
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) framework for arbitrageurs.
1.11.1 Assets
There is a riskless asset with an exogenous return rf > 0 and two risky assets in zero
net supply: futures with a price Ft,Ti and a hedge asset with a price Ht,Ti . Both risky
assets can have a maturity of one or two months: Ti = {T1, T2} denotes the maturity
of the asset. The hedge asset is similar to the futures contract but traded on a market
without ETF demand. For example, for VIX, it is the replicating portfolio of options.
Assets’ payoffs (dividends) each period before maturity (t < Ti) are jointly normal:
dFi,t ∼ N (di, σ2Fi),
dHi,t ∼ N (di, σ2Hi),
corr(dFi,t, dHi,t) = ρi.
At maturity, both assets pay the same amount dFi,Ti = dHi,Ti = STi , where STi is the
exogenous spot price of the asset underlying the futures contract (I do not model its
dynamics for simplicity). Payoffs can be interpreted as the carry of the futures contract
for period t. I take the hedge asset’s price to be exogenous: Ht,Ti =
∑Ti
j=t+1
E(dHi,j)
(1+rf )j .
1.11.2 ETFs
ETFs passively follow their benchmark. There are N ETFs, each with leverage Lj .
For simplicity and tractability, I do not model the dynamics of ETF demand Dallt,i as a
function of realized dividends of the first-month and the second-month futures contract
in equilibrium, and treat it as a demand shock similar to Garleanu et al. (2009). The
main purpose of the model is to illustrate that demand shocks from ETFs can bias
futures prices away from fundamentals but not to solve for the non-linear and less
tractable equilibrium dynamics of ETF rebalancing and dividend effects between the
two futures contracts.
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1.11.3 Arbitrageurs
Arbitrageurs have CARA preferences over wealth in the next period. Consider first a
two-period setup: arbitrageurs choose optimal positions at time t, and consume at time
t+ 1 when the assets pay off. For simplicity, I derive all results for the general futures
contract with maturity Ti.
The maximization problem of an arbitrageur is:
max
xFi,t,xHi,t
−Et(e−γWt+1) (1.19)
subject to a budget constraint:
Wt+1 = xFi,tdFi,t+1 + xHi,tdHi,t+1 + (1 + rf ) (Wt − xFi,tFt,Ti − xHi,tHt,Ti) , (1.20)
where Wt is the wealth of an arbitrageur, γ is the risk aversion parameter, xFi,t is the
position in the futures, xHi,t is the position in the hedge asset. Using log-normality
and the fact that Ht,Ti =
Et(dHi,t+1)
1+rf , the maximization problem is equivalent to
max
xFi,t,xHi,t
Et(Wt+1)− γ2 Vart(Wt+1)
⇐⇒ max
xFi,t,xHi,t
xFi,t(Et(dFi,t+1)− Ft,Ti(1 + rf ))−
− γ2 (x
2
Fi,tσ
2
Fi + x
2
Hi,tσ
2
Hi + 2xFi,txHi,tρiσFiσHi).
(1.21)
Taking first-order condition (FOC) with respect to xHi,t gives x∗Hi,t =
−ρiσFi
σHi
xFi,t.
Substituting back in (1.21) and taking FOC with respect to xFi,t yields
x∗Fi,t =
Et(dFi,t+1)− Ft,Ti(1 + rf )
γσ2Fi(1− ρ2i )
.
Now, using market clearing (x∗Fi,t = −Dallt,i ), I obtain the equilibrium futures price:
Ft,Ti =
Et(dFi,t+1)
1 + rf
+
γσ2Fi(1− ρ2i )
1 + rf
Dallt,i , (1.22)
or
Ft,Ti =
di
1 + rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamental value = Ht,Ti
+
γσ2Fi(1− ρ2i )
1 + rf
Dallt,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
ETF price impact
. (1.23)
The EFG is explicitly given by Ft,Ti − Ht,Ti =
γσ2Fi
(1−ρ2i )
1+rf D
all
t,i and is proportional to
ETF demand as
γσ2Fi
(1−ρ2i )
1+rf ≥ 0. Price impact φi =
∂Ft,Ti
∂Dallt,i
is larger when arbitrageurs
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are more risk-averse, when the variance of the futures payoff is larger, and when H is
a worse hedge (|ρi| < 1).
Why do arbitrageurs optimize over wealth next period and cannot wait until the ma-
turity of the futures contract Ti? This assumption is similar to Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), where arbitrageurs care about next period returns because they could lose mar-
ket share, or face outflows if the price discrepancy widens. The ETF framework studied
here is an even more pronounced example of a setting where arbitrageurs mechanically
have to maximize over wealth next period and cannot wait until maturity. Due to
calendar rebalancing, ETFs gradually roll out of the futures positions before expira-
tion, and always hold zero contracts at maturity. Therefore, if arbitrageurs take the
opposite positions, they also have to gradually close those positions before expiration.
Thus, they face the risk of widening price gaps. Another reason for the short horizon
of arbitrageurs is the specifics of trading futures contracts. Since futures positions are
collateralized and marked-to-market on a daily basis, arbitrageurs could get financially
constrained at times when they are short the futures and the EFG increases, if they do
not hedge the position perfectly.
1.11.3.1 Financial constraints
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) show that when arbitrageurs’ financial constraint binds,
arbitrageurs cannot fully absorb demand shocks, and price gaps can persist for more
than two periods. To illustrate this idea, consider period t− 1 and suppose that as of
time t− 1, di and Dallt,i are uncertain:
di ∼ N (di, σ2Fi),
Dallt,i ∼ N (y¯i, σ2y),
corr(di, Dallt,i ) = ρy.
The fact that Dallt,i and the mean of the dividend are correlated captures the idea that
ETF demand shocks are correlated with realized returns. The price as of time t− 1 is
then:
Ft−1,Ti =
Et−1(Ft,Ti)
1 + rf
= di(1 + rf )2
+
γσ2Fi(1− ρ2i )
(1 + rf )2
Et−1(Dallt,i ). (1.24)
Thus, the futures price before Ti reflects not only the expected future value of dividends
(the fundamental value), but also the expected price impact of ETFs. Equation (1.24)
shows that before Ti, the futures price can be different from the fundamental value due
to the risk of bearing ETF demand shocks. The expectations of higher ETF demand
Passive Funds Actively Affect Prices: Evidence from the Largest ETF Markets 76
shock in the future would push today’s price away from the fundamental value and give
rise to the EFG. The variance of the price is also greater due to the non-fundamental
component:
V art−1(Ft,Ti) =
1
(1 + rf )4
( σ2Fi︸︷︷︸
fundamental var.
+ γ2σ4Fi(1− ρ2i )2σ2y + 2γ(1− ρ2i )σ2FiρyσFiσy︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-fundamental var.
).
(1.25)
Higher variance would decrease the correlation between the futures contract and the
hedge asset, and also increase the volatility of the arbitrageur’s return. If arbitrageurs
have to meet a financial constraint similar to that expressed in Gromb and Vayanos
(2002), higher variance could lead to amplification of price changes. Typically, the finan-
cial constraint would be increasing in the demand shock and the volatility of the price.37
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) show that, due to arbitrageurs’ financial constraints, the
price gap (EFGt = Ft,Ti −Ht,Ti) can persist for several periods. The equilibrium out-
come depends on whether arbitrageurs close the gap before their financial constraint
binds. If the arbitrageurs’ initial wealth is not large enough, the financial constraint
binds in all periods and arbitrageurs do not fully absorb ETF demand shocks. As a
result, the EFG persists over time and is closed only at maturity Ti. The fact that the
two-months EFG increases when the TED spread goes up (Table 1.4) is evidence that
financial constraints are related to the EFG.
With a financial constraint in place, the risk of trading against ETF demand is am-
plified. Demand pressure then enters into the pricing kernel similar to Garleanu et al.
(2009). Large and unexpected demand shock can tighten the financial constraint and
force arbitrageurs to liquidate positions at a loss. Take an arbitrary τ , 0 < τ < Ti.
Suppose EFGτ−1 > 0 and arbitrageurs enter period τ with a position xFi,τ−1 < 0 in
the futures contract. Then, suppose that there is a large and positive realization of
the fundamental dividend dFi,τ . Large and positive dFi,τ would increase the ETF de-
mand shock Dallτ,i mostly due to leverage rebalancing. That would push up Fτ,i further
away from Hτ,i and could make the arbitrageurs’ financial constraint binding since ar-
bitrageurs lose money (they sold the futures). In that case, arbitrageurs would have to
liquidate their positions to meet the constraint. The liquidation would decrease arbi-
trageurs’ wealth and increase the EFG further. Arbitrageurs’ selloff could amplify the
price change, which would increase the leverage-induced demand by ETFs and further
tighten the budget constraint. Thus, the presence of ETFs in a given market creates a
potential feedback channel and pushes today’s price away from the fundamental value,
37This is the case in Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Gromb and Vayanos (2018) and several other
papers. With normally distributed dividends, risk-free loans are not possible, so one can use a similar
constraint that is increasing in volatility, instead of using the maximum possible loss for an arbitrageur.
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increasing the futures premium. Compared to traditional amplification mechanisms
(see, e.g., Gromb and Vayanos, 2002), the feedback channel in the case with ETFs
arises not only because of financial constraints but also due to mechanically induced
short-horizon momentum trades by leveraged ETFs.
1.11.3.2 Transaction costs
Empirically, another risk for arbitrageurs in the VIX market is the risk of widening
bid-ask spreads. As seen from Figure 1.25, the bid-ask spreads of the synthetic futures
contract are larger than those of the traded VIX futures contract. Therefore, hedging
the futures position involves significant transaction costs. Moreover, bid-ask spreads
spike during periods of high volatility. This would decrease the correlation between the
prices of the two contracts and amplify arbitrageurs’ losses if they were to close the
position.
Assume that, in order to hedge her position in Ft,Ti with a position in Ht,Ti , the
arbitrageur incurs a transaction cost c. The cost is paid both when the arbitrageur
buys the asset, and when she sells it (e.g., bid-ask spreads). Without loss of generality
and for analytical tractability, I assume that transaction costs are paid per unit of Ft,Ti .
The maximization problem of an arbitrageur is then slightly changed:
max
xFi,t,xHi,t
xFi,t(Et(dFi,t+1)− Ft,Ti(1 + rf ))−
γ
2 (x
2
Fi,tσ
2
Fi + x
2
Hi,tσ
2
Hi+
+ 2xFi,txHi,tρiσFiσHi)− c|xFi,t|.
(1.26)
Taking first-order condition (FOC) in the two cases (xFi,t > 0 and xFi,t ≤ 0) and using
market clearing), I obtain the equilibrium futures price:
Ft,Ti =
di
1 + rf
+
γσ2Fi(1− ρ2i )
1 + rf
Dallt,i − c, if Dallt,i < 0,
Ft,Ti =
di
1 + rf
+
γσ2Fi(1− ρ2i )
1 + rf
Dallt,i + c, if Dallt,i ≥ 0.
The fact that the one-month EFG increases when bid-ask spreads rise (Table 1.4) is
evidence that transaction costs affect the EFG.
The results from this section show that arbitrageurs who trade against ETFs would
charge a premium for bearing unhedgeable risks. Investors can hedge fundamental
shocks to the futures contract by trading a similar futures contract with no ETF demand
(e.g., a replicating option portfolio for the case of VIX, or non-US gas futures for gas). If,
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however, the hedge asset is not perfectly correlated with the futures contract (|ρi| 6= 1),
the price impact will be positive. Hedging the futures exposure with Ht,Ti is not a pure
textbook arbitrage since it entails the risk of widening price discrepancy between the
two securities before maturity. Arbitrageurs absorb ETF demand as a liquidity service,
rather than to meet their own portfolio needs, and are compensated in equilibrium for
liquidity provision. The compensation comes in the form of a temporary price impact
that pushes prices away from fundamental values.
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1.12 Appendix B – derivations and additional robustness
checks
1.12.1 Forward VIX derivations
RT1→T2 is the gross return on the S&P 500 Index, Rf,t→T = erf (T−t) is the constant
gross risk-free rate. Using RT1→T2 =
Rt→T2
Rt→T1
and EQt RT1→T2 = Rf,T1→T2 :
EQt (V IX2T1→T2) =
2
T2 − T1E
Q
t
(
logEQt RT1→T2 − EQt logRT1→T2
)
= 2
T2 − T1E
Q
t
(
(T2 − t)rf − (T1 − t)rf − (EQt logRt→T2 − EQt logRt→T1)
)
= 2
T2 − T1
(
logEQt Rt→T2 − EQt logRt→T2 − (logEQt Rt→T1 − EQt logRt→T1)
)
= 1
T2 − T1
(
(T2 − t)V IX2t→T2 − (T1 − t)V IX2t→T1
)
.
(1.27)
1.12.2 Calculating VarQt (V IXT1→T2)
Based on a result from Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), the price of any function
g(ST ) satisfies:
1
Rf,t→T
EQt (g(ST )) =
1
Rf,t→T
g(EQt (ST )) +
∫ Ft,T
K=0
g′′(K)putt,T (K)dK +
∫ ∞
K=Ft,T
g′′(K)callt,T (K)dK.
(1.28)
Take g(ST ) = S2T , then:
1
Rf,t→T
(
EQt (S2T )− (EQt (ST ))2
)
= 2
(∫ Ft,T
K=0
putt,T (K)dK +
∫ ∞
K=Ft,T
callt,T (K)dK
)
.
VarQt (ST ) = 2Rf,t→T
(∫ Ft,T
K=0
putt,T (K)dK +
∫ ∞
K=Ft,T
callt,T (K)dK
)
.
(1.29)
Another way to get the same equation is by using RT = STSt in equation (11) of Martin
(2017).
Take T = T1, T2 = T1 + 30 days, ST1 = V IXT1→T2 , then:
VarQt (V IXT1→T2) = 2Rf,t→T1
(∫ Ft,T1
K=0
putt,T1(K)dK +
∫ ∞
K=Ft,T1
callt,T1(K)dK
)
,
(1.30)
where Ft,T1 – time t’s price of a futures on V IXT1→T2 with maturity T1,
putt,T1(K) – time t’s price of a put option on V IXT1→T2 with maturity T1 and strike
K,
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callt,T1(K) – time t’s price of a call option on V IXT1→T2 with maturity T1 and strike
K.
The underlying asset of the call and put options is the futures on the VIX since at
maturity T1, FT1,T1 = ST1 = V IXT1→T2 , and there are no dividends.
1.12.3 Details on the synthetic VIX futures calculation
V IX2t→T1 , and V IX
2
t→T2 are calculated using the exact same procedure as outlined in
the CBOE VIX White Paper. The correlation between the calculated VIX and the
CBOE-quoted one for a maturity of one month is 99.8%.
Empirically, sometimes no S&P 500 Index options expire at the exact same time as
VIX futures. VIX futures typically expire in the morning of the Wednesday before
the third Friday of the month (the settlement value is calculated using special opening
quote values). There are always options expiring 30 days after, since these are used
to calculate the settlement price of VIX. S&P 500 Index options (weeklys) also cease
trading on Wednesday, but are p.m.-settled and expire at 4:00 p.m. I deal with this issue
in several ways. First, I compute EQt (V IX2T1→T2) using the evening quotes for options.
Second, I interpolate in the volatility space to get prices of options expiring in the
morning, and compute EQt (V IX2T1→T2) using these prices. With both approaches, the
estimates for the EFG shared similar patterns as in Figure 1.5. Sometimes, especially
before weeklys were introduced, there were no S&P 500 Index options expiring at the
same time as VIX futures. For those, I interpolate V IX2t→T1 using the nearest (usually
within 1–2 days) expiring option contracts.
For the computation of VarQt (V IXT1→T2), I need the futures price Ft,T1 . I tested three
different ways to estimate it. First, by finding the strike for which put and call prices
are closest (analogous to the calculation of VIX). Second, by implementing an iterative
procedure to find Ft,T1 = E
Q
t (V IXT1→T2) that makes equation (1.5) hold. Third, by
using the traded VIX futures price. The main results were similar with each of the
three estimates.
A potential concern for the computation of V IX2T1→T2 is the existence of discretization
errors. As a robustness check, similar to Aït-Sahalia et al. (2018), I calculated forward
VIX by interpolating the volatility surface and finding option prices for all strikes
following the methodology of Carr and Wu (2009). The EFG was less volatile and
smaller in magnitude, on average, but the main results of the paper were unchanged.
As another robustness test, I calculated the EFG using minimum price instead of mid-
point price for each option in equation (1.7) similar to Kadan and Tang (2020). The
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main results of the paper were unchanged but the EFG was underestimated even more
using this approach.
Another concern is that the specific rules used by the CBOE for selecting options to
calculate VIX could lead to instabilities in the intra-day value of the index, especially
during extreme market movements as noted by Andersen et al. (2011). However, I use
the CBOE methodology to compute forward VIX on a daily basis. These instabilities
should be less severe than on an intra-day basis (see, e.g., Aït-Sahalia et al., 2018).
1.12.4 Variance and volatility
One concern with the replicating portfolio that gives the option-implied VIX futures
price is that we can replicate variance by using it, but the VIX futures settles at
volatility. However, by choosing the number of contracts in a smart way, we can easily
eliminate the risk and make sure to profit from the EFG. Denote the portfolio under the
square root in equation (1.5) X2t = E
Q
t (V IX2T1→T2)− Var
Q
t (V IXT1→T2). For example,
suppose that Ft,T1 > E
Q
t (ST1) =
√
X2t so the EFG is positive (this is the case for the
most of the sample). We can make sure to profit from the gap by selling 2Xt units of
Ft,T1 and buying one unit ofX2t at time t. At maturity T1, FT1,T1 = XT1 = ST1 . Assume,
for simplicity that rf = 0 (with rf > 0, the profit is even larger). The total profit from
t to T1 is then 2XtFt,T1 −X2t +S2T1 − 2XtST1 = 2XtFt,T1 − 2X2t +S2T1 − 2XtST1 +X2t =
2Xt(Ft,T1 −Xt) + (ST1 −Xt)2 > 0 as Ft,T1 > Xt. The logic for the case Ft,T1 < EQt (ST1)
is similar.
1.12.5 Derivations of ETF demand decomposition
At time t, the ETF has a dollar position of LαtAt in the first-month futures contract
and L(1 − αt)At in the second. It holds LαtAtFt,T1 units of the first-month contract and
L(1−αt)At
Ft,T2
units of the second. At time t + 1, the ETF holds L(αt−
1
K
)At+1
Ft+1,T1
units of the
first-month contract and L(1−αt+
1
K
)At+1
Ft+1,T2
of the second. The total rebalancing demand
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(in number of contracts) for the first-month contract from t to t+ 1 is then:
Dt+1,1 =
L(αt − 1K )At+1
Ft+1,T1
− LαtAt
Ft,T1
= 1
Ft+1,T1
(
αt
(
LAt(1 + Lrt+1) + Lut+1 − LAt(1 + rF1t+1)
)
− L
K
At+1
)
= 1
Ft+1,T1
(
αt
(
LAt(Lrt+1 − rt+1 + rt+1 − rF1t+1) + Lut+1
)
− L
K
At(1 + Lrt+1)− L
K
ut+1
)
= 1
Ft+1,T1
(
− L
K
At(1 + Lrt+1) + αtAtL(L− 1)rt+1 + (αt − 1
K
)Lut+1+
+ αt(1− αˆt)LAt(rF2t+1 − rF1t+1)
)
.
(1.31)
I used the fact that rt+1 − rF1t+1 = (1 − αˆt)(rF2t+1 − rF1t+1), where rF1t+1 is the net re-
turn on the first-month futures contract, rF2t+1 is the net return on the second, αˆt =
αtFt,T1
αtFt,T1+(1−αt)Ft,T2
, and rt+1 =
αtFt+1,T1+(1−αt)Ft+1,T2
αtFt,T1+(1−αt)Ft,T2
− 1 = αˆtrF1t+1 + (1− αˆt)rF2t+1 is the
net return on the benchmark. In dollar terms, the rebalancing demand is:
D$t+1,1 = Dt+1,1Ft+1,T1
= − L
K
At(1 + Lrt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
calendar rebalancing
+αtAtL(L− 1)rt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
leverage rebalancing
+ (αt − 1
K
)Lut+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow rebalancing
+
+ αt(1− αˆt)LAt(rF2t+1 − rF1t+1).︸ ︷︷ ︸
remainder
(1.32)
Analogously, the total dollar rebalancing demand for the second futures is:
D$t+1,2 = Dt+1,2Ft+1,T2
= L
K
At(1 + Lrt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
calendar rebalancing
+ (1− αt)AtL(L− 1)rt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
leverage rebalancing
+ (1− αt + 1
K
)Lut+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow rebalancing
−
− αˆt(1− αt)LAt(rF2t+1 − rF1t+1).︸ ︷︷ ︸
remainder
(1.33)
Equations (1.32) and (1.33) can be rewritten in a way to isolate the terms multiplying
L2. For equation (1.32):
D$t+1,1 = (αt −
1
K
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
AtL
2rt+1 − αtAtLrt+1 − L
K
At + (αt − 1
K
)Lut+1+
+αt(1− αˆt)LAt(rF2t+1 − rF1t+1).
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Running the main regressions with the non-linear terms instead of calendar and lever-
age rebalancing still shows that the predictable part of calendar rebalancing ( LKAt) is
statistically significant. Table 1.5 also confirms this fact.
1.12.6 Alternative calculations of leverage rebalancing
A possible concern is that ETFs have higher tracking errors when trying to maintain
a constant daily leverage due to non-linear price responses as shown in section 1.6.
In particular, the exact size of leverage rebalancing could be slightly different. To
alleviate this concern, I tried two alternative ways to estimate leverage rebalancing.
First, I calculated it using β from Table 1.6 instead of L – essentially, using the average
effective leverage. Second, I estimated leverage rebalancing as the difference between
the total rebalancing demand, and the sum of flow rebalancing, remainder, and the
part of calendar rebalancing that is linear in L. The latter three components of ETF
demand are less likely to be influenced by non-linear price responses. In both alternative
approaches, the main results of the paper were unchanged: the EFG was most sensitive
to leverage rebalancing, and the proportion of leverage rebalancing increased steadily
over time. The relative size of the leverage rebalancing component in the two robustness
tests was 3% lower than in the main analysis, on average. Using β from Table 1.6 instead
of L for net calendar rebalancing, flow rebalancing, and remainder barely changed the
results as the errors canceled out for long and inverse ETFs (in the linear terms). I
also performed a robustness test, excluding from the analysis episodes with extremely
large tracking errors. The main results of the paper were unchanged. These tests are
excluded from the paper for brevity but available on request.
1.12.7 Leverage rebalancing. Derivations of the futures-based bench-
mark dynamics in a GBM setting
Consider a simple model where the spot follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM):
dSt
St
= µSdt+σdWt. Wt is a standard Brownian motion, µS and σ are the instantaneous
drift and diffusion of the spot.38 The dynamics of the price of a futures with maturity
i is then dFt,TiFt,Ti = (µS − (rf + yt,Ti))dt + σdWt, where yt,Ti is the per dt convenience
yield and rf is the risk-free rate.
38They can be non-deterministic but for simplicity I assume they are constant. The results with
time-varying volatility are qualitatively similar.
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The dynamics of the futures-based benchmark (dFtFt ) under the physical measure P is
then:
dFt
Ft
= αˆt
dFt,T1
Ft,T1
+ (1− αˆt)dFt,T2
Ft,T2
= αˆt
(
(µS − (rf + yt,T1))dt+ σdWt
)
+ (1− αˆt)
((
µS − (rf + yt,T2)
)
dt+ σdWt
)
=
(
µS −
(
rf + yt,T2 − αˆt(yt,T2 − yt,T1)
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ
dt+ σdWt
= µdt+ σdWt.
(1.34)
Then, with a management fee f , the AUM of a leveraged ETF evolve as::
dAt
At
= LˆdFt
Ft
+ ((1− Lˆ)rf − f)dt
d logAt = (Lˆµ− Lˆ
2σ2
2 + (1− Lˆ)rf − f)dt+ LˆσdWt
⇐⇒ AT = A0e(Lˆµ− Lˆ
2σ2
2 +(1−Lˆ)rf−f)T+LˆσWT
⇐⇒ AT = A0(FT
F0
)Lˆe((−f+(1−Lˆ)rf )T−
Lˆ(Lˆ−1)
2 σ
2T ).
(1.35)
The last line is obtained from the previous one by adding and subtracting Lˆσ22 T in the
power of e.
1.12.8 Derivations of the moments of the short-both strategy
Var(rSB,T ) = Var(
AT
A0
) + 2Cov(AT
A0
,
BT
B0
) + Var(BT
B0
)
= e2LµT (eL
2σ2T − 1) + 2(e(Lµ−L
2σ2
2 )T+LσWT+(−Lµ−L
2σ2
2 )T−LσWT − eLµT e−LµT )+
+ e−2LµT (eL
2σ2T − 1)
= (eL
2σ2T − 1)(e2LµT + e−2LµT ) + 2(e−L2σ2T − 1) ≈ L2σ2T (e2LµT + e−2LµT − 2).
(1.36)
1.12.9 Potential offsetting effect of flows
In cases of extreme market movements, both long and short leveraged ETFs have
to trade in the same direction. However, flows could offset these effects as noted in
Ivanov and Lenkey (2018). If flows to ETFs were contrarian, this could cancel the
effects of leverage rebalancing. For example, suppose the benchmark jumps up on a
given day. If investors take out money from long ETFs and invest it in inverse ETFs,
that would decrease the flow rebalancing and mitigate the feedback channel from ETF
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demand to prices. However, Table 1.10 shows that there is limited evidence in favor of
this suggestion. Only for gas are flows negatively correlated with changes in leverage
rebalancing. For silver and oil, there is even evidence of positive relation between the
two components of ETF demand: flows could reinforce leverage rebalancing.
Table 1.10: Flows on leverage rebalancing. The table presents regression results
of flows on leverage rebalancing. The sample period is from the first leveraged ETF
introduction date in a given market to February 2018 (daily frequency).
Dependent
variables
VIX Gas Silver Oil
Flow, Ft,T1 Flow, Ft,T2 Flow, Ft,T1 Flow, Ft,T2 Flow, Ft,T1 Flow, Ft,T2 Flow, Ft,T1 Flow, Ft,T2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lev reb, Ft,Ti -0.01 0.05 -0.30 -0.29∗ 0.04∗ 0.00 0.11∗∗ 0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.25) (0.18) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00)
Observations 1,687 1,716 1,608 1,687 1,901 2,016 1,595 1,674
R2 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
1.12.10 Mid-term VIX ETFs
Table 1.11 shows the results of regression (1.3) for mid-term VIX ETFs. These ETFs
invest one third of their AUM in the fifth-month futures contract, one third in the sixth-
month one, and roll one third from the fourth-month to the seventh-month futures
contract on a daily basis. The results from Table 1.11 illustrate that ETF demand
has an impact only on the fifth-month spread and the sixth-month spread, mainly
due to leverage rebalancing and flows. The effects of calendar rebalancing are less
pronounced, probably because mid-term VIX ETFs constitute a lower fraction of open
interest compared to short-term VIX ETFs. One standard deviation rise in leverage
rebalancing increases the fifth-month spread by 0.25%, and the sixth-month spread by
0.33%.
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Table 1.11: Mid-term VIX ETFs. The table presents the results of regression (1.3)
for mid-term VIX ETFs. Columns 1–4 correspond to the relative spread of 4–7 months
futures. Panel B shows the estimates for ETF demand components. All independent
variables are standardized. Refer to Table 1.4 for variable definitions. Daily data,
February 2009 – December 2017.
Panel A: Total effect
Dependent variables bt,4, rel bt,5, rel bt,6, rel bt,7, rel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D$,allt,i -0.17 0.13∗∗ 0.12∗ 0.01
(0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
bHt,i 4.21∗∗∗ 4.35∗∗∗ 4.98∗∗∗ 5.30∗∗∗
(1.00) (0.94) (0.97) (1.44)
rbmk,t -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03)
σ2bmk,t -0.18∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.12 -0.01
(0.10) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08)
OIt,i 0.15 0.78∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.23) (0.18) (0.10)
St -2.47∗∗∗ -1.61∗∗∗ -0.96∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.30) (0.28) (0.18)
Liqt,i -0.48∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.70∗ -0.91∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.02) (0.41) (0.16)
αt -0.18∗∗ -0.03 0.07 0.10
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 1,732 1,720 1,724 1,731
R2 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.27
Panel B: Split on components
Dependent variables bt,4, rel bt,5, rel bt,6, rel bt,7, rel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Calendar rebt,i -1.58∗ 0.26
(0.84) (0.81)
Remaindert,i 1.40 -0.24
(1.38) (0.27)
Leverage rebt,i -0.25 0.25∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.17
(0.31) (0.12) (0.13) (0.28)
Flow rebt,i -0.30∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.15 -0.81
(0.12) (0.06) (0.151) (0.63)
Observations 1,697 1,685 1,694 1,692
R2 0.58 0.41 0.35 0.30
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1.13 Appendix C – Additional regressions, figures and ta-
bles
Figure 1.12: Futures term structure. Summary statistics. S is the spot, F1, F2, ...
F9 are the first, second, ... ninth generic futures contracts. The red dot corresponds to
the mean, the bold horizontal line corresponds to the median price of a given futures
maturity. The bottom and top borders of each bar show the first and third quartile
of the price distribution, respectively. The green bars indicate futures maturities in
which ETFs invest. The data are at a daily frequency, from the first ETF introduction
date in a given market to February 2018.
S F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9
0
10
20
30
40
VIX term structure
Vo
la
til
ity
 p
oi
nt
s
l l
l l l
l l l l l
l Mean
Median
S F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9
0
2
4
6
8
Gas term structure
$ l l l l l
l l l l l
S F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9
5
10
15
20
25
30
Silver term structure
$
l l l l l l l l l l
S F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9
500
1000
1500
Gold term structure
$
l l l l l l l l l l
Passive Funds Actively Affect Prices: Evidence from the Largest ETF Markets 88
Figure 1.13: Realized VIX futures premium before and after ETFs. The chart
shows the average size of the VIX futures premium for different maturities before
ETFs (including the crisis period, June 2004 – January 2009) and after ETFs (January
2009 – February 2018). The premium is calculated as the annualized net return of a
short-seller of a VIX futures Ft,T−FT,TFt,T , where T (Term) is maturity.
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Figure 1.14: Open interest dynamics. The left panel shows the dynamics of open
interest (monthly averages) in the VIX market for futures with maturities at 1–8
months. The dotted vertical line indicates the date when the first ETF was introduced.
The right panel shows the fraction of ETFs in open interest (monthly averages) for
futures with maturities at 1–8 months.
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Figure 1.15: Predictive power of basis in commodity markets. The figure depicts β1
and β2 from regressions (1.1) and (1.2) significant at the 5% level for gas, silver, gold
and oil for maturities at 1–9 months.
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Figure 1.16: Monthly ETF futures gap imputed from variance swaps. The left panel
shows the dynamics of the EFG for one month, the right panel for two months.
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Figure 1.17: Hedge fund positions and the EFG. The top panel shows the dynamics
of weekly net positions in VIX futures contracts for the main groups of investors. The
bottom panel illustrates the weighted-average ETF futures gap between one and two
months. The plots suggest hedge funds are mostly short VIX futures contracts after
the EFG starts to be positive.
−
20
0
0
20
0
Net positions in VIX futures
N
um
be
r o
f c
on
tra
ct
s,
 
00
0−
s
2006 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Dealers (ETFs)
Hedge Funds
0.
0
1.
0
EFG weighted avg., cumulative log−value
Lo
g−
va
lu
e
2006 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Passive
Funds
Actively
A
ffectPrices:
Evidence
from
the
LargestET
F
M
arkets
91
Figure 1.18: Example of trading against the leverage rebalancing of ETFs. At time t, the arbitrageur is trading against a double-long and a
double-short ETFs, both of which have AUM of 10 (the exposure is 20 for the long and -20 for the short ETF). At time t + 1, the price of the
underlying asset increases from 10 to 11, so both ETFs have to buy, and the arbitrageur acquires a net short position of 8. The left panel shows
the marked-to-market loss of an arbitrageur from t+ 1 to t+ 2, if the price drifts up from 10 to 11, to 12 over 3 periods. The right panel shows
the marked-to-market profit of an arbitrageur from t+1 to t+2, if the price reverts back to the initial value (from 10 to 11, to 10) over 3 periods.
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If price increases, both long and short have to buy: 
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Figure 1.19: VIX ETFs: log-values. The figure shows the log-values of a long (L = 1)
and inverse (L = −1) VIX ETFs. The plot illustrates that the two ETFs are not exact
mirror images of each other.
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Figure 1.20: Theoretical distribution of the short-both strategy return (rSB,T ) at
daily frequency for different values of µ and σ (both annualized). Mean is the average
daily return, SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio. Risk-free rate for calculating the
Sharpe ratio is set to 1%. Skew is skewness.
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Figure 1.21: Empirical distribution of intra-day rSB,T at daily frequency. Mean
is the average daily return, SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio. Risk-free rate for
calculating the Sharpe ratio is from French’s website. Skew is skewness.
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Figure 1.22: Empirical distribution of rSB,T at daily frequency using returns from
market’s open to close. Equity indices.
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Figure 1.23: Empirical distribution of rSB,T at daily frequency using returns from
market’s open to close. Equity, foreign exchange and bond indices.
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Figure 1.24: DD estimates, testing the parallel trends assumption. The figure
presents estimates of the DD effect from regression (1.17) with a 60-day window.
The x-axis shows days from the event date (introduction of ETF). Red dots illustrate
the point estimates, black vertical lines mark 2 standard deviations.
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Figure 1.25: Bid-ask spreads. The figure shows the dynamics of relative bid-ask
spreads of the synthetic futures and traded VIX futures for two months maturity.
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Table 1.12: Predictive power of basis – longer sample. Panels A and B present the
results from a predictive regression of spot or futures price changes on basis. Daily
frequency, June 2004 – February 2018.
Panel A: Spot VIX on basis: ST − St = α1 + β1 · (Ft,T − St) + 1,t
T=1m T=2m T=3m T=4m T=5m T=6m T=7m T=8m
β1 0.06 0.33∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.19) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
R2 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.27
Observations 3,247 3,235 2,953 2,973 2,991 2,936 2,627 2,389
Panel B: VIX futures on basis: FT,T − Ft,T = α2 + β2 · (Ft,T − St) + 2,t
T=1m T=2m T=3m T=4m T=5m T=6m T=7m T=8m
β2 -0.94∗∗∗ -0.68∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.09 -0.06
(0.22) (0.16) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
R2 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations 3,247 3,235 2,953 2,973 2,991 2,936 2,627 2,389
Table 1.13: Second basis regressed on ETF demand. In columns 1–4 and 6, demand
(D$,allt,2 and D
$,all
t,2 (rt−1)) is scaled by market capitalization; in column 5, it is not.
Columns 1–2 use absolute basis (Ft,T2 − St), 3–6 use relative basis (Ft,T2−StSt ). All
independent variables are standardized. Daily frequency, February 2009 – December
2017.
Dependent variables absolute basis relative basis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D$,allt,2 0.39∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 2.12∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.03) (0.40) (0.18) (0.20)
D$,allt,2 (rt−1) 0.63∗∗∗
(0.17)
bHt,2 2.59∗∗∗ 8.33∗∗∗ 8.31∗∗∗ 8.41∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
rbmk,t −0.07 −0.94∗∗∗ −1.03∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17)
σ2bmk,t −0.38 −2.90∗∗∗ −2.90∗∗∗ −3.27∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.71) (0.73) (0.73)
OIt,2 −0.19∗∗∗ 0.28 0.05 0.28
(0.06) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30)
St −0.49∗∗∗ −2.50∗∗∗ −2.58∗∗∗ −2.60∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27)
Liqt 0.16∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
αt 0.08 1.09∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Observations 1,922 1,907 1,922 1,854 1,847 1,853
R2 0.12 0.81 0.13 0.75 0.75 0.74
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Table 1.14: Impact of ETFs on basis and EFG. Regressions in first differences (columns 1–8). Relative basis scaled by days to maturity (columns
9–10). Controls include time to maturity, variance of benchmark, return on benchmark, spot price, open interest, and liquidity measured by
bid-ask spreads. All independent variables are standardized. Daily frequency, February 2009 – December 2017.
Dependent variables ∆bt,1, abs ∆bt,1, rel ∆bt,2, abs ∆bt,2, rel ∆EFGt,1 ∆EFGt,2 ∆EFGt,1 ∆EFGt,2 bt,1, rel, days bt,2, rel, days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
D$,allt,i 0.18∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.15 0.34∗ 0.93∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.10) (0.07) (0.15) (0.19) (0.38) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02)
Calendar rebt,i -0.47∗ -0.03
(0.27) (0.11)
Leverage rebt,i 2.32∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(1.09) (0.16)
Flow rebt,i 0.94∗∗ 0.25
(0.41) (0.16)
Remaindert,i -0.44 -0.21
(0.78) (0.158)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,944 1,944 1,921 1,921 1,897 1,823 1,889 1,818 1,932 1,908
R2 0.70 0.52 0.33 0.26 0.35 0.26 0.341 0.26 0.47 0.42
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Table 1.15: Impact of ETF fractions on prices and EFG in the VIX market. The
table presents regression results for the basis, spread, and EFG regressed on the net
ETF fraction (Φt,i =
∑N
j=1 LjAj,t,i/Mkt capt,i) in futures with maturity i. All inde-
pendent variables (except Φt,i in columns 3 and 6 of Panel B) are standardized. Panel
A shows the result for the first-month basis, and the spread between the first and the
second futures. Columns 1 and 3 present the regressions for absolute basis and spread,
columns 2 and 4 for relative basis and spread. Panel B presents the results for one and
two-months EFG. Columns 3 and 6 use non-standardized demand. Controls include
return on the ETF benchmark, variance of the ETF benchmark, open interest, spot
price, liquidity and time to maturity. Daily frequency, February 2009 – December
2017.
Panel A: Basis and spread on ETF fraction
Dependent variables bt,1, abs. bt,1, rel. bt,2, abs. bt,2, rel.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Φt,i 0.19∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12)
bHt,i 1.35∗∗∗ 5.20∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 5.63∗∗∗
(0.24) (1.17) (0.05) (1.12)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,946 1,946 1,923 1,923
R2 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.49
Panel B: EFG on ETF fraction
Dependent variables EFGt,1 EFGt,2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Φt,i 2.07∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.32) (0.22) (0.14) (0.13) (0.28)
EFGt−1,i 6.64∗∗∗ 6.63∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗
(0.57) (0.58) (0.17) (0.17)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,825 1,825 1,825
R2 0.28 0.47 0.47 0.29 0.61 0.61
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Table 1.16: Robustness: periods of high and low variance, Fama–French five factors.
Columns 1–2 and 4–5 show the impact of ETF demand in periods of high (above me-
dian) and low (below median) variance of the benchmark. Columns 3 and 6 present
the results of a regression with the Fama–French five factors and momentum. Columns
7–8 show the results for the period before ETFs. D$,allt,i is scaled by market capital-
ization. RM,t − Rf,t, HMLt, SMBt, CMAt, RMWt, Momt are the Fama–French five
factors and momentum. Daily frequency, February 2009 – December 2017.
Dependent variables EFGt,1 EFGt,1 EFGt,2 EFGt,2 EFGt,1 EFGt,2
high var low var high var low var before ETFs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D$,allt,i 1.15∗∗∗ 0.71∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.37) (0.38) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11)
EFGt−1,1 5.40∗∗∗ 4.47∗∗∗ 6.07∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ 3.93∗∗∗ 6.52∗∗∗ 3.27∗∗∗
(0.58) (1.06) (0.72) (0.30) (0.18) (0.19) (0.26) (0.15)
rbmk,t 0.69∗∗∗ 0.49 0.45∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ -0.06 0.18∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.30) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (0.23) (0.12)
σ2bmk,t 0.99 0.68∗ 1.49 -0.70 -0.12 -0.32 -0.27 -0.00
(1.29) (0.35) (0.96) (0.90) (0.11) (0.57) (0.22) (0.12)
OIt,i 1.76 2.44 1.69 -1.14 -1.28 -1.11 -0.89∗∗∗ 0.01
(1.80) (1.99) (1.49) (1.25) (1.25) (1.16) (0.32) (0.17)
St -0.57 0.63∗∗∗ 0.31 -0.60∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.60∗ 0.045
(1.12) (0.15) (0.58) (0.13) (0.04) (0.08) (0.33) (0.18)
Liqt,i 0.97∗ 1.04∗∗ 0.91∗∗ -0.21 0.22 -0.01 0.33∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.51) (0.53) (0.37) (0.20) (0.14) (0.11) (0.16) (0.06)
TEDt 1.60 -1.17 0.46 2.33∗∗ 0.92∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 0.38 -0.15
(1.86) (1.05) (0.94) (1.08) (0.44) (0.40) (0.33) (0.19)
αt 0.96∗∗∗ 0.65∗ 0.66∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.04 -0.31∗∗ -0.22 0.05
(0.35) (0.37) (0.24) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12) (0.28) (0.15)
RM,t-Rf,t 0.15∗ 1.61
(0.09) (1.24)
HMLt 0.03 -0.04
(0.34) (0.12)
SMBt -0.03 0.01
(0.24) (0.10)
CMAt -0.13 0.01
(0.26) (0.08)
RMWt -0.11 0.08
(0.25) (0.09)
Momt 0.09 0.17
(0.22) (0.10)
Observations 949 949 1,870 912 912 1,801 464 481
R2 0.50 0.36 0.44 0.60 0.53 0.58 0.65 0.53
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Table 1.17: Robustness: adding lagged demand and hedging pressure from the VIX
options market. Columns 1–2 show the results for relative basis, 3–6 for EFG. D$,allt,i
is scaled by market capitalization. Deltat,i and Gammat,i are measures of hedging
pressure in the VIX options market. Deltat,i is the sum of all Black-Scholes deltas
multiplied with the open interest and the futures price for all options on the first-month
or second-month futures. Gammat,i is the sum of all Black-Scholes gammas multiplied
with the open interest and the squared price for all options on the first-month or
second-month futures. All independent variables are standardized. RM,t−Rf,t, HMLt,
SMBt, CMAt, RMWt, Momt are the Fama–French five factors and momentum. Daily
frequency, February 2009 – December 2017.
Dependent variables bt,1, rel bt,2, rel EFGt,1 EFGt,2 EFGt,1 EFGt,2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D$,allt,1 0.89∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.36) (0.10) (0.41) (0.14)
D$,allt−1,1 0.70∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.19∗
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11)
bHt,i 5.42∗∗∗ 5.19∗∗∗
(1.22) (1.14)
EFGt−1,i 6.12∗∗∗ 4.15∗∗∗ 6.27∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.16) (0.82) (0.17)
rbmk,t -0.97 -0.51 1.86∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(0.86) (0.65) (0.59) (0.22) (0.69) (0.25)
σ2bmk,t -1.17∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ 0.55 -0.47 0.54 -0.21
(0.28) (0.16) (0.82) (0.50) (0.82) (0.18)
OIt,i 1.66∗∗∗ 0.15 -1.56 -0.36 -1.14 -0.27
(0.27) (0.24) (1.35) (0.29) (1.47) (0.28)
St -2.79∗∗∗ -3.89∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.31∗∗ -0.05 -0.32∗∗
(0.32) (0.26) (0.28) (0.12) (0.49) (0.15)
Liqt,i 1.22∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.08 0.70∗∗∗ 0.07
(0.21) (0.37) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.10)
TEDt -0.01 1.26∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.39) (0.12) (0.30)
αt 0.93∗∗∗ -0.21∗ 0.46∗∗∗ -0.34∗ 0.63∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18) (0.31) (0.13)
RM,t −Rf,t 0.13 1.14∗ 0.36 1.53∗∗
(0.29) (0.66) (0.48) (0.71)
HMLt -0.21 -0.02 -0.08 -0.15
(0.22) (0.10) (0.39) (0.11)
SMBt -0.36 -0.03 -0.21 -0.16
(0.24) (0.10) (0.28) (0.11)
RMWt -0.10 -0.01 -0.15 0.03
(0.19) (0.09) (0.27) (0.09)
CMAt -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.08
(0.18) (0.07) (0.34) (0.10)
Momt -0.14 0.17 -0.08 0.06
(0.18) (0.11) (0.24) (0.09)
Deltat,i -0.62∗ -0.02
(0.36) (0.13)
Gammat,i -0.09 -0.12
(0.40) (0.14)
Observations 1,942 1,920 1,895 1,822 1,842 1,797
R2 0.49 0.45 0.51 0.63 0.50 0.63
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Table 1.18: Predictive regressions of futures returns on EFG in the VIX market.
Columns 1 and 2 show the results of monthly predictive regressions of the realized
futures returns on the EFG. For one-month futures contract, I use returns from the
date when a two-months contract becomes a one-month contract, to expiration. For
two-months futures contract, I use returns calculated from 45 days before maturity, to
expiration. rFit,Ti =
FTi,Ti−Ft,Ti
Ft,Ti
. Columns 3 and 4 present daily predictive regressions.
Return on futures is already excess return because the collateral earns the risk-free rate
of interest: all futures positions are fully collateralized, with the collateral invested
in three-month Treasury bills. RM,t − Rf,t, HMLt, SMBt, CMAt, RMWt, Momt are
the Fama–French five factors and momentum. The data sample is February 2009 –
December 2017.
Dependent variables rF1t,T1 r
F2
t,T2
rF1t r
F2
t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EFGt,i −0.22∗∗ −1.44∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −1.28∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.51) (0.06) (0.20)
rbmk,t 0.03 0.005 0.01 0.02∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
σ2bmk,t 0.02 0.01 0.004 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
OIt,i −0.03 0.02 −0.001 −0.04∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
St −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Liqt,i 0.004 0.003 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
TEDt 0.07 0.09∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
αt −0.02 0.03 0.01 −0.004
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
RM,t −Rf,t 0.01 0.08 0.003 −0.001
(0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
SMBt 0.03 −0.07∗∗ −0.003 0.005
(0.02) (0.03) (0.005) (0.01)
HMLt −0.04 −0.01 0.005 0.02∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
RMWt 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.002 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
CMAt 0.02 −0.04∗ −0.005 −0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Momt −0.04 0.03 −0.002 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.005) (0.01)
Observations 102 68 1,893 1,822
R2 0.25 0.27 0.15 0.21
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Table 1.19: Regression results of synthetic futures and spot on synthetic basis.
Panel A presents the results from a predictive regression of spot price changes on
synthetic basis: ST − St = α1 + β1 · (EQt (ST ) − St) + 1,t. Panel B presents the
results from a predictive regression of synthetic futures changes on synthetic basis:
EQT (ST )−EQt (ST ) = α2 + β2 · (EQt (ST )− St) + 2,t. Daily frequency, February 2009 –
December 2017.
Panel A: Spot VIX on basis
T=1m T=2m T=3m T=4m
β1 0.25∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11)
Observations 2,137 2,119 2,009 1,840
R2 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.09
Panel B: Synthetic VIX futures on basis
T=1m T=2m T=3m T=4m
β2 -0.75∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.19) (0.11) (0.09)
Observations 2,137 2,119 2,009 1,840
R2 0.41 0.14 0.50 0.33
Table 1.20: Impact of ETF demand on synthetic basis (EQt (ST1) − St) and spread
(EQt (ST2) − EQt (ST1)). All independent variables are standardized. Daily frequency,
February 2009 – December 2017.
Dependent variables EQt (ST1)− St EQt (ST2)− EQt (ST1) EQt (ST1)− St EQt (ST2)− EQt (ST1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D$,allt,i -0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.07
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
bHt,i 1.87∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.13)
rbmk,t -0.44∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ -0.74∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
OIt,i -0.04 -0.40∗∗∗ -0.20 -0.34∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10)
σ2bmk,t -1.15∗∗∗ 0.26 -1.92∗∗∗ 0.41
(0.33) (0.30) (0.39) (0.30)
St -1.05∗∗∗ -0.28 -2.18∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.23) (0.18) (0.29) (0.16)
Liqt,i -0.05 0.37 1.08∗∗ 0.33
(0.37) (0.32) (0.43) (0.32)
αt 0.16 -0.17∗∗ 0.11 -0.15∗
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
Observations 1,872 1,815 1,872 1,815
R2 0.38 0.30 0.28 0.22
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Table 1.21: Regressions of positions of leveraged money in VIX futures. The table
presents weekly regressions of the positions of leveraged money (mostly hedge funds)
on the ETF futures gap. bt,1 and bt,2 are absolute basis and spread. Column 3 is with
raw variables, the rest with standardized ones. Weekly frequency, September 2006 –
December 2017 (some data is missing).
Dependent variables Weekly Hedge Funds’ net positions, million USD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EFGt -7.46∗∗ -7.54∗∗ -30.62∗∗
(3.51) (3.47) (14.20)
ETF positionst -38.46∗∗∗ -38.45∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗ -44.69∗∗∗ -32.88∗∗∗
(4.17) (4.17) (0.08) (3.06) (4.57)
σ2bmk,t -12.57∗∗ -39.63 -7.68 -7.06
(5.23) (24.02) (4.94) (6.87)
bt,1 -2.03 -3.11 -1.54 -0.47 -3.48
(2.97) (3.01) (2.09) (2.13) (2.53)
bt,2 -12.60∗∗ -13.03∗∗ -6.64∗∗∗ -12.11∗∗∗ -12.40∗∗
(5.07) (5.25) (2.29) (3.79) (5.35)
St 2.58 2.82 0.57 0.21 -1.63
(5.28) (5.27) (0.63) (4.33) (5.59)
Observations 416 416 416 452 452
R2 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.72 0.55
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Table 1.22: Short-both strategy returns across markets. The table shows α-s of
excess returns on the short-both strategy rSB,t for each market with respect to the
Fama–French five factors, momentum, spot return, and variance of the benchmark
σ2bmk. The last column shows the estimates from a regression that includes five year
CDS quotes of the long and the inverse ETF sponsors for VIX – Barclays and Credit
Suisse, respectively. rSB,t are in %. RM,t−Rf,t, HMLt, SMBt, CMAt, RMWt, Momt
are the Fama–French five factors and momentum. Interpretation of the coefficients,
e.g. HMLt for Financials: 1% increase in HMLt increases rSB,t by 0.1220%. The
sample period is from the first inverse ETF introduction date in a given market to
December 2018 (daily frequency).
Dependent variables rSB,t
VIX (%) Gas (%) Silver (%) Oil(%) Gold (%) S&P 500 (%) Financials (%) VIX (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
α 0.06∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.03)
St 10.57 1.20 4.25 10.30 1.04 7.76 2.22 10.22
(17.11) (2.25) (4.54) (11.37) (1.46) (7.28) (3.59) (16.94)
RM,t-Rf,t 20.90 0.53 −1.43 −1.84 0.75 7.32 8.60 21.35
(12.74) (2.76) (2.52) (1.83) (5.84) (4.86) (14.08) (17.97)
SMBt −18.36∗ −2.19 1.35 −1.82 −0.40 −5.34 −16.15 −18.47∗
(10.10) (4.82) (3.23) (2.29) (5.34) (7.26) (10.63) (10.13)
HMLt −1.43 −1.05 −2.29 −2.54 6.67 −11.42 12.20∗∗∗ −1.41
(2.97) (6.41) (4.27) (3.07) (9.42) (13.61) (2.97) (2.84)
RMWt 11.64 −2.36 9.10 1.45 −0.55 9.35 9.71 11.87
(11.17) (6.57) (5.66) (5.82) (6.78) (12.21) (10.54) (11.20)
CMAt 9.68 2.99 −2.28 0.77 −0.47 23.92 −17.46∗∗ 9.64
(7.79) (8.19) (5.45) (4.26) (16.50) (21.65) (7.53) (7.77)
Momt 0.06 0.03 −0.00 0.01 0.07∗∗ −0.03 −0.07 0.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
σ2bmk,t 0.01∗ 0.02 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
CDSt, long sponsor 0.01
(0.01)
CDSt, inverse sponsor 0.01
(0.01)
CDSt−1, long sponsor -0.01
(0.01)
CDSt−1, inverse sponsor -0.01
(0.01)
Observations 1,890 1,708 1,793 419 1782 2,535 2,530 1,890
R2 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Table 1.23: ETF impact on realized futures returns. The table presents the results
of an event-study for realized futures returns to see if the steepening of the curve
caused by ETF demand, pushed realized returns down. It shows the estimates of
the regression rFit = α + βPostt + γrHit + t,j with a window of 60 days around the
first ETF introduction date. rFit is the realized return on the futures until maturity
Ti (rFit =
FTi,Ti−Ft,Ti
Ft,Ti
), α is an intercept, rHit is the return on the hedge asset. All
returns are in %.
Dependent
variables VIX Gas Silver Gold Oil
rF1t r
F2
t r
F1
t r
F2
t r
F1
t r
F2
t r
F1
t r
F2
t r
F1
t r
F2
t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Postt -0.63 -0.30∗∗∗ -0.08 -0.02∗∗ 0.01 -0.03∗∗ -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01∗∗
(0.41) (0.07) (0.06) (0.01) (0.12) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
rHit 0.65∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.33) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.37) (0.38)
Observations 120 120 119 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
R2 0.48 0.47 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.34 0.31 0.93 0.92
Chapter 2
Quantify the Quantitative
Easing: Impact on Bonds and
Corporate Debt Issuance
Karamfil Todorov1
2.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a surge in the use of unconventional monetary policy tools across
the developed world. Following the 2008 financial crisis, major central banks have
exhausted the traditional monetary toolkit and have started using new instruments
to spur economic activity and tackle low inflation. Being constrained by the (near
zero) lower bound of interest rates, national regulators have expanded their traditional
measures for stimulating the economy by conducting large-scale asset purchases known
as quantitative easing (QE). Billions of dollars, euros, pounds, and yen have been
injected into the economy by the Federal Reserve (Fed), the ECB, the Bank of Japan
(BoJ), and the Bank of England (BoE) in order to buy bonds and other asset classes
as part of QE. These massive purchases represent a substantial fraction of the Gross
1I am grateful to the editor (William Schwert) and the referee (Bo Becker) for their excellent
comments and suggestions. The referee’s recommendations to disentangle the different QE channels
and to use notional value of new issued bonds were extremely helpful. I would also like to thank
Ron Anderson, Simeon Djankov, Daniel Ferreira, Christian Julliard, Dong Lou, Igor Makarov, Martin
Oehmke, Daniel Paravisini, Andrea Tamoni, Dimitri Vayanos, Kathy Yuan and Jean-Pierre Zigrand
for their useful advice and comments. I am also thankful to seminar participants at the London School
of Economics and Political Science, London Business School, Goethe University Frankfurt, and Paris
Dauphine University for their helpful feedback.
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Domestic Products (GDP) of these countries,2 but despite its large scale, little research
has been devoted to the consequences of QE for bond prices, liquidity, and for corporates
in general. In this paper, I exploit a unique data set on bond transactions and firms’
financial indicators, which allows me to study questions as yet unanswered in the QE
literature. I quantify the very heterogeneous effects of the European QE programme
on bonds and on corporate debt issuance. Surprisingly, I find that the main effects of
QE for corporates were transmitted through increase in dividend payments rather than
through changes in investment.
2.1.1 Empirical evidence
The analysis developed in this research is based on the Corporate Sector Purchase
Programme (CSPP) launched by the ECB in 2016 as part of QE. The focus of the
study is on the ECB because of all the central banks implementing QE, the European
institution is the largest holder of corporate bond debt.3 This paper exploits the
exogenous nature of the CSPP announcement to construct a before-after comparison
between bonds that are eligible for purchase and bonds that are not. I make use of a
proprietary data set on bond transactions between February 2015 and June 2016 from
Euroclear, combined with pricing information from Bloomberg and with firms’ financial
data from the Bureau van Dijk, and employ a difference-in-differences (DD) research
design to estimate the causal impact of QE.
The first broad topic of this paper is the impact of QE on bond prices and liquidity. The
results show that QE significantly increased prices: yields of eligible bonds declined by
30 bps (8%) after the CSPP announcement. The policy also had a large positive im-
pact on liquidity, which I quantify using two main metrics: trading activity (turnover)
and cost of trading (bid-ask spreads). After the CSPP announcement, tri-party (repo)
turnover increased on average by 8.15 million USD (29% rise given the control group
before-QE mean of 28.14 million USD) and bilateral (buyer-seller) turnover4 went up
by 7.05 million USD (72% increase given the control group before-QE mean of 9.69
million USD). The bid-ask spread of yields went down by 46%, indicating massively
reduced costs of a round-trip transaction. However, the positive impact on liquidity
2Around 20% for the Fed and the BoE, 40% for the ECB, and more than 90% for the BoJ as of
May 2017. Sources – the Fed, the ECB, the BoE, the BoJ.
3170.38 billion euros as of September 2018. Source – the ECB.
4A bilateral trade takes place when two member firms provide matching instructions to Euroclear
to transfer ownership from one counterparty to the other in return for an agreed amount of money.
The tri-party repo transactions are repurchase transactions arranged by a tri-party repo agent whereby
one party can obtain short-term funds by providing a security it owns for a sale to a counterparty with
a matching repurchase agreement set for a later date.
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was mostly concentrated in the segment of QE-eligible bonds. The effects on ineligi-
ble bonds were less pronounced, and in the tri-party repo market, liquidity of these
bonds even decreased after QE. Moreover, the initial spike in trading activity gradually
dissipated. In contrast, the impact on yields and the reduction in trading costs were
more persistent. There was also some evidence of spillover effects to yields of ineligible
bonds.
As a next step, the paper studies which bonds benefited the most from the QE inter-
vention. The drop in yields is decomposed into different risk premia by applying the
methodology of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) (KVJ). I run DD regres-
sions, splitting the sample of bonds into several maturity-rating-liquidity risk buckets
to isolate the duration risk channel, the default risk channel, and the liquidity channel
of QE. The results show that the greatest effects of the CSPP were observed for bonds
with higher duration and default risks. The estimates reveal an inverse relationship be-
tween the rating of a bond and the decline in yields. A positive relationship is observed
between the maturity of the bond and the reduction in yields: longer-duration bonds
experienced the largest drop in yields. On the other hand, the liquidity impact of QE
was only marginally different for bonds with different duration and default risks.
The fact that eligible lower-rated, longer-maturity bonds close to the threshold were
the main drivers of the decrease in yields shows that the ECB’s intervention had a
higher positive impact on riskier debt instruments within the treated set of bonds.
These findings suggest that the European QE was successful in reducing the duration,
the default, and the liquidity premiums of eligible bonds and in re-allocating risks.
The logic is as follows. In times of financial turmoil investors typically require a larger
premium for holding riskier bonds, causing a decrease in bond prices. As a consequence,
banks holding these risky illiquid bonds could become constrained by their risk bearing
capacity as in Vayanos and Vila (2009), or face Value at Risk (VaR) constraints. By
implementing QE, the central bank steps in, inflates bond prices, and improves liquidity
by making it easier for investors to sell these risky illiquid assets as part of the bond
buying programme, thereby reducing the risk premium and lowering bond yields. The
drop in yields and the increase in liquidity could potentially reduce risks in the system
by removing problematic assets from banks’ balance sheets and by contributing to
deleveraging (see, e.g., Woodford, 2012). The effects of the European QE documented
in this research are consistent with such a story.
The second broad part of this paper studies the reaction of corporates to QE. The
analysis shows an overall increase in the issuance of QE-eligible bonds compared to
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ineligible ones both in the absolute number of bonds, and in the par amount outstand-
ing. However, firms issuing eligible bonds might be systematically different from those
issuing ineligible bonds. To address this concern, I saturate the firm dimension by
restricting the sample to firms that can issue bonds in both segments. If there was
a switch to issuing more QE-eligible debt, these firms would be more likely to issue a
larger amount of their debt liabilities in euro-denominated bonds that satisfy the CSPP
criteria, and less in other types of bonds. This is indeed what I find. Corporates issued
1.39 QE-eligible bonds more per week (a 38% increase given the mean before QE for
ineligible bonds of 3.70), after the CSPP announcement, compared to ineligible bonds.
This corresponds to 1.94 billion EUR, or a 49% rise in newly issued QE-eligible debt
each week. Firms also increased the fraction of bond debt in their total liabilities.
Next, the study focuses on the heterogeneous effects of QE for firms with different risks.
A number of papers (see, e.g., Kashyap et al., 1993; Rauh and Sufi, 2010) show that
corporates become more credit-constrained and reduce bank borrowing during financial
crises. However, it is unclear whether QE would alleviate the problem by boosting new
debt issuance and easing borrowing for more financially constrained firms. It is also
debatable whether these firms would use the funds attracted through bond issuance to
increase investment. To answer these questions, I conduct the following analysis. Given
that longer-duration, lower-rated bonds experienced the largest drop in yields, one could
hypothesize that firms would be more likely to issue bonds with longer maturities and
that riskier firms would make wider use of the programme. To test these hypotheses,
I split the eligible segment in different rating and maturity groups and run several
DD regressions. The results show that corporates were indeed more likely to issue
bonds with longer maturities. Moreover, the estimates illustrate a monotonic inverse
relationship between the rating of a firm and the amount of issued QE-eligible debt.
This fact shows that lower-rated corporates made wider use of the programme.
Surprisingly, however, the funds attracted through QE, were not used to increase in-
vestment, but were mostly utilized through dividend payments. The results of a DD
regression on a subset of firms with financial data before and after the CSPP an-
nouncement show that firms issuing QE-eligible bonds did not change cash holdings,
investments in working capital, property, plant, and equipment (PPE), or research
and development (R&D). To the contrary, these firms increased dividends four times
compared to the before-QE mean of firms not issuing QE-eligible bonds. These new
empirical findings suggest that QE was successful in providing cheap liquidity to more
credit-constrained corporates by lowering the cost of market debt issuance. However,
the programme had greater impact on firms’ dividend payments and little impact on
investment.
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The main conclusions of this paper are verified in a series of robustness checks. To
address the issue of heterogeneity in bond characteristics, I construct a matched sample,
restricting the treatment group to bonds for which there is a suitable control bond
with similar pre-treatment characteristics (par amount outstanding, rating, time to
maturity). I also try different variations of the control group and extensions of the
post-announcement period. Furthermore, I collapse the data by time and run pure
time-series tests to verify the panel regression estimates. The main findings of the
study are robust to these modifications. To check that the sample selection of bonds
in treatment and control groups does not mechanically produce the main results, the
study performs two placebo tests. In the first, the sample period is shifted backwards
by one year to remove any effects of seasonality. In the second, USD-denominated
bonds that satisfy all the CSPP eligibility criteria are used as a treatment group. Both
placebo tests show no statistically significant effects and rule out the possibility that
the main conclusions of the research are due to seasonality, or due to mechanical sample
selection.
2.1.2 Related literature
The analysis developed in this paper is related to the growing literature on quantitative
easing. Most articles in the QE literature have focused on the effects of the Fed’s
QE programme. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) study the impact of
the Federal Reserve’s QE programmes on interest rates and outline several important
channels through which QE affects bond yields. In a recent paper, Song and Zhu (2018)
analyze the implementation of QE in the US and study which bonds are more likely to
be purchased by the Fed. Christensen and Gillan (2018) find that the Federal Reserve’s
second QE programme improved market liquidity. However, there is little research on
the impact of the ECB’s QE on bond yields, liquidity, and on corporate debt issuance,
partly because there is no analogue of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine
(TRACE) database for European bonds. Given the significance of the corporate bond
market in Europe, however, the impact of the ECB’s QE is an important concern for
European investors and market participants. To the best of my knowledge, the research
presented here is the first one to analyze the impact of the European QE on bond yields
and bond liquidity, and the first one to study firms’ reaction to QE in general.
This paper is also related to the literature on liquidity measures in financial markets.
Asquith et al. (2013) assess the impact of a mandatory transparency regulation on
bond liquidity using volume of trading and turnover ratio. Amihud (2002) develops
a new price-volume indicator to measure liquidity in the stock market. Huang and
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Wang (2009) show that illiquidity can lead to crashes in asset prices and increases in
volatility. Bao et al. (2011) confirm the latter conclusion and show that liquidity of
corporate bonds decreased significantly during the financial crisis of 2008. In recent
research, the TABB Group (2016) summarizes the most commonly used measures of
liquidity and shows that liquidity increased in the US corporate bond market after
the financial crisis. In the research presented here, I contribute to the literature by
quantifying the impact of QE on liquidity of European corporate bonds using turnover,
bid-ask spreads, and the Amihud illiquidity measure.
The paper presented here also builds on the extensive literature on corporate debt
issuance. Bolton and Freixas (2000) present a model in which, because of the greater
flexibility of bank credit, corporates with higher default probability would prefer bank
financing to bond financing during financial distress. Becker and Ivashina (2014) find
evidence that firms substitute bank credit with bonds as credit conditions tighten. Rauh
and Sufi (2010) find similar effects for US rated firms: corporates substitute bank credit
with bond financing as their credit quality increases. The conclusions of De Fiore and
Uhlig (2015) are in line with these findings. Their paper shows how banking distress can
lead to a surge in corporate bond issuance. The results of the research presented here
complement the literature on corporate debt issuance. Consistent with the conclusions
of Adrian and Shin (2014), Becker and Ivashina (2014), and De Fiore and Uhlig (2015),
I find that there is a switch to issuing more corporate debt in the aftermath of the
financial crisis. The new result is that these conclusions continue to hold even during a
QE intervention and in a low-interest rate environment. Moreover, I show that riskier
firms issued more debt in response to QE implementation. I also find that corporates
were more likely to issue longer-maturity bonds since QE reduced yields of these bonds
the most.
Financial regulators and international finance associations have expressed differing
views on the potential impact of the European corporate bonds purchase programme
on debt issuance. For example, in a note, the ICMA (2016) argues that cheaper funding
opportunities due to the CSPP would not have a significant influence on firms’ debt
issuance, since “many corporates are already awash with cash.” The note also argues
that the ECB’s intervention might in fact push investors towards riskier QE-ineligible
bonds in the search for yield, and reduce liquidity in eligible bonds. On the other hand,
Demertzis and Wolff (2016) and Sparks (2017) claim that there is evidence that cor-
porates took advantage of the CSPP to issue a greater number of securities. There is
no clear consensus on the effects of the CSPP for corporate debt issuance, bond prices,
bond liquidity, and the use of QE funds. The research presented here aims to fill in
these gaps.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I describe the data set, the
research framework, and give details of the CSPP. Section 2.3 presents the results for
the impact of the ECB’s intervention on bond prices and liquidity. Section 2.4 describes
the corresponding results for corporate debt issuance and the use of QE funds. Section
2.5 presents two placebo tests and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data and research framework
2.2.1 Data
The data set used in this research consists of information on the total volume of trading
(turnover) and the holdings of individual bonds reported by Markit based on reports
supplied by Euroclear Plc. (the largest securities depository in the Eurobond market
and a major clearing house). I combine these data with information on the issue, the
issuing entity, and the price of each bond from Bloomberg, and with data on firms’
financial indicators from the Bureau van Dijk.
The Euroclear data set reports total daily transactions on individual securities from
February 2015 to June 2016. For each security (identified by International Securities
Identification Number (ISIN)) I observe the total value of transactions (expressed in
USD equivalents) in the bilateral and tri-party repo markets. The entire data set
consists of 109,421 different ISINs and 330 trading days. As many bonds do not trade
on a day-to-day basis, I construct total weekly turnover of a given bond, which is
consistent with the literature on bond liquidity (see, e.g., Asquith et al., 2013). Since
the focus of this paper is the impact of the CSPP on European corporate bonds, I
filter out all non-corporate bonds, and all bonds outside the EU. This leaves a total of
6,590 bonds traded during the sample period. The next section provides details of the
corporate bonds purchase programme.
2.2.2 The CSPP
The ECB started a series of QE-programmes following ECB President Mario Draghi’s
famous “whatever it takes” speech in 2012. The first programmes, the Asset-Backed
Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) and Covered Bond Purchase Programme
(CBPP) were aimed at buying long-term EU sovereign bonds. These programmes
improved economic conditions in the euro area and contributed to growth (see, e.g.,
Demertzis and Wolff, 2016), but were not enough to achieve the inflationary target
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set by the ECB. It became evident that the European regulator should go beyond
government bonds and target riskier assets as part of its QE programme.
On 10 March 2016, the ECB announced a further expansion of its asset purchase pro-
gramme including the new CSPP. This measure was introduced with its main purpose
being to “further strengthen the pass-through of the Eurosystem’s asset purchases to
the financing conditions of the real economy” and was expected to last until at least
March 2017.5 The decision to include investment grade non-bank corporate bonds in
the QE programme caught the market by complete surprise. The CSPP was a very
novel measure since the ECB entered the private sector financing market, whereas pre-
viously it had bought almost exclusively government bonds as part of QE. However,
the full details of the CSPP, including the eligibility criteria, were not specified, with
the promise of making them public “in due course.” In fact, this promise left more
questions than answers, since it did not explicitly define the range of ratings, set of
maturities, or firm eligibility criteria.
On 21 April 2016, the ECB published a full set of criteria for a bond to be purchased
under the new programme. To be eligible, a bond had to satisfy the following conditions:
• be denominated in euros
• have a minimum rating of BBB- or equivalent
• have a remaining maturity of 6 months – 30 years at the time of purchase
• be issued by a corporation established in the euro area; credit institutions not
eligible.
The programme was scheduled to start at the beginning of June 2016.
2.2.3 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 present summary statistics of the QE-eligible (546) and ineli-
gible (6,044) bonds.
[Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 about here]
Figure 2.2 shows the age-rating distribution of all European corporate bonds for com-
parison. As we can see from Table 2.1, QE-eligible bonds (column QE) are, on average,
younger and have larger amounts outstanding, compared to the ineligible ones (column
5The programme was extended during the ECB meeting in March 2017.
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non-QE). This is true for the mean and the median, and largely for the whole distribu-
tion (as seen from the deciles). In addition, QE-eligible bonds are always rated above
BBB. This heterogeneity might be driving the differences in bond prices and liquidity.
I address this issue in section 2.3.
[Figure 2.2 about here]
Figure 2.3 presents monthly summary statistics of the bilateral trading volume for all
European corporate bonds and for the QE-eligible segment separately. As we can see,
the distribution of turnover is highly positively skewed, the mean being higher than the
median. This is more pronounced for the QE-eligible segment where the difference is of
the magnitude 2–4 times. Inspecting the quartiles also confirms the positive skewness,
since even the third quartile is often lower than the mean. Table 2.8 in the Appendix
illustrates that a similar picture is observed for the tri-party repo market where the
positive skewness is even stronger.
[Figure 2.3 about here]
Figure 2.3 illustrates also that the difference between the mean and the median trading
volume starts to diverge for the last three bars, particularly for the segment of QE-
eligible bonds. This is the first evidence of increased trading in large quantities around
March 2016. Presumably, it was the newly launched ECB’s QE programme that drove
these results.
[Figure 2.4 about here]
The plots of bond yields and trading volume before and after the CSPP in Figure 2.4
support this hypothesis. Before the QE announcement, both bilateral and tri-party
repo trading volumes move in parallel trends. However, after the CSPP, we see a large
spike in turnover of QE-eligible bonds for both markets. At the same time, we see a
drop in yields at the time of the CSPP announcement and in the post-announcement
period which suggests QE increased bond prices. To prove that the ECB’s intervention
caused these changes, however, I test the causality in a more rigorous way using a
regression approach.
2.2.4 Research framework
The empirical strategy in this research exploits the CSPP announcement to construct
a before-after comparison between bonds that are eligible for purchase and bonds that
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are not. To study the impact of QE, I take a window around the announcement and
employ a difference-in-differences research design. This methodology allows me to avoid
confounding the effects of QE with unobserved shocks to the European corporate bond
market. Figure 2.4 confirms that the parallel trends assumption for the DD specification
is largely satisfied.
The sample period analyzed in this study is January 2016 to June 2016 (23 weeks).
To the best of my knowledge, no other significant events influenced exclusively the
European corporate bond market in the sample period, so the main driver of changes
in liquidity and debt issuance in this market was presumably the ECB’s intervention.
The period between the announcement of the CSPP on 10 March 2016, and 21 April
2016 (the day when the criteria were revealed) is defined as the interim period, and
the period after 21 April 2016 as the post-announcement period. The corresponding
regression dummies are Inter and Post. A bond is defined as being part of the treatment
group if it satisfies all the CSPP eligibility criteria. The corresponding dummy variable
is Treat. The basic regression specification is:
yit = αi + λt + γTreat×Inter × Treati × Intert + γTreat×Post × Treati × Postt + it,
(2.1)
where yit is the variable measuring yields (Yit), liquidity (e.g., Turnoverit, Turnover
ratioit, Bid-ask spreadit), firms’ debt issuance (e.g., Number of bondsit), or firms’
financial indicators (e.g., Dit). αi is an individual (bond/firm) fixed effect and λt is
a time fixed effect. In later specifications, the basic regression is modified by adding
controls and rating dummies. The next section studies the impact of the QE programme
on bond prices and liquidity.
2.3 Impact of QE on bond prices and liquidity
This part analyzes the first broad topic of the paper, namely, the effects of the ECB’s
QE on bond prices and liquidity. To estimate the impact on prices, I look at changes
in bond yields of eligible versus ineligible bonds after QE. To quantify the effect on
liquidity, I measure it within two main dimensions: trading activity and cost of trading.
The first one is estimated using weekly turnover (volume of trading) and turnover ratio
(volume of trading scaled by the par amount of the bond) as they are commonly used
indicators of trading activity in the bond literature (see, e.g., Asquith et al., 2013). The
cost of trading aspect of liquidity is quantified using bid-ask spreads as they represent
the cost of a round-trip transaction in raw terms.
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Table 2.9 in the Appendix also provides regression results using scaled bid-ask spreads:
divided by either the bid price (sometimes referred to as the liquidity cost score LCS =
Ask−Bid
Bid ) or by the mid-price (the effective spread ES =
Ask−Bid
Mid ). It also presents the
results for price impact indicators (the Amihud illiquidity measure) to quantify liquidity
within a third dimension: the ease with which large quantities can be traded on the
market. The main conclusions of this research also hold with these measures of liquidity.
First, I analyze the impact of QE on bond yields. Columns 1–3 of Table 2.2 estimate
the basic regression (2.1) and a modification without time and bond fixed effects:
yit = α+ γTreat × Treati + γInter × Intert + γPost × Postt+
γTreat×Inter × Treati × Intert + γTreat×Post × Treati × Postt + it.
(2.2)
The dependent variable is yields (Yit). The DD estimates remain robust to adding dif-
ferent control variables and reveal the causal impact of the ECB’s intervention on bond
prices. Yields of eligible bonds were reduced in the post-announcement period by 30 bps
(an 8% decrease given the control group before-QE mean of 371 bps). The reduction
of 22 bps in the interim period is also statistically significant. The negative coefficients
on Inter and Post from column 2 suggest that there was an overall decrease in yields
for all bonds of 21 bps in the interim period and of 31 bps in the post-announcement
period. However, these coefficients are only marginally significant. Using the estimates
from the second column, the total effect on yields of QE-eligible bonds was approx-
imately 43 (22+21) bps in the interim period and 60 bps in the post-announcement
period. These are significant reductions (11% and 16%, respectively).
The effects on liquidity are also statistically and economically significant. Columns 6–9
of Table 2.2 show that liquidity improved in terms of trading activity. Bilateral turnover
went up in the post-announcement period by 7.05 million USD (a 72% rise given the
control group before-QE mean of 9.69 million USD). Tri-party repo market turnover
went up by 8.15 million USD (a 29% increase given the control group before-QE mean
of 28.14 million USD) during the post-announcement period. The larger increase (in
relative value) in the bilateral market suggests that investors mostly engaged in buy-sell
transactions around the time of the announcement, and a relatively smaller fraction of
bonds was used as collateral for borrowing. However, the increase in trading volume
might have been driven by the heterogeneity of trading large and small bonds (as
measured by the par outstanding). To address this concern, I use turnover scaled by
the total par amount as an alternative liquidity measure. Columns 8–9 of Table 2.2
present the result of regression (2.1) using this approach. Now, the increase in the
turnover ratio for the repo market also becomes significant for the interim period.
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QE also decreased the cost of trading bonds. The estimates from column 10 of Table 2.2
show that bid-ask spreads were reduced by 2 bps in the interim period and by 6 bps
in the post-announcement period. These are massive reductions of 15% and 46%,
respectively, given the control group before-QE mean of 13 bps. Overall, the results
from Table 2.2 support the hypothesis that the ECB’s intervention increased bond
prices and liquidity significantly.
[Table 2.2 about here]
2.3.1 Robustness checks and alternative liquidity measures
So far, the control group consisted of all bonds that did not meet any of the eligibility
criteria set by the ECB. However, since the treatment and control groups are different
by design, this heterogeneity might have driven my results. To address this issue, I
construct a matched sample, restricting the treated sample to bonds for which there is
a suitable control bond with similar pre-treatment characteristics.
The bond characteristics used to construct the matched sample are: par amount out-
standing, credit rating just before the announcement, and time to maturity just before
the announcement. The whole sample is divided by par amount outstanding into four
quartiles. For the rating, it is split into four groups. The first group consists of only
AAA and AA+ rated bonds, the second of AA, AA-, A, A-, A+ rated bonds, the third
of BBB, BBB-, and BBB+ rated bonds, and the last consists of all bonds with ratings
lower than BBB-. For the time to maturity, bonds are divided on above and below the
median time to maturity. This division results in 32 potential cells. Obviously, there
will be no QE-eligible bonds in rating group four, which leaves 24 potential groups.
The estimates for the matched sample DD yield regression are in column 4 of Ta-
ble 2.2. To control for bond attributes, I add a dummy variable for each cell to the
regression (2.2), and interact the cell dummy with Post, Inter, and Treat dummies.
Their inclusion means that the estimates are a weighted average of the within-cell DD
estimates. The coefficients for both the interim and the post-announcement period
remain negative and significant and have roughly the same magnitude as before.
Another robustness check that I conduct is to define the control group as all bonds
that satisfy the CSPP eligibility criteria (except for those in EUR). This leaves a total
of 1,991 bonds. The results are in column 5 of Table 2.2. As we can see, the main
conclusions still hold. Thus, the significant effects of the QE programme documented
in column 3 of Table 2.2 are robust to alternative specifications of the control group.
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In the Appendix (Table 2.10), I also present similar robustness checks for the liquidity
measures. The estimates for the turnover measures and the bid-ask spreads also remain
statistically significant in these regressions. Table 2.9 in the Appendix shows the results
from estimating the impact of QE on alternative liquidity measures. As we can see
from the tables, the bid-ask spread of prices, the effective spread, and the liquidity cost
score also go down, indicating that the cost of a round-trip transaction has decreased
as a result of QE. The Amihud illiquidity measure illustrates that both bilateral market
illiquidity and tri-party repo market illiquidity decreased substantially. This fact shows
that liquidity also improved in terms of market depth.
In a final robustness check, I collapse the data by time period and run pure time-series
tests. The results are presented in the Appendix, Table 2.11. The estimates from
columns 1–6 show that the main conclusions from this section still hold and that the
estimates are similar in magnitude.
2.3.2 Does liquidity revert back after the initial shock?
The plot of trading volume in Figure 2.4 shows that the initial increase for QE-eligible
bonds at the time of the CSPP announcement started to dissipate in the following
few weeks. This raises the concern that liquidity changes could reflect temporary
responses as new information causes a short-lived spike in trade.6 To trace whether
the trading volume reverts back, I extend the post-announcement analysis by four
months.7 Figure 2.9 in the Appendix presents the results. It shows that turnover
gradually declined after the initial spike. The reversion was more pronounced for the
bilateral market, where the jump in trading volume following the CSPP announcement
was larger in magnitude. By August 2016, the bilateral trading volumes of QE-eligible
and QE-ineligible bonds were quite close. The picture for the repo market was slightly
different as QE-eligible bonds were traded more frequently than ineligible bonds for
a longer time period. Eventually, the trading volumes converged around the end of
September 2016.
These results are consistent with the following buy-and-hold story. Following the an-
nouncement of the programme, investors started trading QE-eligible bonds intensively,
causing a spike in trading volume. However, once eligible bonds were purchased, there
was a gradual dissipation of trading which suggests that investors did not sell eligible
6I would like to thank the referee for pointing this out.
7A possible caveat is that extending the analyzed period further away from the initial shock could
cast doubt on the conclusion that the observed differences in turnover are only due to QE.
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bonds or did not trade these bonds in a significantly different manner compared to inel-
igible ones. These effects were more pronounced for the bilateral market as the turnover
reversion was much faster there, compared to the repo market. Another explanation for
the decline in trading volume could be the fact that, since the ECB was buying eligible
bonds, these bonds were removed from the market, and therefore turnover decreased.
[Table 2.3 about here]
The results from Table 2.3 confirm the gradual decline in turnover. The magnitude
of the estimates is smaller compared to Table 2.2, which suggests that there was a
decrease in trading after the initial shock. The estimates for the bilateral turnover
are insignificant, but the coefficients for the repo turnover in the post-announcement
period and the coefficients for the turnover ratios are still significant. This fact shows
that the overall improvement in liquidity (measured by trading volume) of QE-eligible
bonds documented from before, is robust to extending the post-announcement period,
albeit with much weaker effects. In contrast, the estimates for prices (columns 5 and 6
of Table 2.3) are very similar to the ones from Table 2.2, which shows that the effects
on prices are more robust. Yields of eligible bonds were reduced by 26 bps in the
post-announcement period compared to 30 bps from before. The results for bid-ask
spreads are even slightly stronger – the coefficient of the Treat×Post dummy suggests
a 7 bps decline in bid-ask spreads over the longer post-announcement period. This
finding is again consistent with improved liquidity (measured by the cost of trading)
of QE-eligible bonds. I also ran the regression for bonds with different ratings and
for alternative liquidity measures over the extended post-announcement period. The
results were similar to the ones for the main period analyzed and were excluded from
the paper for brevity.
2.3.3 Does QE reduce risks?
This part studies the heterogeneous QE effects for bonds with different risks. I decom-
pose the reduction in yields into different risk premia by applying the methodology of
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).8 Similar to them, I use DD regressions
to isolate the duration risk channel, the default risk channel, and the liquidity channel
of QE. To disentangle the different risks, I split the sample of bonds into four maturity
groups: 0–2 years, 2–5 years, 5–10 years, and more than ten years,9 and then, within
8I would like to thank the referee for this excellent suggestion.
9The results are similar if I split bonds into quartiles or into three groups with a similar number of
bonds in each: 0–2 years, 2–5 years, more than five years. The split of more than ten years is to isolate
the effect on the longest-maturity corporate bonds.
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each maturity group, into three rating buckets: AA, A, and BBB. All bonds within
a particular maturity-rating bucket then have similar duration and default risks. To
test for heterogeneous effects of QE on bonds with different risks, I run the following
regression for each maturity-rating group:
yit = αi + λt + γTreat×Post2 × Treati × Post2t + it, (2.3)
where Post2 is a dummy equal to one after 10 March 2016 (Inter + Post). The
dependent variable is yields or bid-ask spreads.
To quantify the default risk channel of QE, I compare the yield spread of eligible versus
ineligible bonds after the CSPP, within each maturity bucket. Analogously, to isolate
the duration risk channel, I compare the yield spread of eligible versus ineligible bonds
after QE, within each rating group. To isolate the liquidity channel, I look at the change
in bid-ask spreads for eligible versus ineligible bonds after QE, within each maturity-
rating bucket. The results are summarized in Table 2.4. Rows are different default
risk groups, columns – different duration risk groups. Panel A shows the effect on
yield spreads, Panel B on bid-ask spreads. The numbers in the table are the estimates
of regression (2.3) for bonds within a particular maturity-rating group. For example,
-0.381 is the coefficient on the Treat × Post2 dummy for the sample of bonds rated
AA, with a maturity of more than ten years. It shows a 38.1 bps reduction in yields for
QE-eligible bonds in this category, compared to ineligible bonds in the same category,
after QE. In relative terms (Table 2.13 in the Appendix), this is a 15.25% reduction.
Firm and time fixed effects are used in the regressions to account for individual and
time-specific risks. F-statistics and number of observations are in Table 2.14 in the
Appendix.
[Table 2.4 about here]
The point estimates in Table 2.4 illustrate an interesting pattern. If we fix a row, we
can see that within each rating group, the statistically significant coefficients are mono-
tonically decreasing from bonds with lower maturity to bonds with higher maturity.
This result illustrates that QE decreased yields of longer-term bonds more, compared
to those of short-term bonds. The fact is consistent with KVJ’s prediction and shows
that QE had a positive effect on reducing the duration risk of bonds. The magnitude is
the largest for lower-rated bonds close to the eligibility threshold (BBB). Moreover, if
we fix a column, we can see that the significant estimates within each maturity group
are also monotonically decreasing from bonds with higher ratings to bonds with lower
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ratings. This fact shows that QE had a positive effect on reducing the default risk
premium. In other words, the safety premium channel during the ECB’s QE worked in
the opposite direction to KVJ’s prediction for the Federal Reserve’s QE: the estimates
in Table 2.4 show that the CSPP reduced yields of safer bonds less, compared to yields
of riskier bonds. However, this result is not surprising given the differences between the
ECB’s and the Fed’s programmes. The prediction of the KVJ study is for QE involving
very safe assets, whereas the CSPP included riskier corporate bonds.
To investigate the conclusion that lower-rated bonds experienced a larger drop in
yields, I restrict the sample to only treated (QE-eligible) bonds and run a difference-
in-difference-in-differences (DDD) regression within each maturity group:
yit = αi + δ(Treati=1)t + γPost2BBB × Treati × Post2t ×BBBi + it. (2.4)
Hence, the reference category in each maturity group is treated bonds with ratings
higher than BBB. If the conclusion is true, the coefficients on the interaction terms
should be negative. The results are presented in the last row of Panel A. As we can
see, the estimates are negative and monotonically decreasing across maturity groups
which shows that within each duration risk group, eligible lower-rated bonds close to
the threshold experienced the largest reduction in yields.
The statistically significant bid-ask spread estimates from Panel B suggest that BBB-
rated bonds also experienced the largest increase in liquidity within most maturity
groups. However, the difference in liquidity for AA-rated compared to A-rated bonds
is not clear. Moreover, there is no obvious pattern of liquidity improvement for bonds
with different maturities within each rating group – the estimates are monotonically
decreasing for A-rated bonds only. Furthermore, the coefficients for BBB-rated bonds
within the sample of QE-eligible bonds (the last row of Panel B) show that there
are minor statistically significant differences in liquidity for longer-maturity bonds.
Running the DDD regression for all BBB-rated bonds (combining all maturities) shows
that there are no significant liquidity changes to these bonds compared to AA-rated or
A-rated bonds. The results are excluded for brevity.
In the Appendix (Table 2.15), I repeat the same analysis but split the sample of bonds
into three dimensions: duration risk, default risk, and also liquidity risk. The split
in liquidity is done to isolate possible pre-existing liquidity differences for bonds with
similar duration and default risks. Within each maturity-rating risk bucket bonds are
further sorted into illiquid (above median bid-ask spread) and liquid (below median
bid-ask spread) based on their bid-ask spreads before the QE announcement. There
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are fewer bonds within each maturity-rating-liquidity risk bucket and less statistically
significant results but the general picture is unchanged. This fact shows that the
effects in Table 2.4 are not due to pre-existing differences in liquidity. Table 2.16
in the Appendix presents the p-values of t-tests on coefficient differences for various
rating-maturity groups. The tests strongly reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for
BBB-rated bonds in the yield regressions is the same as the coefficient for AA-rated
bonds for maturities 2–5 years, 5–10 years, and more than ten years. Panel B of the
table shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal liquidity changes for bonds
with different ratings within the longest-maturity group.
The results from this subsection show that QE had heterogeneous effects on bonds with
different risks. The largest impact of QE was observed for prices of bonds with higher
duration and default risks. The liquidity effects, on the other hand, were only slightly
different for bonds with different duration and default risks.
2.3.4 Discussion of the results
The substantial decrease in duration and default risks and the increase in liquidity of
QE-eligible bonds documented in this section means that QE was successful in reducing
the bond risk premium. This is an important result for market participants as during
market crashes, this premium can become a substantial component of yields, causing
a decrease in bond prices. As a consequence, banks holding risky illiquid assets could
become constrained by their risk bearing capacity as in Vayanos and Vila (2009), or face
VaR constraints. Hence, their ability to invest in riskier instruments would be reduced
and bank supply would go down. The idea of QE is then to boost economic activity
by expanding the list of eligible collateral and by stimulating investors to switch to
riskier investments (portfolio rebalancing channel). As the central bank steps in and
implements asset purchases, it eliminates risk by reallocating the risky illiquid assets
from private banks’ balance sheets to the central bank’s balance sheet, thereby relaxing
the VaR constraint and decreasing the market price of risk.
The decrease in yields has two main beneficial effects. First, it allows investors to
dispose of the risky QE-eligible corporate bonds by selling them to the central bank.
Essentially, the increase in asset prices that QE generates is akin to a capital injection
for leverage-constrained institutions. Moreover, it would allow new investors to increase
their holdings of QE-eligible securities because of the reduced duration and default
premiums and the fact that these securities can be sold to the central bank in the
future. The results of this section show that both the price impact measures and
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the cost of trading of QE-eligible bonds went down indicating that investors could
dispose of these bonds easier and incur lower costs in doing so. The surge in trading
volume shows increased activity in QE-eligible bonds which might be related to both
disposition effects (see, e.g., Koijen et al., 2017) and to new inflows into QE-eligible
bonds. However, in contrast to QE-eligible bonds, the impact of QE on premiums
of ineligible instruments was much weaker. Since the portfolio rebalancing channel
towards riskier instruments was one of the main goals of QE, we can conclude that the
ECB’s intervention achieved this goal in the subset of eligible instruments, but that
the effect on ineligible bonds was less pronounced.
Second, the QE intervention would directly benefit credit-constrained corporates who
could finance more cheaply on the bond market by issuing eligible bonds. The fact
that the QE effects on yields were very heterogeneous across different maturity-rating
groups but liquidity effects were roughly similar suggests that price changes had a first
order effect on corporates’ decisions to issue new bonds, whereas liquidity changes had
a second order impact. The result that most of the decrease in yields within the QE-
eligible segment was driven by lower-rated bonds suggests that the CSPP had a larger
positive impact on riskier debt instruments and for lower-rated corporates. As we will
see in the next section, these corporates made wider use of the programme.
2.4 Impact of QE on corporate debt issuance
This section analyzes the reaction of corporates to QE. When the central bank inter-
venes by buying large amounts of corporate bonds, this presumably makes it easier
for companies to raise capital. Essentially, the ultimate purpose of QE in this respect
is to boost aggregate investment by lowering the cost of market debt issuance. The
policy would allow firms that were previously unable to receive financing due to either
bad quality, or asymmetric information problems, to become eligible for direct financ-
ing through the ECB. In other words, bonds issued by these firms could now be sold
to the ECB, and the boost in demand by the central bank should have incentivized
credit-constrained firms to start issuing more euro-denominated bonds that fulfilled the
CSPP criteria after the QE announcement.
2.4.1 Issuance of new bonds
To detect an issuance of a new bond, I compute the age of each security on each date
in the sample period. In each week, I then filter for bonds which are less than one
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week old; and this will reveal the newly issued bonds. Figure 2.5 shows the evolution
of the number and the par of newly issued bonds in the sample period. As we can see,
there was an increase both in the absolute number and in the notional amount of newly
issued QE-eligible bonds after the CSPP announcement.
[Figure 2.5 about here]
To formally test the hypothesis that firms made use of the new cheaper funding oppor-
tunity resulting from the CSPP, I run regression (2.3) with the number and the par of
newly issued bonds as the dependent variables. The results are presented in Table 2.5.
As we can see from the first column of Panel A, firms issued 1.18 QE-eligible bonds
more per week compared to ineligible bonds, after the CSPP. This is a 12% increase,
given the mean before QE for ineligible bonds of 9.70 new bonds per week. The coef-
ficient from column 1 of Panel B suggests that firms started issuing more QE-eligible
debt after the CSPP announcement not only in number of bonds but also in notional
amount. The estimate shows a 2.19 billion EUR rise of newly issued eligible debt com-
pared to ineligible one in the post-announcement period. This is a significant increase
of nearly 25%. These results suggest that corporates started to issue more QE-eligible
bonds after the CSPP announcement compared to other types of debt.
[Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 about here]
However, firms issuing QE-eligible bonds might be systematically different from those
issuing QE-ineligible bonds. To rigorously test the hypothesis that firms made use of
the cheaper funding opportunity, and switched to issuing more euro-denominated QE-
eligible bonds, I saturate the firm dimension in the following way. I search for firms that
issue bonds in different currencies (at least one of them being the euro). There are 254
such firms (out of 1,550). If there was a switch to issuing more QE-eligible debt, these
firms would be more likely to issue a larger amount of their debt in euro-denominated
bonds that satisfy the CSPP criteria, and less in other types of bonds. To see the
cumulative effect on young bonds, I plot the total number of young bonds before the
CSPP announcement, in the interim period, and following it. Figure 2.6 illustrates a
clear increase in the number of newly issued QE-eligible bonds, which was mostly caused
by issuance from BBB-rated firms. Figure 2.7 shows that a similar picture is observed
for the par amount. Figure 2.8 presents the results with the euro sample split into
QE-eligible and QE-ineligible bonds to show the differential effects of QE. Figure 2.10
in the Appendix does the same for quarterly frequency to see the cumulative effect.
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The figures show that firms started issuing more debt in euro-denominated bonds both
in absolute numbers, and in the total amount of debt. There is an increase in the
par amount of QE-eligible euro bonds in the post-announcement period, but at the
same time a decline in issuance of euro QE-ineligible bonds. The total amount of euro-
denominated new debt increased slightly, and the difference with other currencies went
up from the start of the interim period. These facts serve as additional evidence in
favour of the hypothesis that firms issued more euro-denominated QE-eligible debt as
a result of the CSPP.
The DD estimates confirm these observations. The second column of Panel A in Ta-
ble 2.5 shows that firms issuing in several currencies, switched to more QE-eligible debt.
Corporates issued 1.39 QE-eligible bonds more per week after the CSPP, compared to
the number of ineligible bonds. This is a 38% increase given the mean before QE for
ineligible bonds of 3.70. The coefficient from column 2 of Panel B illustrates that the
increase in notional value was also significant – firms issued 1.94 billion EUR more of
QE-eligible debt compared to ineligible one, which is a 49% increase. Column 3 of both
panels shows that corporates issued more euro-denominated bonds in general.
Next, I investigate the hypothesis that more credit-constrained firms would issue more
bonds as a result of the programme. The rating of the firm is used as a proxy for credit
constraints. Although not a perfect measure, rating could serve to check which firms
made wider use of the cheap financing opportunity. The logic is as follows: companies
in rating categories below A that can issue eligible bonds (mostly BBB, BB) face more
severe asymmetric information problems since there is a larger firm heterogeneity in
these rating categories. Moreover, these companies obtain credit under less favourable
conditions compared to firms rated AAA, AA, or even A. The fraction of firms within
each rating category and the fraction of QE-eligible bonds issued by a firm in a certain
category is in Table 2.17 in the Appendix. As we can see, roughly 97.71% of the QE-
eligible bonds were issued by firms rated AA, A, or BBB. The regression estimates from
columns 4–6 in Panels A and B of Table 2.5 support the hypothesis that firms with lower
ratings (more credit-constrained) made wider use of the cheap funding opportunity: the
coefficients rise from A to BBB firms.10 BBB-rated firms issued on average 0.59 eligible
bonds more each week compared to ineligible ones, after QE. In terms of par amount,
they issued 0.77 billion EUR more in eligible debt. These are massive increases: 65%
in number of bonds and 76% in notional terms compared to the mean of ineligible
BBB-rated bonds before QE. Next, I run a DDD regression for the sample of treated
10The estimates for BB-rated firms were not significant and are excluded for brevity. Running the
regressions for the whole sample of firms (Table 2.18 in the Appendix) produces similar results.
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bonds:
yit = αi + λt +
3∑
k=1
γTreat×Post2,k × Treati × Post2t ×Ratingk + it. (2.5)
The results are even stronger. The coefficients from columns 11–13 show that the
increase for AA-rated firms becomes significant and that the estimates rise from AA
to A to BBB firms. Since most of the firms that can issue QE-eligible bonds are rated
AA, A, or BBB, and only 2.29% are rated BB, this fact shows that there is a monotonic
inverse relationship between the rating of a firm and the amount of issued QE-eligible
debt. BBB-rated firms are the ones that issued the most after the CSPP.
These results are not surprising given the evidence from Table 2.4. Since lower-rated
eligible bonds experienced the largest drop in yields, one could expect firms with lower
ratings to make wider use of the programme by issuing more bonds. This is indeed what
we observe in Table 2.5. Another conclusion from Table 2.4 was that yields of longer-
maturity bonds decreased the most. One could hypothesize then that firms would be
more likely to issue bonds with longer maturities. To test for this, I run regression (2.3)
for the number and the par of bonds within each maturity bucket. The coefficients from
columns 7–10 in Panels A and B of Table 2.5 suggest that firms were more likely to issue
longer-maturity bonds. The estimates for bonds with short and medium maturities (0–
2 years, 2–5 years) are insignificant but the ones for longer maturities are positive
and statistically significant. The coefficient for bonds with maturities of 5–10 years
is the largest and shows that firms issued 0.58 (36%) eligible bonds more per week
compared to ineligible ones. In terms of notional, they issued 1 billion EUR (63%) of
new QE-eligible debt more each week compared to ineligible one. These facts show
that the duration risk channel of QE incentivized firms to issue more bonds with longer
maturities since these bonds experienced the largest drop in yields.11
[Table 2.5 about here]
A possible caveat is that, although the regression results show that firms made use
of the CSPP and issued more QE-eligible debt, it might also be that firms took even
more bank credit, or used other sources of debt financing. That would cast doubt on
the story developed so far. However, I rule out this possibility by looking at the ratio
11I also performed t-tests on coefficient differences for various rating and maturity groups similar to
the ones in Table 2.16 in the Appendix. The t-tests strongly rejected the hypothesis of equal increase
in issuance between A and AA bonds, and between BBB and AA at the 1% significance level for
the sample of QE-eligible bonds. The tests also rejected the hypothesis of equal increase in issuance
between bonds with short maturities (0–2 years) and long maturities (more than ten years) at the 5%
level. These tests were excluded from the paper for brevity.
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of bond debt outstanding to total debt for each firm. The average ratio at the end
of the first quarter of 2016 was 73.41%, whereas at the end of the second quarter of
2016 it was 81.07%. This observation suggests that firms increased not only their total
amount of bond debt, but also the fraction of bond debt in total liabilities. This is
consistent with the findings of Gerba and Macchiarelli (2016): banks surveyed in their
paper claimed that “the extra liquidity they[banks] receive has basically no impact on
their decisions to grant (or not) loans.” The next step in the analysis is to see what
corporates do with the financing raised through the issuance of new QE-eligible bonds.
The answer to this question is not as straightforward because there are many possible
caveats and it is hard to claim that the observed effects are only due to the ECB’s
intervention. I provide some analysis that attempts to answer this question, but I am
aware of the different effects at play and of the possible limitations.
2.4.2 What do corporates do with the funds?
The results in this section are based on data from the Bureau van Dijk on firms’
dividends (D), total assets (A), fixed assets (FA), tangible fixed assets (TFA), long-
term debt (LTD), R&D expenses (RD), property, plant, and equipment (PPE), working
capital (WC), and cash holdings.12 Out of the 1,550 distinct firms in my sample, only
417 have data on these characteristics and even less have data for the time period
around the CSPP-announcement. A further limitation of the firms’ financial data is
that it is only observed at quarterly frequency compared to the weekly frequency of
the Euroclear data. Another effect is that the firms in the sample are different along
many dimensions (size, age, parent/daughter companies, etc.) and it is hard to argue
that the only difference in observed responses is due to the issue of QE-eligible bonds.
With these caveats in mind, I proceed to the empirical analysis.
I use the sample period from the first quarter of 2016 to the third quarter of 2016
and define the post period as the second and third quarters of 2016. Firms that have
issued at least one QE-eligible bond are in the treatment group. The results are robust
to taking only the third quarter of 2016 and to taking only firms issuing after the
announcement. The basic regression (2.1) is run with firms’ financial data as the
dependent variable. As Table 2.6 shows, most Treat×Post coefficients are insignificant,
except the one for dividends. It might be true that firms that issue QE-eligible bonds
are just larger, on average, which could partly explain the difference in the change of
dividends in the post-announcement period. To address this issue, I run the regression
12Unfortunately, data on capital expenditures and share repurchases were available for only a tiny set
of firms. There were no statistically significant effects for these indicators and the results are excluded
for brevity.
Quantify the Quantitative Easing: Impact on Bonds and Corporate Debt Issuance 129
on a sample of firms matched by total assets by splitting the firms in four quartiles based
on their total assets in the first quarter of 2016. The regression coefficient (column 2)
is now significant at the 1% level and shows a four times increase in dividends for firms
that issued QE-eligible bonds, compared to the before-QE mean of firms not issuing
QE-eligible bonds.
[Table 2.6 about here]
These findings suggest that corporates used the funds attracted through the issuance
of QE-eligible bonds for one-off dividend payments to current shareholders. They did
not, however, change cash holdings or invest the funds in working capital, PPE, or
R&D. One of the goals of the QE programme was to incentivize corporates to use
the attracted funds to increase investment in the real economy. To the contrary, the
figures in Table 2.6 show that the funds were not used for this purpose in the sample
of firms studied. However, these results should be interpreted with caution, given the
limitations of the Bureau van Dijk data and the caveats outlined above.
Overall, the analysis in this section suggests that corporates made use of QE and issued
more euro-denominated, QE-eligible debt. These results complement the literature on
corporate debt issuance. Consistent with the conclusions of Adrian and Shin (2014),
Becker and Ivashina (2014), and De Fiore and Uhlig (2015), I find that there is a
switch to issuing more corporate debt in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The new
result is that these conclusions continue to hold even during a QE intervention and in
a low-interest rate environment. Moreover, I show that more credit-constrained firms
made wider use of the bond financing opportunity during a QE implementation. These
new empirical findings suggest that QE was successful in providing cheap liquidity to
more credit-constrained corporates, but at the same time had greater impact on firms’
dividend payments and little impact on investment.
2.5 Placebo tests
As a final check, this paper performs two placebo tests to verify that the sample selection
of bonds in treatment and control does not mechanically produce the above results. In
the first test, the sample period is shifted backwards by one year to remove any effects
of seasonality. A bond belongs to the treatment group if it satisfies all the QE-eligibility
criteria. Similarly, the post-announcement period is defined as after 21 April 2015, as
though there was a CSPP announcement on that day. Regression (2.1) is estimated
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using yields, bid-ask spreads, bilateral turnover ratio, tri-party turnover ratio, number
and par of newly issued bonds as dependent variables. The results of the estimation
are in Table 2.7, Panel A. As we can see, none of the DD estimators are statistically
significant.
The second placebo test uses USD-denominated bonds that satisfy all the CSPP eli-
gibility criteria as a treatment group. These bonds share similar characteristics with
the ones classified as QE-eligible earlier (maturity of less than 30 years, rating above
BBB, issued by a non-credit institution, etc.) and are also similar in total numbers
(479 compared to the 546 euro-denominated, QE-eligible bonds). However, the USD
bonds should not be affected by the ECB’s announcement and hence should not exhibit
any significant pattern around the CSPP, unless the effects I found for the QE-eligible
bonds were due to some other characteristic common for all bonds satisfying the eli-
gibility criteria. The results of regression (2.1) using yields, bid-ask spreads, bilateral
turnover ratio, tri-party turnover ratio, number and par of newly issued bonds as de-
pendent variables are in Table 2.7, Panel B. As we can see, the DD estimates are again
not statistically significant.
[Table 2.7 about here]
The results of the second placebo test are robust to alternative specifications of the
treatment group. I ran tests with different currencies, with a broader set of USD
bonds, relaxing some of the eligibility criteria, and even with all USD-denominated
bonds. None of the DD estimates turned out to be statistically significant. These
tests are excluded from this paper for brevity. Overall, the placebo tests rule out the
possibility that the positive effects on bond yields, liquidity, and firms’ debt issuance,
found in the main text, were due to seasonality, or mechanical sample selection.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the impact of an unconventional QE programme on bond prices,
bond liquidity, and corporate debt issuance. The results show that the ECB’s CSPP
decreased yields and increased liquidity in the European corporate bond market, espe-
cially in the QE-eligible segment. Yields of eligible bonds decreased by 30 bps (8%)
in the post-announcement period and bid-ask spreads went down by 6 bps (45%).
Tri-party repo turnover increased on average by 8.15 million USD (29%) in the post-
announcement period, and bilateral turnover increased by 7.05 million USD (72%).
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All these effects are statistically and economically significant. They were particularly
pronounced for QE-eligible, lower-rated, longer-maturity bonds. These bonds experi-
enced the largest drop in yields, which means that the ECB’s intervention had a higher
positive impact on riskier debt instruments. However, there was limited evidence for
a significant shift towards ineligible, riskier bonds during the analyzed period. Since
the portfolio rebalancing channel towards riskier instruments was one of the main goals
of QE, I can conclude that the ECB’s intervention achieved this goal in the subset of
eligible instruments, but that the effect on ineligible bonds was less pronounced. The
increases in prices and liquidity show that QE was successful in reducing the bond risk
premium.
As to firms’ reaction to QE, the study finds that after the significant reduction in
the cost of bond issuance, corporates did make use of the cheaper financing opportu-
nity. Firms issuing in several currencies switched to more QE-eligible debt and euro-
denominated debt in general, after the CSPP announcement, compared to debt in other
currencies. These effects were more pronounced for more credit-constrained firms and
for longer-maturity bonds. Surprisingly, corporates used the funds attracted through
the issuance of QE-eligible bonds mostly for increasing dividend payments, but did not
change cash holdings or invest the funds in working capital, PPE, or R&D. These re-
sults are new and show that the QE programme achieved its goal of providing cheaper
credit to more credit-constrained corporates, but did not incentivize firms to increase
investment. Possible extensions to this paper might include analyzing the impact of QE
on firm’s default probability for firms that can issue QE-eligible debt. It would also be
interesting to see whether the ECB’s intervention actually forced investors “searching
for yield” (e.g., pension funds, insurance companies) to buy more ineligible bonds in
the long run.
There are many important under-researched questions about the economic effects of
QE. Our knowledge of the impact of such unconventional monetary policy tools is
constrained because they are relatively new and unexplored. Some critics even believe
that the policy acts in the opposite direction: it provides monetary stimulus in the
short run, but creates instability and exacerbates market distortions in the long run.
The analysis presented here provides evidence on the relative efficiency of QE in the
short term. However, as time goes by and new information becomes available, we would
be in a better position to assess the impact and to fully understand the consequences
of the era of unconventional monetary policy in which we are currently living.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Fraction of bonds by rating category. The figure shows the rating dis-
tribution of QE-eligible and QE-ineligible bonds just before the CSPP announcement
on 10 March 2016. The number of bonds is 6,590 (546 eligible and 6,044 ineligible).
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Figure 2.2: Age-rating distribution of all European corporate bonds just before the
CSPP announcement on 10 March 2016. The number of bonds is 6,590 with a total
face value of 4.42 trillion EUR. Age is in years. Rating group junk includes bonds rated
below B. The area of each rectangle represents the fraction of bonds in the respective
age-rating group. The area of the entire square is 100%.
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Figure 2.3: Monthly bilateral turnover. Quantiles’ dynamics: July 2015–June 2016.
The top panel shows the turnover of all European corporate bonds (6,590 bonds),
the bottom panel illustrates the turnover of QE-eligible bonds only (546 bonds). The
dot corresponds to the mean, and the bold horizontal line corresponds to the median
bilateral turnover of a given month. The bottom and top borders of each bar show
the first and the third quartile of the monthly bilateral turnover, respectively. The
last three bars indicate the CSPP period.
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Figure 2.4: QE-eligible and QE-ineligible bonds: January 2016–June 2016. The top
panel shows the daily time series of mean bond yields. The middle and the bottom
panels illustrate the weekly dynamics of mean turnover. The first vertical dashed line
indicates the day after 10 March 2016 (CSPP announced), the second dashed line
shows 21 April 2016 (eligibility criteria made public). Units for turnover: USD.
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Figure 2.5: Weekly dynamics of the number and the par of newly issued bonds:
QE-eligible compared to QE-ineligible. Sample period: January 2016–June 2016. The
first vertical dashed line indicates the day after 10 March 2016 (CSPP announced),
the second dashed line shows 21 April 2016 (eligibility criteria made public). Par is
the notional amount of bonds outstanding, measured in billion EUR.
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Figure 2.6: Number of new bonds issued by firms issuing in several currencies:
January 2016–June 2016. The top panel shows the total number of newly issued
eligible and ineligible bonds. The mid and bottom panels present the results split
by rating categories. The first dashed line indicates the day after 10 March 2016
(CSPP announced), the second dashed line shows 21 April 2016 (eligibility criteria
made public).
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Figure 2.7: Par of new bonds issued by firms issuing in several currencies: January
2016–June 2016. The top panel shows the total par of newly issued eligible and ineli-
gible bonds. The mid and bottom panels present the results split by rating categories.
The first dashed line indicates the day after 10 March 2016 (CSPP announced), the
second dashed line shows 21 April 2016 (eligibility criteria made public). Par is the
notional amount of bonds outstanding, measured in billion EUR.
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Figure 2.8: New bonds issued by firms issuing in several currencies: splitting the
sample of euro-denominated bonds. Sample period: January 2016–June 2016. The
first dashed line indicates the day after 10 March 2016 (CSPP announced), the second
dashed line shows 21 April 2016 (eligibility criteria made public). Par is the notional
amount of bonds outstanding, measured in billion EUR.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics. The table shows summary statistics for eligible (QE)
and ineligible (non-QE) bonds just before the CSPP announcement on 10 March 2016.
The total number of eligible bonds is 546, the total number of ineligible ones is 6,044.
Age, years Maturity, years Coupon, % Par, million EUR
QE non-QE QE non-QE QE non-QE QE non-QE
Mean 3.19 4.31 5.75 6.97 2.54 4.17 834.44 657.25
Standard deviation 2.67 4.17 3.00 20.64 1.48 2.37 433.20 544.13
Min 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.05 0.00 0.00 98.56 0.03
Deciles
20% 1.12 1.41 3.04 1.87 1.25 1.90 528.76 262.55
50% 2.60 2.99 5.42 4.21 2.12 4.12 728.98 549.11
70% 3.64 4.90 7.10 6.52 3.12 5.38 899.99 799.66
100% 13.79 31.38 17.72 999.62 8.12 14.00 3,068.05 10,255.61
Quantify the Quantitative Easing: Impact on Bonds and Corporate Debt Issuance 141
Table 2.2: Impact of QE on bond prices and liquidity. Column 1 estimates regression
(2.2) for bond yields (Y). Column 2 estimates the same regression with several controls
(bond coupon, rating dummies, age, par amount). Junk is a dummy for all ratings
below B. Column 3 estimates regression (2.1). Column 4 estimates regression (2.2) for
a sample of bonds matched on par outstanding, rating, and time to maturity. Column
5 estimates regression (2.1) with a control group consisting of all bonds that satisfy
the CSPP eligibility criteria. Columns 6–7 estimate regression (2.1) for the bilateral
turnover (BT) and the tri-party repo turnover (RT), respectively. Column 8 estimates
the same specification for the bilateral market turnover ratio – BTR (here and in
all subsequent regression tables measured in %) and Column 9 for the tri-party repo
market turnover ratio (RTR). Column 10 estimates the same regression specification
for bid-ask spreads of yields (BA). The coefficients Treat×Inter and Treat×Post are
the DD estimates of the effect of the CSPP announcement. Here and in all subsequent
tables yields and bid-ask spreads are observed daily, whereas turnover and turnover
ratios are weekly. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust
and double-clustered by firm and time (1,550 · 23 clusters). *,**, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Units for Y, BTR, RTR, and
BA: %. Units for BT, RT: million USD.
Dependent variables Y Y Y Y Y BT RT BTR RTR BA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coupon 0.90***
(0.14)
AA -2.14***
(0.39)
A -2.02***
(0.45)
BBB -2.07***
(0.53)
BB (-0.89)
(0.71)
B 2.08***
(0.95)
Junk 19.63***
(2.85)
Age -0.16***
(0.04)
Par -0.01
(0.01)
Treat -2.86*** -0.61*** -5.31*** 0.20**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.78) (0.10)
Inter -0.24* -0.21* -0.04 -0.33***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.34) (0.02)
Post -0.37* -0.31* -1.18 -0.41***
(0.21) (0.17) (1.82) (0.03)
Treat× Inter -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.13*** 2.40 1.52 0.46** 0.39** -0.02**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (1.56) (1.14) (0.21) (0.18) (0.01)
Treat× Post -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.23*** 7.05*** 8.15*** 1.17*** 1.51*** -0.06***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (1.75) (2.25) (0.28) (0.27) (0.01)
Bond fixed effects
and time dummies No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations
(Bond-Time) 611,356 611,356 611,356 611,356 101,672 115,174 107,875 115,048 107,758 611,356
F-statistics 1111.33 15,459.10 16,523.86 360.87 368.15 125.86 76.43 81.04 52.47 38.67
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Table 2.3: Liquidity dissipation. The table presents the estimates of regression
(2.1) with the post-announcement period extended by four months – until 08 October
2016. Columns 1–4 present the results for the turnover measures, column 5 for yields,
and column 6 for bid-ask spreads. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are het-
eroskedasticity robust and double-clustered by firm and time. *,**, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. See Table 2.2 for variable and
unit definitions.
Dependent variables BT RT BTR RTR Y BA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat× Inter -1.65 -1.63 0.46** 0.38** -0.22*** -0.02**
(1.84) (1.04) (0.19) (0.16) (0.04) (0.01)
Treat× Post 3.29 4.11** 0.50*** 1.30*** -0.26*** -0.07***
(2.34) (1.88) (0.15) (0.20) (0.09) (0.02)
Bond fixed effects and time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Bond-Time) 195,226 183,295 195,088 183,137 1,091,051 1,091,051
F-statistics 20.36 81.41 88.70 127.21 1892.16 331.62
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Table 2.4: Isolating QE channels. The table presents the coefficients for the Treat×
Post2 interaction dummy in regression (2.3) estimated for a particular maturity-rating
bucket of bonds. Panel A presents the results for yields, Panel B for bid-ask spreads.
The last row in each panel estimates DDD regression (2.4) only for the sample of
treated bonds. Each regression has firm and time fixed effects. Standard errors (shown
in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust and double-clustered by firm and time.
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Units for
all estimates: %.
Panel A: Yields
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA -0.052 0.007 -0.126*** -0.381***
(0.09) (0.008) (0.043) (0.034)
A 0.022 -0.144*** -0.292*** -0.476***
(0.038) (0.030) (0.035) (0.075)
BBB -0.108 -0.148* -0.532*** -0.824***
(0.082) (0.076) (0.092) (0.140)
BBB, QE -0.148* -0.203*** -0.354*** -0.368**
(0.075) (0.064) (0.088) (0.146)
Panel B: Bid-ask spreads
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA -0.288 -0.023*** -0.011*** -0.024***
(0.203) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
A 0.085 -0.015** -0.019*** -0.021***
(0.076) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
BBB -0.241 -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.024***
(0.160) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
BBB, QE -0.264 0.003 -0.008*** -0.006
(0.167) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005)
Q
uantify
the
Q
uantitative
Easing:
Im
pacton
Bonds
and
C
orporate
D
ebtIssuance
144
Table 2.5: Impact of QE on the issue of new bonds. Panel A estimates regression (2.3) for the number of bonds issued each week, Panel B
– the same regression for the total par of bonds issued each week. For both panels, column 1 presents the results for the sample of all firms,
column 2 for the sample of firms issuing in more than two currencies (254 firms). Column 3 shows the estimates for bonds issued in euros. The
reference category for this column is bonds issued by the 254 firms in currencies other than the euro. Columns 4–6 present the results for the
sample of 254 firms split into different rating groups, columns 7–9 for the same sample split according to maturity of new bonds issued. Columns
11–13 present the results for regression (2.5) where the QE-eligible sample of firms is split into different rating groups. The reference category for
this regression is firms rated BB. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust and double-clustered by firm and time.
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Units for the estimates in Panel A: number of bonds. Units for the
estimates in Panel B: billion EUR.
Panel A: Number of bonds
Dependent variables All All EUR AA A BBB 0–2y 2–5y 5–10y >10y AA, QE A, QE BBB, QE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Treat× Post2 1.18** 1.39* 2.87* 0.31 0.55* 0.59** -0.03 0.48 0.58** 0.56** 0.23** 0.54*** 0.92***
(0.60) (0.79) (1.67) (0.42) (0.30) (0.28) (0.22) (0.57) (0.28) (0.26) (0.12) (0.14) (0.27)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Treat × Week dummies No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations
(Bond-Week) 8,970 3,082 2,185 714 1,029 1,287 650 776 920 736 897 897 897
F-statistics 11.48 5.34 2.58 0.51 4.59 4.71 0.02 0.59 4.56 3.51 10.65 10.65 10.65
Panel B: Par of bonds
Dependent variables All All EUR AA A BBB 0–2y 2–5y 5–10y >10y AA, QE A, QE BBB, QE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Treat× Post2 2.19** 1.94* 2.73* 0.45 0.48* 0.77** 0.03 0.62 1.00* 0.53** 0.12** 0.63*** 0.84***
(1.10) (1.11) (1.59) (0.50) (0.27) (0.37) (0.26) (0.63) (0.58) (0.25) (0.06) (0.23) (0.35)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Treat × Week dummies No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations
(Bond-Week) 8,970 3,082 2,185 714 1,029 1,287 650 776 920 736 897 897 897
F-statistics 11.22 5.59 1.80 0.70 4.72 5.01 0.01 0.80 3.75 5.10 7.31 7.31 7.31
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Table 2.6: Firms’ financial indicators. The table presents the results of regression
(2.1) using firms’ financial indicators as dependent variables. Column 1 uses dividends,
column 2 – dividends for firms matched on total assets. Columns 3–8 use tangible
fixed assets, long-term debt, R&D expenses, property, plant, and equipment, working
capital, and cash holdings, respectively. The analyzed period is first-third quarter
of 2016. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust and
double-clustered by firm and time. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Units for the estimates: 100,000.
Dependent
variables D D-matched TFA LTD RD PPE WC Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat× Post 5.75** 20.64*** -15.17 -2.81 -1.92 -15.32 -2.57 -0.72
(2.54) (7.21) (42.07) (14.35) (1.85) (30.94) (9.50) (6.78)
Firm and quarter
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations
(Firm-Quarter) 264 264 364 360 370 364 279 369
F-statistics 12.46 35.31 9.48 5.12 8.26 9.48 10.21 5.46
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Table 2.7: Placebo tests. In Panel A, I shift the post-announcement period back-
wards by one year. In Panel B, I use USD instead of EUR bonds. Columns 1 and
2 estimate regression (2.1) for yields and bid-ask spreads, respectively. Columns 3
and 4 estimate the same regression for the bilateral and tri-party repo turnover ratio,
respectively. Columns 5 and 6 present the estimates of the same regression for the
number (NB) and the par of newly issued bonds. Standard errors (shown in paren-
theses) are heteroskedasticity robust and double-clustered by firm and time. *,**,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Units for all
estimates in columns 1–4: %. Units for the estimates in column 6: million EUR.
Panel A: Placebo test I
Dependent variables Y BA BTR RTR NB Par
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat× Post -1.33 -2.62 -0.28 0.96 0.00 -0.29
(1.37) (2.89) (0.19) (1.17) (1.29) (0.71)
Bond fixed effects and week dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Firm fixed effects and week dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Observations (Bond-Week) 509,161 509,161 86,204 80,339 4,784 4,784
F-statistics 5.33 5.42 68.32 37.59 2.01 2.35
Panel B: Placebo test II
Dependent variables Y BA BTR RTR NB Par
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat× Inter -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.22)
Treat× Post -0.09 -0.06 0.10 0.05
(0.07) (0.04) (0.16) (0.43)
Treat× Post2 0.76 0.39
(1.41) (1.52)
Bond fixed effects and week dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Firm fixed effects and week dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Observations (Bond-Week) 611,356 611,356 115,068 107,781 3,536 3,536
F-statistics 89.79 113.03 107.20 63.16 1.27 3.07
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2.9 Appendix
Figure 2.9: Extended post-announcement period. QE-eligible and QE-ineligible
bonds. The top panel shows the daily time series of mean bond yields. The middle
and the bottom panels illustrate the weekly dynamics of mean turnover. The first
vertical dashed line indicates the day after 10 March 2016 (CSPP announced), the
second dashed line shows 21 April 2016 (eligibility criteria made public). Units for
turnover: USD.
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Figure 2.10: New bonds issued by firms issuing in several currencies: splitting the
euro sample. Quarterly aggregation. The first dashed line indicates the day after 10
March 2016 (CSPP announced), the second dashed line shows 21 April 2016 (eligibility
criteria made public). Par is the notional amount of bonds outstanding, measured in
billion EUR.
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Table 2.8: Trading volume. The table presents summary statistics of the monthly
turnover for all bonds from June, 2015 to June, 2016. Panel A shows the numbers
for the bilateral market, Panel B – for the tri-party repo market. Panel C compares
QE-eligible and QE-ineligible bonds before and after the CSPP announcement. Units:
million USD.
Panel A: Bilateral market
06.2015 08.2015 10.2015 12.2015 02.2016 03.2016 04.2016 05.2016 06.2016
Mean 65 66 71 63 60 61 89 83 68
Standard deviation 197 244 247 205 252 167 382 293 226
Observations 4,327 4,434 4,529 4,744 4,754 4,820 4,991 5,062 5,031
Deciles
50% 25 23 23 22 22 24 25 27 23
70% 50 47 50 46 47 49 54 54 47
100% 5,130 6,901 5,097 5,021 11,442 5,068 8,494 7,175 4,996
Panel B: Tri-party repo market
06.2015 08.2015 10.2015 12.2015 02.2016 03.2016 04.2016 05.2016 06.2016
Mean 199 208 195 166 166 168 183 180 175
Standard deviation 375 398 353 310 291 308 346 343 326
Observations 4,093 4,205 4,354 4,474 4,588 4,596 4,692 4,693 4,696
Deciles
50% 78 87 84 66 63 68 70 66 69
70% 178 189 179 143 147 151 161 153 152
100% 5,944 10,675 7,532 4,140 5,287 8,194 7,052 6,231 4,687
Panel C: Bond turnover before and after QE
Bilateral market Tri-party (repo) market
Mean 20% 50% 80% Mean 20% 50% 80%
Turnover (million USD), QE-eligible
Before QE 8.51 1.64 4.07 9.74 20.74 4.15 10.91 28.04
After QE 19.84 1.98 5.28 12.58 30.13 5.03 14.23 39.59
Turnover (million USD), QE-ineligible
Before QE 9.69 0.78 3.35 11.22 28.14 2.18 10.40 40.27
After QE 12.03 0.90 3.91 12.80 28.57 2.02 10.30 39.58
Turnover ratio (%), QE-eligible
Before QE 0.91 0.23 0.51 1.11 2.52 0.57 1.31 3.44
After QE 2.13 0.30 0.62 1.40 3.43 0.60 1.76 4.71
Turnover ratio (%), QE-ineligible
Before QE 1.24 0.21 0.53 1.43 4.61 0.32 1.53 5.81
After QE 1.44 0.21 0.60 1.61 4.47 0.33 1.53 5.68
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Table 2.9: Alternative measures of liquidity. Impact on Price. The table presents
the results of regression (2.1) using price measures and the Amihud illiquidity measure.
Columns 1-5 show the estimates for the daily bid-ask spread, effective spread, liquidity
cost score, mid and ask prices as dependent variables. Column 6 presents the estimates
for the Amihud illiquidity indicator in the bilateral market, column 7 – in the tri-party
repo market. The Amihud illiquidity measure for a period p is Aip = 1Dip
∑Dip
t=1
|rit|
Dvolit
,
where Dvolit is the daily trading volume in asset i, rit is the daily return of the asset,
andDip is the number of days in the period over which the averaging is done. Standard
errors (shown in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust and double-clustered by
firm and time. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels. Units for the estimates in columns 1-3: %. Units for the estimates in columns
6-7: 10−9.
Dependent variables BA, prices ES LCS Mid Ask A, bilateral A, tri-party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat× Inter -0.35*** -0.49*** -0.55*** 4.22*** 4.04*** -1.62 -24.97
(0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.48) (0.46) (1.47) (23.56)
Treat× Post -0.32*** -0.49*** -0.59*** 3.29*** 3.13*** -2.87** -22.92*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.52) (0.54) (1.46) (12.76)
Bond Fixed Effects
and Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations
(Bond-Week) 539,951 539,951 539,951 539,951 539,951 238,442 238,442
F-statistics 60.07 13.84 4.22 25.72 24.29 4.63 4.13
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Table 2.10: Impact of QE on turnover. Column 1 estimates regression (2.2) for the bilateral turnover (BT). Column 2 estimates the same
regression with several controls (bond coupon, rating dummies, age, par amount). Column 3 estimates regression (2.2) for a sample of bonds
matched on par outstanding, rating and time to maturity. Column 4 estimates regression (2.1) with a control group consisting of all bonds that
satisfy the CSPP eligibility criteria. Columns 5-6 present the results for the same regressions as in columns 3-4, respectively, but for the bilateral
turnover ratio (BTR). Columns 7-12 estimate the same regression specifications as in columns 1-6 for the tri-party repo market. Columns 13-14
estimate the same regression specifications as in columns 3-4, respectively, but for bid-ask spreads. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are
heteroskedasticity robust and double-clustered by firm and time (1,550 · 23 clusters). *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels. Units for BTR, RTR and BA: %. Units for BT, RT: million USD.
Dependent variables BT BT BT,CG BT,ACG BTR, CG BTR, ACG RT RT RT,CG RT,ACG RTR, CG RTR, ACG BA, CG BA, ACG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Coupon -1.07*** 0.11
(0.23) (0.35)
AA 0.01 -1.64
(1.05) (1.49)
A -0.86 -0.51
(0.64) (0.91)
BBB 0.78 1.42
(0.73) (0.95)
BB -0.24 0.63
(0.62) (1.06)
B 1.16 0.34
(1.54) (1.16)
junk -1.91** -0.27
(0.74) (1.56)
Age -1.11*** -0.63***
(0.13) (0.17)
Par 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Treat -1.47* -3.84*** -9.95*** -10.21***
(0.85) (0.90) (1.24) (1.23)
Inter 3.41*** 3.36*** 1.26 1.32*
(0.90) (0.91) (0.80) (0.80)
Post 1.61* 1.55*** 0.10 0.17
(0.84) (0.83) (0.87) (0.88)
Treat× Inter 3.31* 3.30* 2.20 2.04 0.39 0.24 2.75** 2.75* 1.21 1.23 0.37 0.06 -0.02 -0.02*
(1.74) (1.75) (2.87) (1.84) (0.29) (0.19) (1.45) (1.43) (1.45) (1.58) (0.26) (0.17) (0.02) (0.01)
Treat× Post 7.66*** 7.40*** 6.70*** 6.42*** 1.03*** 0.85*** 8.45*** 8.37*** 7.45*** 7.75*** 1.37*** 1.16*** -0.05*** -0.04***
(2.28) (2.25) (2.08) (3.17) (0.38) (0.48) (2.05) (2.04) (1.92) (2.61) (0.32) (0.31) (0.01) (0.01)
Bond Fixed Effects
and Time Dummies No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations
(Bond-Time) 115,174 115,174 115,174 38,216 115,068 38,193 107,875 107,875 107,781 36,103 107,875 36,092 611,186 101,672
F-statistics 65.09 92.23 87.57 47.98 88.97 63.38 41.63 49.82 33.59 41.29 64.52 66.60 88.19 399.63
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Table 2.11: Data collapsed by time period. The table presents the results of the main regressions (except those from Table 2.12) if the data
are collapsed by time (week or day). All estimates are from pure time-series regressions. Column 1 presents the results for yields, column 2 – for
bid-ask spreads, columns 3-6 – for the turnover measures, columns 7-13 – for the number of newly issued bonds by a firm’s rating category and by
bond maturity. Columns 14-21 show the estimates for firms’ financial indicators. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation robust. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent variables Y BA BT BTR RT RTR AA A BBB 0-2y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treat× Inter -0.20*** -0.01 2.62 0.46*** 1.72 0.39***
(0.02) (0.03) (2.12) (0.11) (1.33) (0.13)
Treat× Post -0.30*** -0.06* 7.70*** 1.19*** 8.40*** 1.45***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.98) (0.10) (0.55) (0.11)
Treat× Post2 0.32 0.55** 0.57** 0.01
(0.50) (0.28) (0.28) (0.20)
Observations (Day/Week/Quarter) 114 114 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
F-statistics 101.1 2.31 22.74 64.78 91.27 76.06 2.04 5.41 5.80 0.06
2-5y 5-10y >10y D D-matched TFA LTD RD PPE WC Cash
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
Treat× Post 5.97** 22.47** -14.85 -6.13 -2.43 -14.28 -4.91 0.60
(1.05) (8.40) (26.43) (5.78) (2.12) (9.96) (3.75) (6.41)
Treat× Post2 0.44 0.57** 0.55**
(0.47) (0.28) (0.27)
Observations (Day/Week/Quarter) 23 23 23 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
F-statistics 0.75 3.95 3.20 542.20 685.21 14.12 13.76 5.75 15.15 0.53 0.00
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Table 2.12: Isolating QE channels: data collapsed by time period. The table presents
the coefficients for the Treat×Post2 interaction dummy in a time series regression es-
timated for a particular maturity-rating bucket of bonds. Panel A presents the results
for yields, Panel B – for bid-ask spreads. The last row in each panel estimates the
time-series regression only for the sample of treated bonds. Standard errors (shown in
parentheses) are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust. *,**, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Units for all estimates: %.
Panel A: Yields
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA -0.328 -0.184 -0.142*** -0.305***
(0.281) (0.144) (0.050) (0.022)
A -0.162 -0.191*** -0.226*** -0.298***
(0.150) (0.054) (0.029) (0.061)
BBB -0.139 -0.284*** -0.473*** -0.822***
(0.082) (0.116) (0.123) (0.133)
BBB, QE -0.097*** -0.178*** -0.316*** -0.356***
(0.026) (0.061) (0.122) (0.120)
Panel B: Bid-ask spreads
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA -0.295 0.098 -0.011*** -0.024***
(0.230) (0.122) (0.005) (0.002)
A -0.015 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.020***
(0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
BBB -0.031 -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.023***
(0.022) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
BBB, QE -0.173 0.032 -0.008*** 0.017
(0.150) (0.032) (0.002) (0.014)
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Table 2.13: Isolating QE channels: relative changes. The table presents the relative
change in yields or bid-ask spreads for a particular maturity-rating bucket from Ta-
ble 2.4. The numbers are the coefficients from Table 2.4 divided by the control group
before-QE mean of bonds within a particular bucket. Panel A presents the quantities
for yields, Panel B – for bid-ask spreads. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Units for all estimates: %.
Panel A: Yields
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA -9.40 0.71 -10.85*** -15.25***
A 2.05 -8.62*** -13.97*** -13.83***
BBB -8.42 -8.36* -17.89*** -19.79***
BBB, QE -19.31* -27.65*** -30.51*** -30.68**
Panel B: Bid-ask spreads
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA -226.77 -22.43*** -12.94*** -27.27***
A 22.73 -13.16** -16.96*** -20.59***
BBB -87.96 -14.97*** -21.36*** -20.17***
BBB, QE -98.31 26.68 -9.09*** -8.05
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Table 2.14: Isolating QE channels: number of observations and F-statistics. The
table presents the number of observations and F-statistics (in brackets) for each re-
gression for a particular maturity-rating bucket from Table 2.4. Panel A presents the
quantities for yields, Panel B – for bid-ask spreads.
Panel A: Yields
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA 9,260 1,5015 10,349 6,203
(18.97) (243.75) (272.46) (154.73)
A 33,699 56,294 46,352 25,442
(88.12) (1,706.81) (1,795.82) (965.57)
BBB 34,240 53,925 54,059 31,934
(393.01) (506.87) (2,553.16) (695.40)
BBB, QE 3,771 17,868 21,211 3,617
(156.326) (2,269.38) (2,334.11) (1,079.98)
Panel B: Bid-ask spreads
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA 9,260 15,015 10,349 6,203
(6.43) (22.37) (94.18) (59.62)
A 33,699 56,294 46,352 25,442
(1.54) (39.02) (215.84) (96.17)
BBB 34,240 53,925 54,059 31,934
(166.08) (276.16) (64.52) (6.56)
BBB, QE 3,771 17,868 21,211 3,617
(15.72) (245.26) (945.99) (521.24)
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Table 2.15: Isolating QE channels: splitting bonds on liquid and illiquid before QE. The table presents the coefficients for the Treat× Post2
interaction dummy in regression (2.3) estimated for a particular maturity-rating bucket for the sample of liquid bonds (below median bid-ask
spread before QE) and illiquid bonds (above median bid-ask spread before QE). Panels A and B present the results for liquid bonds, Panels
C and D – for illiquid bonds. Panels A and C present the results for yields, Panels B and D – for bid-ask spreads. Empty cells indicate that
there are no bonds within the particular maturity-rating bucket. Each regression has firm and time fixed effects. Standard errors (shown in
parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust and double-clustered by firm and time. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels. Units for all estimates: %.
Panel A: Yields. Lliquid
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA 0.110 -0.209*** -0.376***
(0.041) (0.063) (0.034)
A -0.054 -0.516*** -0.479***
(0.081) (0.115) (0.063)
BBB -0.262 0.414 -0.785*** -0.792***
(0.274) (0.855) (0.179) (0.130)
Panel B: Bid-ask spreads. Lliquid
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA -0.009** 0.024*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
A 0.324** -0.018*** -0.016***
(0.143) (0.005) (0.002)
BBB -0.149 0.035 -0.025*** -0.022***
(0.253) (0.047) (0.006) (0.004)
Panel C: Yields. Illiquid
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA 0.012 0.059 -0.101***
(0.059) (0.036) (0.030)
A 0.036 -0.123*** -0.203*** -0.609***
(0.039) (0.027) (0.032) (0.079)
BBB -0.048 -0.126* -0.258***
(0.094) (0.070) (0.045)
Panel D: Bid-ask spreads. Illiquid
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
AA -0.133 -0.017* -0.013***
(0.144) (0.010) (0.002)
A -0.033 0.023 -0.019*** -0.011**
(0.042) (0.022) (0.002) (0.005)
BBB -0.254 -0.022*** -0.045***
(0.192) (0.006) (0.016)
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Table 2.16: Isolating QE channels: t-tests. The table presents the p-values of t-tests
on the hypothesis that the regression coefficients are equal for a set of bonds within a
particular rating-maturity group. Each number in the table reports the p-value from
such a test. Panel A presents the quantities for yields, Panel B – for bid-ask spreads.
For example, the first row of Panel A presents the p-value from a test of whether
the coefficient for BBB-rated bonds is the same as the coefficient on AA-rated bonds
within each maturity group.
Panel A: Yields
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
BBB vs AA 0.37 0.01 0.00 0.00
BBB vs A 0.03 0.94 0.00 0.00
A vs AA 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.16
BBB, QE, 0–2 years 0.05 0.00 0.00
BBB, QE, >10 years 0.00 0.51
Panel B: Bid-ask spreads
0–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years >10 years
BBB vs AA 0.02 0.48 0.00 0.95
BBB vs A 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.85
A vs AA 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.55
BBB, QE, 0–2 years 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB, QE, >10 years 0.00 0.03
Table 2.17: Percentage of QE-eligilbe bonds issued by firms with different ratings.
The table shows the fraction of firms in each rating category and the corresponding
proportion of QE-eligible bonds issued by these firms. Units of the numbers: %.
Firm’s rating group Percentage of firms Percentage of QE-bonds issued
AA 10.19 9.92
A 29.30 40.20
BBB 35.08 47.58
BB 22.54 2.29
junk 2.89 0.00
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Table 2.18: Impact of QE on the issue of new bonds: whole sample of firms. Panel A
estimates regression (2.3) for the number of bonds issued each week, Panel B – the same
regression for the total par of bonds issued each week. For both panels, columns 1-3
present the results for the sample of all firms split into different rating groups, columns
4-7 – for the same sample split according to maturity of new bonds issued. Standard
errors (shown in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust and double-clustered by
firm and time. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels. Units for the estimates in Panel A: number of bonds. Units for the estimates
in Panel B: billion EUR.
Panel A: Number of bonds
Dependent variables AA A BBB 0-2y 2-5y 5-10y >10y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat× Post2 0.10 0.59* 0.61* 0.37 0.37 0.28* 0.48**
(0.39) (0.34) (0.37) (0.31) (0.78) (0.16) (0.24)
Firm Fixed Effects and Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Bond-Week) 1,840 2,651 3,055 1,860 2,302 2,698 2,110
F-statistics 0.07 10.94 10.49 1.51 0.18 10.13 11.81
Panel B: Par of bonds
Dependent variables AA A BBB 0-2y 2-5y 5-10y >10y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat× Post2 0.62 0.57* 0.91** 0.45 -0.77 3.49*** 3.15***
(0.78) (0.33) (0.45) (0.56) (1.13) (1.27) (1.10)
Firm Fixed Effects and Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Bond-Week) 1,840 2,651 3,055 1,860 2,302 2,698 2,110
F-statistics 0.71 11.76 11.16 0.71 0.40 15.95 16.06
Chapter 3
What Drives Repo Haircuts?
Evidence from the UK Market
Christian Julliard, Zijun Liu, Seyed E. Seyedan, Karamfil Todorov, Kathy Yuan1
3.1 Introduction
The repurchase agreement (repo) market is a major tool for short-term funding of
financial institutions. Although there are no definitive data about the size of this
market, the International Capital Market Association suggests that the value of the
global commercial market can be up to 15 trillion EUR.2 During the recent financial
crisis repo markets experienced various disruptions and potentially contributed to the
severity of the crisis. For example, Copeland et al. (2010) show that, during the days
prior to bankruptcy, the amount of collateral Lehman Brothers financed in tri-party
repo fell drastically. Gorton and Metrick (2012) argue that the repo market experienced
a run during the crisis, manifested in a rise of haircuts, which exacerbated the crisis.
Given the importance of the repo market and its contribution to the systemic risk of the
financial system – especially in the wake of the recent 2008 crisis – there is ample interest
from academics, policy makers and members of the public in better understanding
and monitoring this market. However, due to the over-the-counter nature of repo
transactions, repo contract terms are rarely disclosed. Adrian et al. (2013) provide an
1We are grateful to seminar participants at the London School of Economics, the European Meeting
of the Econometric Society, and the RiskLab/BoF/ESRB Conference on Systemic Risk Analytics for
their helpful feedback. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
2ICMA (2013).
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overview of the sources that provide information for the US repo market and conclude
that, although some sources provide data on interest rates and notional values used in
repo trades, very little is known about haircuts, collaterals and counterparties.
The systemic importance of the repo market and the shortage of micro-data prompted
the UK regulator to require banks to disclose transaction-level data on their repo books.
We were given the opportunity to work with this unique regulatory data set to analyze
the structure of the UK repo market. We have access to all trade level repo data such
as notional value, maturity, counterparty, collateral, and haircut, except for repo rates.
To our knowledge, this is the only database that covers transaction-level haircut infor-
mation for a rich set of different collaterals and counterparties. Given the importance
of haircuts and the fact that they control the amount of inside liquidity generated by
the shadow banking system, we aim to answer the question of what factors drive their
magnitude using transaction-level data. Furthermore, we examine the structure and
attributes of the repo market network and assess their influence on haircuts.
A priori it might appear puzzling why repo loans feature both interest rate and haircut.
Recent theoretical work such as Ozdenoren et al. (2018) shows that while both repo
rates and haircuts are affected by the demand and supply for funding liquidity, riskiness
of repo loans drives the former and the severity of adverse selection that lenders face
influences the latter. Our survey of several trading houses in London has revealed that
while repo rates are determined at the trading desk, haircuts are set by the credit
department of the corresponding firm. The observation of the separate roles played
by rates and haircuts motivates us to formulate testable hypotheses to study haircut
determinations in details empirically.
In particular, we build testable hypotheses to study haircut determinations empirically
based on the existing theoretical work on collateralized borrowing and repo runs. The
theoretical work on collateralized borrowing can be categorized into two streams. One
is based on the difference of opinion approach in a general equilibrium setting (see, e.g.,
Geanakoplos, 1997; Simsek, 2013). The other is based on contractual and/or informa-
tion frictions (see, e.g., Dang et al., 2011, 2013; Gottardi et al., 2017; Ozdenoren et al.,
2018). The repo run literature focuses on coordinations either extending Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) to the repo setting (see, e.g., Martin et al., 2014), short-term borrowing
(see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2011), or endogenous information acquisition (see, e.g., Gor-
ton and Ordonez, 2014), or to adverse selection and inter-temporal coordination (see,
e.g., Ozdenoren et al., 2018).
In our empirical investigation, we find that transaction maturity has a first order im-
portance in setting haircuts. Haircuts are also increasing in the VaR of collaterals
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and collateral concentration. This set of findings indicates that collateral quality and
liquidity are important determinants of haircuts. We also find that counterparties
matter in haircut determinations: one or two banks in our sample receive a significant
share of repo trades with zero haircuts, hedge funds are charged at higher haircut,
larger borrowers with higher ratings receive lower haircuts. However, we do find that
collateral quality can overshadow counterparty characteristics. Furthermore, there is
evidence that borrowers with lower ratings use higher quality collateral to receive a
lower haircut. Hence, the influence of counterparty attributes is concealed.
We also find that bilateral relationships matter in haircuts. Banks charge higher hair-
cuts when they transact with non-bank institutions. This is supportive of the difference
of opinion explanation of haircuts since it is likely that banks and non-bank financial
institutions have different valuation models about collateral. However, it may also
support the adverse selection explanation of haircuts since there are information fric-
tions between different types of business. Furthermore, we find significant pairwise
borrower-lender relationships: some borrowers receive consistently lower haircuts when
interacting with certain counterparties, and a few bilateral pairs conduct a large portion
of zero haircut trades in our sample. These findings are difficult for the difference of
opinion theory to explain since these bilateral pairs are often from different lines of busi-
ness. They are, however, supportive of the adverse selection theory since relationship
banking lowers information frictions.
We find little evidence that lenders’ liquidity position or default probabilities affect
haircuts, suggesting that the traditional bank run mechanism cannot explain repo runs.
This lends support to the inter-temporal feedback/coordination explanations of repo
runs.
Finally, we examine the structure and attributes of the repo market network and assess
if the network structure has an influence over haircuts. We observe that the banks
with higher centrality measures ask for lower haircuts on reverse repos and pay lower
haircuts on repos. We interpret this set of findings as supportive of the demand-and-
supply theory for funding liquidity since the unique market position of central network
players affects the terms of bilateral repo contracts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief description
of repurchase agreements and summarizes the relevant literature. Section 3.3 outlines
the main hypotheses that we test in the data. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section
3.5 analyzes the determinants of haircuts and presents the testable hypotheses. Section
3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Background information on repurchase agreements and
related literature
3.2.1 Background information on repurchase agreements
A repurchase agreement is the simultaneous sale of, and forward agreement to repur-
chase, securities at a specific price, at a future date (Duffie, 1996). In effect, a repo is a
collateralized loan, where the underlying security serves the collateral role. The party
that borrows cash and delivers collateral is said to be doing a repo, and the party that
lends cash and receives collateral is doing a reverse repo. The difference between the
original loan value and the repayment specifies the repo rate. The haircut or margin,
on the other hand, is determined by the difference between the loan and the collateral
value. Usually, the borrower has to post collateral in excess of the notional amount,
and the haircut is defined as h = 1−F/C with collateral value C and notional amount
F (Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). For example, if a borrower receives $98 against $100
value of collateral, the haircut is 2%.
In Europe, the legal title to the collateral is transferred to the cash lender by an outright
sale. In the US this is not the case, but the repo collateral is not subject to an automatic
stay and can be sold by the lender should the borrower default (ICMA, 2013).
Repurchase agreements are broadly classified into two categories. Tri-party repo is a
transaction for which post-trade services such as collateral management (e.g. selection,
valuation, and verifying eligibility criteria), payment, margining, etc. are outsourced to
a third-party agent which is a custodian bank.3 A tri-party agent settles the repos on
its book, but in a bilateral repo, settlement usually occurs on a delivery versus payment
basis, and the cash lender must have back-office capabilities to receive and manage the
collateral (Adrian et al., 2013).
A growing number of repos are cleared via central (clearing) counterparties (CCPs).
CCPs place themselves between the two sides of a trade, leading to a less complex web
of exposures (Rehlon and Nixon, 2013). They provide benefits such as multilateral
netting and facilities to manage member defaults in an orderly manner, but can also
pose systemic risks to the financial system. CCPs always receive a haircut, whether
in a reverse repo or repo. Banks doing a reverse repo with a CCP will need to give a
haircut, which amounts to a negative value for the haircut.
3In Europe, the main tri-party agents are Clearstream, Euroclear, Bank of New York Mellon, and
SegaInterSettle.
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3.2.2 Related literature
The financial crisis rekindled interest in the theoretical and empirical study of the
short-term funding market. The theoretical work on collateralized borrowing can be
categorized into two streams. One is based on the difference of opinion approach in
a general equilibrium setting such as in Geanakoplos (1997), Geanakoplos and Zame
(2002), Geanakoplos (2003), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) and Simsek (2013). The
other is based on contractual and/or information frictions such as in Dang et al. (2011),
Dang et al. (2013), Gottardi et al. (2017) and Ozdenoren et al. (2018). We will discuss
the theoretical literature in details when forming testable hypotheses in the next section
of the paper. There is also a body of literature that models crisis and runs in the repo
market. One approach is based on the classical setting in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
extending to the repo setup as in Martin et al. (2014). In this setup, the liquidity needs
of the lender, the capital position of the borrower, and the market microstructure of the
repo market play important roles in determining the magnitude of the run. Acharya
et al. (2011) model freezes in the market for short-term financing in the form of a
sudden collapse in debt capacity of collateral in an information-theoretic framework.
Gorton and Ordonez (2014) focus on the information in-sensitivity of debt contracts and
show how a sudden switch of information environment might trigger a deep discount
and collateral crisis. Ozdenoren et al. (2018) emphasize the inter-temporal feedback
of (expected) future asset price and the decisions of today’s borrowers and lenders.
Dynamic mis-coordination might lead to a run in the repo market.
The empirical studies of repurchase agreements have been mostly focused on the US
repo market. Several papers have studied developments in this market during the
financial crisis. Broadly speaking, two distinct phenomena can be identified in the US
bilateral and tri-party repo markets. In the bilateral market, as argued by Gorton and
Metrick (2012), a run occurred in the form of rapid increases in haircut levels. This is
further supported by multiple hedge funds failing due to margin calls (Adrian et al.,
2013). Adrian and Shin (2010) empirically show that repo transactions have contributed
the most to the procyclical adjustments of the leverage of banks. From this perspective,
the rapid increase of haircuts in bilateral repos during the crisis can also be viewed as
(forced) deleveraging of broker-dealers (Adrian et al., 2013). In contrast, in the tri-
party market haircuts moved very little and the amount of funding remained fairly
stable but, instead, lenders refused to extend financing altogether to the most troubled
institutions – namely, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers (Copeland et al., 2010).
Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) argue that there was a run in the tri-party market but only
for non-agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS)/asset-backed securities (ABS), which
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constituted a relatively small and insignificant part of the short-term debt market. In
the tri-party market, tension seemed to affect specific institutions rather than the broad
collateral classes, except maybe for the private-label securitized assets (Adrian et al.,
2013). Martin et al. (2014) relate the differences between the behavior of these two
markets with respect to their microstructure: in the tri-party market, haircuts are fixed
in custodial agreements that are revised infrequently, but this is not the case in the
bilateral market.
There is a limited number of empirical studies on repos. Most US studies on repos are
on tri-party repos starting with Copeland et al. (2014), Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) and
Hu et al. (2019). They generally find that the market is quite segmented and market
power, collateral concentration and fund families might play important roles. To our
knowledge, empirical studies on bilateral repos are rare. Therefore, the work by Gorton
and Metrick (2012) using a proprietary database is important for the understanding
of repo transaction, where various types of collaterals and counterparties are present.
The repo studies in the European area are mostly conducted on general collateral repos
or through CCPs, where regulations play a very important role (Mancini et al., 2016).
To the best of our knowledge, the repo haircut database used in this paper is the only
database that covers a significant part of a bilateral repo market.
3.3 Testable hypotheses on haircuts
Collateralized borrowing is an ancient financial institution. It serves an important
economic function and has been used for a long time, and under very different institu-
tions. For example, pawnshop loan records from China circa 662-689 A.D. show that
silk garments were used as collateral (see, e.g., Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst, 2005).
The popularity of collateral-backed lending is often attributed to its abilities to miti-
gate information frictions. In practice, producing information about borrowers or their
actions can be very costly (due to credit registries, monitors, courts, etc.). Collateral
allows the flow of credit while economizing on costly information acquisition with the
haircut. However, according to the above pawn shop logic, the haircuts on collateral
should be determined by the quality of collaterals only, not by the identity of the bor-
rowers. Intuitively, the volatility or the illiquidity of the collateral asset matters in
determining the amount of loan extended because in the event of default, the lender
may not be able to recover the full market price (valued at the initial lending date) of
the collateral. This leads to our first testable hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1 (collateral quality): The repo haircut is larger when the collateral is of
lower quality and/or illiquid.
Collateral quality can be measured using VaR, maturity, rating, or asset types. Trans-
action maturity should matter since as the maturity of repo debt is longer, the loss from
worsening collateral quality is greater. We use data from Bloomberg to calculate VaR
based on the time series of prices before the date when the asset was used as a collateral
in the repo/reverse repo contract. VaR (for 5-10 days) is used because most financial
intermediaries need a certain holding period when finding a trading counterparty.
However, the pawnshop logic stops short in explaining the impact of counter-party
quality and relationship banking on the magnitude of the haircuts in repo contracts.
The empirical evidence has shown that the former matters. For example, Dang et al.
(2011) show that repo by hedge fund borrowers have higher haircut than bank bor-
rowers, on average. There are mainly two strands of the recent theory developments
that study collateralized borrowing and hence, have implications for haircuts on repo
contracts: those based on belief disagreement in a general equilibrium framework, and
those based on contractual and/or information frictions. Geanakoplos (2003) is the
first to propose a general equilibrium framework with difference in opinions to study
leverage constraints and hence, haircuts on repos. The mechanism works as follows:
optimists borrow from pessimists to speculate on the collateral. Since pessimists do
not value the collateral as much as optimists do, they are reluctant to lend, which con-
strains optimists’ ability to borrow and results in a haircut, which means that the face
value of the loan is lower than the market value of the asset. Simsek (2013) emphasizes
that only the belief disagreement about the probability of the downside states has a
significant effect on haircut and asset prices. Since it is difficult to measure difference
of opinion, we conjecture that when borrowers are from a different line of business from
lenders, the potential belief disagreement is larger. This leads to our second testable
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (counterparty types): The repo haircut is larger when the counterparties
in the contracts are from different lines of business.
The second strand of the literature uses the principal-agent models of borrowing con-
straints. As demonstrated in Simsek (2013), there is an equivalence of the principal-
agent framework and the general equilibrium framework proposed by Geanakoplos
(2010) as long as the optimistic borrowers have all the bargaining power. The principal-
agent framework can be extended to include frictions other than belief disagreements
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such as costly state verification, moral hazard, or adverse selection (see, e.g., Dang
et al., 2011; Ozdenoren et al., 2018). In these cases, the credit quality of the coun-
terparty matters rather than the difference in types. This leads to our third testable
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (counterparty’s quality): The repo haircut is larger when the default prob-
ability (credit quality) of borrower is higher (lower), or when the borrower is better
privately informed about the quality of the collateral.
There is a strand of literature that models coordinations and runs, which have implica-
tions for repo haircuts. Gorton and Ordonez (2014) find that endogenous information
acquisition can cause a sudden increase in haircut and a collateral crisis, hence, lenders’
characteristics might matter. Similarly, in a dynamic sequential trade model, Dang
et al. (2011) find that the haircut size is increasing in the liquidity needs of the lender,
and in the default probability of the lender in a subsequent repo transaction. Similarly,
in a series of dynamic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) models with an asset collateral
market, Martin et al. (2014) find that collateral and liquidity constraints matter and
hence, the liquidity of lenders matters in the haircut determination. This leads to our
fourth testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 (lender’s quality and liquidity): The repo haircut is larger when the default
probability and/or liquidity need of the lender is higher.
In contrast, Ozdenoren et al. (2018), in a dynamic adverse selection model, do not
find that lenders’ credit quality or liquidity constraints matter in haircuts. They find
instead that the severity of adverse selection matters. This indicates that the bilateral
relationship between borrower and lender should matter in haircuts since it lowers the
information friction. This leads to our fifth testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 (bilateral relationship): Haircuts are lower for bilateral parties with bank-
ing relationship.
Ozdenoren et al. (2018) also show that there are other ways to lower adverse selection.
For example, a portfolio of collateral assets will have a larger borrowing capacity if it
includes some safe asset. The idea is that the safe collateral convinces the lender to
fund the borrower to invest in the risky collateral assets since the lender can recover the
loan backed by the safe collateral. This initial investment, in turn, increases the prices
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of risky assets, and allows borrowers to borrow more against their risky collaterals,
creating an unravelling effect and generating more liquidity. This leads to our last
testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6 (portfolio repos): Risky assets in a portfolio repo with safe assets have
lower haircut than purely risky asset repos.
We turn next to the description of the data, empirical strategy, and present hypotheses
test results.
3.4 Overview of the data
The regulatory data set is a snapshot of the repo books of six banks that are major
players in the UK repo market. The total size of their repo books – the sum of repos and
reverse repos – is around 511 billion GBP (including CCP transactions) as at the end
of 2012.4 According to Financial Stability Board (2013), the UK-resident deposit-taker
banks hold around 2.1 trillion GBP in gross repo activity on their balance sheets, hence
our data set accounts for around 24% of the total repo activity in this market. The
majority of this activity is with non-UK resident banks, including the activity between
UK and foreign branches of the same consolidated group, and is highly concentrated
(Financial Stability Board, 2013).
Each of the six banks reports its outstanding repo transactions as at the end of 2012,
including the gross notional, maturity, currency, counter-party, haircuts and collaterals.
We have supplemented this data set with additional data on securities, counter-parties,
and the reporting banks from Datastream and Bloomberg. In what follows we report
information and results for reverse repos (REVR) and repos (REPO) separately. This
classification is from the point of view of the reporting banks, hence in a reverse repo
the reporting bank is lending to a counter-party, and in a repo the reporting bank is
borrowing money from a counter-party.
3.4.1 General sample
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 present an overview of our data set in terms of key variables.
They show the breakdown of the data along four categories: maturity, currency, coun-
terparty type, and collateral type (Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively). The breakdown
4The actual reporting periods differ slightly across the banks but all are toward the end of 2012.
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is only for the deals that have no missing information on haircut. For each category,
we report the sum of the notional amounts of deals for each subcategory in Table 3.1,
and the weighted average of haircuts for each subcategory in Table 3.2. Table 3.1 also
shows the percentage of each category in terms of the notional values. The average
haircuts in Table 3.2 are weighted by the gross notional of transactions. Both values
and haircuts are reported for reverse repos and repos separately. Since repo indicates
bank borrowing, we denote the repo values with negative numbers.
[Table 3.1 about here]
By comparing the values of reverse repos and repos, we find that the reporting banks
are net borrowers in the repo market (see the row labeled “Total” in Table 3.1). Panel
A of Table 3.1 shows that most of the borrowing and lending transactions for these
reporting banks have maturities of less than three months. While borrowing exceeds
lending for overnight contracts, lending is larger for transactions with maturities of
less than three months. This observation suggests that the reporting banks conduct
maturity transformation, to some extent. However, for maturities longer than one year
they are still net borrowers. Panel B of the same table shows that the reporting banks
in our sample borrow more in GBP and EUR followed by USD. They lend mostly in
GBP followed by EUR and USD. In net terms, they borrow mostly in GBP and lend
in currencies such as EUR, USD, GBP, followed by JPY.
Panel C of Table 3.1 shows that the reporting banks, in aggregate, borrow from counter-
parties such as central banks and governments, other banks, money-market funds and
broker-dealers, and lend to counter-parties such as other asset managers, insurance
companies and pension funds, and through CCPs. This is in line with our general
understanding of the money flow pattern in the wholesale funding market.5 Finally,
Panel D in Table 3.1 shows the breakdown based on collateral types. It shows that when
the six banks borrow, only a small percent of their repo collaterals is US government
bonds. Hence, it appears that the reporting banks use relatively worse collaterals
when borrowing than lending in the repo markets. They intermediate in (and borrow
against) relatively worse collaterals such as securitisation products and corporate debt.
UK government bonds are the most common collateral used both in repo and in reverse
repo contracts.
[Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 about here]
5The first row in Panel C describes the values when counter-party is a reporting bank. The reporting
banks report on a UK consolidated basis, but counter-parties are reported on a global basis. Therefore,
there may be discrepancies between the reverse repos and repos with the reporting banks.
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Inspecting the maturity-currency relationship (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2), we see that
the majority of contracts (frequency, not notional values) are in EUR and USD followed
by GBP and JPY. Most of the contracts have maturity of less than 3 months across all
currency groups and only a very small fraction of the contracts have maturity of more
than half a year within each currency category. GBP has a relatively higher fraction of
reverse repo contracts within 3 to 6 months, compared to other currencies. Repo and
reverse repo transactions in JPY and other currencies happen almost exclusively with
maturity of less than 1 month.
Panel A of Table 3.2 shows that, except for very long maturities, the reporting banks
are able to borrow at slightly lower haircuts than they lend. This observation means
that they can use the collateral they receive in a reverse repo to obtain more funding.
A similar pattern exists for different currencies as shown in Panel B.
[Table 3.2 about here]
Panel C makes it clear that the above-mentioned haircut advantage for reporting banks
arises from trades with hedge funds, other asset managers and, to a lesser extent, with
other banks and broker-dealers. In the transactions with these counter-parties, the
banks can receive funding at significantly lower margins. This advantage disappears
when they trade with central banks and government agencies, insurance and pension
funds and other reporting banks.
Finally, Panel D in Table 3.2 shows the breakdown based on collateral types. It displays
how margins depend on the quality of collaterals. For example, both repos and reverse
repos for German government bonds have a low average haircut, while haircuts for
corporate debt and securitisation are higher. The numbers also show that the six
reporting banks are able to borrow at a lower haircut compared to the one they charge
for the same type of collateral. This is true for all collateral types, except securitized
debt. Note that the UK government collateral commands a relatively high haircut, but
this is largely due to the longer maturity of the collateralized assets.
3.4.2 Zero-haircut sample
There are a lot of zero haircuts in the data as illustrated by the histogram of haircuts
in Figure 3.3: over 35% of the whole sample. Some of these zero haircuts are due to the
way haircuts are reported in CCP trades as explained in section 3.5, but even excluding
CCP trades, zero-haircut trades are still quite common. This finding is not surprising
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and has been confirmed by other data collections undertaken at the global level. A
summary of the zero-haircut trades trades is presented in Table 3.3. The table shows
that the vast majority of contracts are with other banks and are denominated in EUR.
Most of the zero-haircut contracts are overnight (84% for the repo sample, 72% for the
reverse repo sample), as shown in Figure 3.4.
[Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4 and Table 3.3 about here]
The network graphs in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 illustrate the topology of the zero-
haircut trades. The size of each node reflects the number of counterparties with which
it has at least one zero-haircut deal. Edge widths show the total number of zero-haircut
trades between two given nodes. The figures show that the zero haircut observations
from the repo and the reverse repo samples are generated mostly by one or two entities.
In the repo market, one of the banks (bank A in Figure 3.6) receives more than 98%
of all the zero-haircut trades. This borrower has 89 counterparties who are willing
to lend at zero haircut, but it does most zero haircut borrowing with one particular
counterparty (24% of all trades) – C697 in Figure 3.6. In the reverse repo market,
another bank (bank B in Figure 3.5) is involved in 95% of all the zero-haircut trades.
The top 10 counterparties account for 68% of all zero-haircut repo trades and 71% of
all zero-haircut reverse repo trades, which shows that a small number of counterparties
contribute to the majority of zero-haircut observations. These facts suggest that there
are important borrower-lender relationships among the determinants of the zero-haircut
trades, supporting our fifth testable hypothesis highlighted above. We investigate the
role of bilateral relations further in later sections.
[Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 about here]
3.5 The Determinants of haircuts
We now analyze what explanatory variables govern haircuts and in what ways these
variables affect them. For this purpose, we ran multiple regressions on reverse repo and
repo data separately, with different specifications as described below.
For the most part of the regression analysis, we focus on the sample excluding the trades
with CCPs. In practice, CCPs often calculate haircuts (or initial margin requirements)
on a portfolio basis. That is, the over-collateralization of repo positions is calculated at
the portfolio or netting set level, without applying haircuts on individual transactions.
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In our data set, firms still report a transaction-level haircut, but this is often zero
given that the ‘true’ haircut is applied at the portfolio level. In such cases, it is not
meaningful to look at haircuts on individual transactions that are centrally cleared. In
addition, there is only one CCP in our sample, which uses a fixed schedule of haircuts.
Therefore, we focus on the sample that excludes CCP transactions.
In order to make sure that the multitude of zero haircuts does not distort our results,
in addition to the ordinary least square regressions, we perform two sets of regressions.
We use the Tobit model with truncation at zero, and use the logit transform to generate
more variation in haircuts and to run logistic regression.
We split the data and consider separately repo and reverse repo transactions since they
are different samples: one has reporting banks as borrowers, and the other has the
reporting banks as lenders. Moreover, we observe heterogeneity in the counterparties
in the two types of transactions, which allows us to conduct a more detailed analysis
of the haircut determinants.
Table 3.4 presents all the explanatory variables used in different regressions. We have
dummy variables for currencies, collateral types, counterparty types, bank-counterparty
pairs and a dummy for collateral bundled in a portfolio with a very safe asset. Other
than dummy variables, we use trade-specific variables, collateral rating and maturity,
and counterparty characteristics. We also have two measures for counterparty and col-
lateral concentration. Counterparty concentration measures the share of transactions
with a specific counterparty in total, evaluated using the notional amount of trans-
actions. It represent how systemically important that counterparty is to the bank.
Similarly, collateral concentration is measured by the share of transactions against a
specific collateral in total, evaluated using the notional amount of transactions. We also
include an interaction term between collateral rating and counterparty rating. The logic
behind this term is to find whether counterparty and collateral quality can compensate
for each other as a conditional effect.
[Table 3.4 about here]
Table 3.5 shows summary statistics for haircuts and non-dummy explanatory variables
for the sample used in the baseline regressions. Except collateral and counterparty
ratings which are categorical, other variables in this table are continuous. The summary
statistics are represented separately for reverse repos and repos in Panels A and B,
respectively, given that haircut practices can potentially differ significantly between
the two instruments. Variables have been winsorized at 0.5% level.
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Even though haircuts can have a value as high as 46%, the weighted average of hair-
cuts is about 6% for reverse repos and about 2% for repos. Notional values are log-
transformed. Maturity values, both for transactions and collateral, are in years. The
weighted average of maturity for the transactions is about 22-29 days, while the mean
is around 26-29 days. Average collateral maturity used is between 7.5 and 12 years.
Collateral and counterparty ratings are modified into numeric scale from 1 to 20, with
20 being the highest rating. The average collateral quality in this scale is about 14,
while the average counterparty rating is between 14 and 15.
[Table 3.5 about here]
The summary statistics for counterparty return on assets (RoA), leverage, credit default
swap (CDS) spread, and cash ratio are also presented in Table 3.5, and the respective
definitions are in Table 3.4. The logic for including RoA is to see how profitability of the
counterparty can affect haircuts, and the cash ratio is intended to proxy for liquidity
needs. Overall, the summary statistics for reverse repos and repos are not significantly
different.
In Table 3.6–Table 3.11 we present the main results of this study. These tables show
regression results in order to understand what factors might determine haircuts. The
dependent variable is haircut in all tables and explanatory variables are listed in the
second column. We have classified explanatory variables into several categories. These
categories are shown in the first column. The columns that are labeled with numbers
display regression coefficients for different sets of explanatory variables. All continuous
explanatory variables are standardized in order to simplify the comparison of coeffi-
cients for different variables. Standard errors, which are not reported, are clustered at
the reporting bank level. One, two and three stars denote 10%, 5% and 1% signifi-
cance levels, respectively. The tables present the results for Tobit, OLS, and Logistic
regressions for reverse repos and repos.
[Table 3.6, Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 about here]
The results in Table 3.6–Table 3.8 are for reverse repo transactions. In these trans-
actions the reporting bank lends cash and receives collateral, and the counterparty
borrows money and delivers collateral to the bank. Hence, counterparty characteristics
correspond to borrower characteristics in these transactions. Table 3.6 presents the
outcome of the Tobit regression, and Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 show the OLS and Lo-
gistic regressions, respectively. The main results that we emphasize below are robust
with respect to the choice of models.
What Drives Repo Haircuts? Evidence from the UK Market 173
We present analogous results for repos in Table 3.9–Table 3.11. In these transactions
the reporting bank borrows cash and delivers collateral, and the counterparty lends
money and receives collateral. Hence, counterparty characteristics correspond to lender
characteristics in these transactions.
[Table 3.9, Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 about here]
Column (1) in all these tables reports the result when the smallest set of explanatory
variables is used. In this column, we include currency dummies, notional and maturity
of transaction, collateral characteristics (rating and maturity), collateral type dummies,
and dummies for counterparty type, but we leave out counterparty characteristics. In
column (2) we add counterparty characteristics and concentration measures for coun-
terparties and collateral. Columns (3) and (4) are similar to column (1), but they also
include network centrality measures described in section 3.5.2. Analogously, columns
(5) and (6) are similar to column (2) but include network centrality measures.
In columns (1) and (2) we do not include the reporting bank characteristics, instead we
look for haircut determinants by assessing the effects of explanatory variables within
transactions conducted by each reporting bank. This is achieved by including reporting
bank fixed effects in the regressions. To account for special relationships in the repo
and reverse repo samples, we add a set of dummies for each bank-counterparty pair.
We describe the results for these dummies in the next section.
The next section elaborates on the main results presented in Table 3.6–Table 3.11 in
light of the six hypotheses formulated in section 3.3.
3.5.1 Tests of hypotheses
Test 1 (collateral quality): The repo haircut is larger when the collateral is of lower
quality and/or illiquid.
As aforementioned, collateral quality can be measured using VaR, maturity, rating,
and/or asset types. Transaction maturity is also a proxy because the longer the ma-
turity, the riskier the underlying collateral becomes. Furthermore, when the collateral
concentration ratio increases, the collateral portfolio pool becomes riskier. To test hy-
pothesis 1, we include VaR of each asset, collateral rating, maturity, asset types in
terms of corporate debt, securitisation products, transaction maturity, collateral con-
centration, notional value in all baseline regressions. We compute the VaR using two
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approaches. First, the measure is obtained using the historic approach (using the quin-
tiles of the historical return distribution). We calculate simple returns and take the
5-days, 5% VaR as our main measure.6 Second, we also computed VaR using the para-
metric approach (using the deciles of the normal distribution). The results are largely
similar to the results obtained using the historic approach. In the main text, we provide
the results obtained with the historic VaR.
The results from Table 3.6–Table 3.11 show that VaR has a positive impact on the hair-
cut both in the repo market, and in the reverse repo market. Table 3.7 and Table 3.10
show that one standard deviation increase in the 5-day, 5% VaR is correlated with 9
bps increase in the repo haircut and 5 bps increase in the reverse repo haircut. The
estimates from the Logit and Tobit regressions confirm the positive and statistically
significant results. The effect is robust to adding different controls – the estimates in
columns 1-6 barely change.
Similar results are obtained for transaction maturity and securitisation products. Trans-
action maturity has a significant positive and robust effect on haircuts across all spec-
ifications: one standard deviation rise in maturity increases haircuts by 83-103 bps for
reverse repos and by 24-47 bps for repos. Securitized collateral increases haircut by
20-64 bps when the reporting banks are lending, and by 9-14 bps when the same banks
are borrowing. The notional value of transactions also increases haircuts: one standard
deviation increase in notional is correlated with 4-9 bps rise in haircuts for reverse repo
transactions, and with 4-6 bps rise in repos.
For the repos, higher collateral concentration – another measure for the riskiness of
the collateral portfolio – increases the haircut. Therefore, our reporting banks are
charged significantly higher haircut when borrowing relatively large sums against the
same collateral. On the other hand, collateral concentration measures do not exhibit
any notable effect on haircuts in reverse repo transactions. This might reflect the
fact that our reporting banks are relatively larger than their counterparties and are
able to absorb a large amount of the same collateral when trading with these smaller
counterparties.
Other results on collateral quality and liquidity depend on whether the tests are un-
dertaken with the reverse repo or repo sample, that is, whether banks are lending via
reverse repo or borrowing via repo. When banks are lending, they lower the haircut if
the collateral rating is higher. When they are borrowing, their lenders require higher
haircuts when collateral is of longer maturity and corporate debt. This might reflect
6Using 1% or 10 days produces similar results.
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the fact that banks in our sample use predominantly corporate debt as collateral assets
to borrow.
In general, there is strong evidence that collateral quality and liquidity variables are
important determinants of repo haircuts.
Test 2 (counterparty types): The repo haircut is larger when the counterparties in the
contract are from different lines of business.
To test hypothesis 2, we define a dummy variable for all non-bank counterparties in
our sample (broker-dealers, hedge funds, asset managers, insurance companies, pension
funds, central banks, governments and all others). Since all these counterparties are
from different lines of business compared to the six reporting banks, the point estimate
on the dummy shows the average effect on haircuts when the counterparties are from
different business types. In order to see how haircuts applied between a bank and a non-
bank entity differ from the haircuts between two banks, we ran analogous regressions
to those in Table 3.6–Table 3.11, except that there is only one dummy variable for
counterparty type which takes value of 1 if the counterparty is not a bank, and 0
otherwise. The results from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18 in the Appendix show that
haircut increases both in the repo market, and in the reverse repo market. For contracts
where banks deal with non-bank counterparties, the haircut increases by 9-13 bps in
the reverse repo market and by 6-8 bps in the repo market. The estimates from the
Logit and Tobit regressions (excluded for brevity) confirm the positive and statistically
significant effects.
These results suggest that when banks trade with institutions similar to themselves,
on average, they charge lower haircuts, controlling for all observables (counterparty
or collateral rating, maturity, etc.). Similar institutions use comparable models, and
therefore it is more likely that two banks have less disagreement than two completely
different entities, for example, a bank and a hedge fund, hence the higher haircuts for
non-bank counterparties in our sample. This might also be due to the fact that there
is lower information friction and hence, less adverse selection between counterparties of
similar types. This evidence supports both the difference of opinion framework started
with Geanakoplos (1997) and the adverse selection framework as in Ozdenoren et al.
(2018).
However, these findings should be interpreted with caution. Even though the haircut
increases when banks interact with non-bank entities on average, there are heterogenous
effects for different non-bank institutions. Table 3.6–Table 3.11 show that banks charge
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higher haircut when lending to hedge funds and asset managers, but lower haircut when
lending to broker-dealers, insurance companies and pension funds. Banks receive higher
haircut when borrowing from insurance companies and pension funds, but lower hair-
cut when borrowing from central banks and governments, and broker-dealers. These
observations illustrate that despite the positive effect on average, sometimes the hair-
cut can be lower when banks interact with non-bank entities which goes against the
hypothesis.
Test 3 (counterparty’s quality): The repo haircut is larger when the default probability
(credit quality) of borrower is higher (lower), or when the borrower is better privately
informed about the quality of the collateral.
To test hypothesis 3, we use the rating and the leverage ratio of the borrower in the
reverse repo sample. The results from Table 3.6–Table 3.8 show that higher-rated
(lower default probability) borrowers are charged a lower haircut: one unit increase in
rating decreases the haircut by 8-21 bps. However, the coefficient is less statistically
significant in the Tobit and the Logit regressions and sometimes switches sign, especially
in the specifications including network centrality measures. A possible reason for this
is the collinearity between the counterparty rating and the centrality measures: the
correlation between the two variables is close to 40%.
Using the counterparty’s leverage ratio produces more robust results. The coefficients
are positive and significant, which shows that riskier counterparties are charged a higher
haircut. The OLS estimates show that one standard deviation rise in leverage increases
the haircut by 53-79 bps, which is a massive increase. The coefficients from the Tobit
and Logit specifications confirm the positive effects.
Removing the bank-counterparty interaction dummies from the regressions shows that
the coefficient on rating is more statistically significant and negative across all specifi-
cations. Higher-rated counterparties receive a lower haircut in these regressions which
shows that some of the rating effects are absorbed by the bank-counterparty interac-
tion dummies. These results are excluded from the paper for brevity. Overall, there is
evidence that riskier borrowers are charged a higher haircut.
Table 3.6–Table 3.11 show that among the counterparty types, hedge funds receive
massively higher haircuts in all specifications, relative to the baseline haircut received
by banks: they are charged 99-157 bps higher haircut, on average. When banks borrow
from hedge funds, there is no significant change in the charged haircut as seen from the
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coefficients for the repo sample. Broker-dealers both receive and charge a lower haircut
in most specifications. Similar effects are observed for central banks and government
agencies. Other asset managers are charged higher haircuts, but give lower ones in
a contract with the reporting banks. Insurance companies and pension funds charge
massively higher haircuts as a lender (90-103 bps more) but receive lower haircuts as a
borrower (23-33 bps less).
The results in columns (2), (5), (6) of Table 3.6–Table 3.8 show that larger counter-
parties are charged lower haircut: one standard deviation increase in size massively
reduces the haircut by 93-139 bps. The results for the repo sample are less significant
and indicate that larger lenders charge a higher haircut. Higher counterparty CDS in-
creases the haircut both for repos and for reverse repos, but the effect is less significant.
Counterparties with missing data on size, rating, CDS, etc. charge a higher haircut as
lenders but receive a lower haircut as borrowers. The majority of these counterparties
are small banks and some hedge funds. For reverse repos, there are relatively more
other asset managers and less broker-dealers with missing data on size, rating, CDS,
etc. compared to the general sample.
An important question about haircuts is how collateral risk and counterparty risk in-
teract. There is a significant and positive coefficient on the interaction term between
counterparty and collateral rating for the reverse repos. Excluding this interaction term
from the regression weakens the magnitude and significance of the effect of counter-
party characteristics. This observation means that collateral quality can overshadow
counterparty characteristics. It seems that borrowers with lower ratings try to use
higher quality collateral to receive a lower haircut, and as a consequence the influences
of counterparty attributes are concealed. After accounting for this interaction we can
observe that larger counterparties and borrowers with higher ratings are charged lower
haircuts.
Test 4 (lender’s quality and liquidity): The repo haircut is larger when the default
probability and/or liquidity need of lenders is higher.
We use lender’s rating to account for default probability in the repo sample. To proxy
for liquidity needs, we use lender’s cash ratio. The evidence from Table 3.9–Table 3.11
is mixed. The estimates for rating are only marginally significant and positive, which
goes against the hypothesis. The estimates for cash ratio are insignificant but nega-
tive, which supports the hypothesis. Overall, there is mixed evidence in favor of this
hypothesis.
What Drives Repo Haircuts? Evidence from the UK Market 178
Test 5 (bilateral relationship): The repo haircut is lower for bilateral parties with bank-
ing relationship.
Table 3.12 shows the percentage of significant bank-counterparty interaction dummies
in column (2) of Table 3.7 and Table 3.10. Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 present a network
graph of all the bank-counterparty interaction dummies, significant at the 1% level.
Red color means the interaction coefficient is negative (lower haircut if the two nodes
form a contract). Blue color means the coefficient is positive (higher haircut if the
two nodes form a contract). The thickness of the edge between two nodes shows the
magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction dummy. The size of each node reflects
the number of significant interactions involving the node. The figures are consistent
with the hypothesis that relationships matter in haircut determination. The effect is
particularly pronounced for the repo market, where one of the banks (E in the figure)
receives significantly lower haircuts from most of its counterparties. In the reverse
repo market two other banks (B and F) charge lower haircuts in deals with a subset of
counterparties. On the other hand, another bank (D on the graph) consistently requires
a higher haircut.
[Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 about here]
For robustness, we also split the general sample into only hedge funds and only banks.
As we see from columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.12, the relationship dummies are signif-
icant for the subsample of hedge funds. However, even more of them are significant if
we split the sample to only banks (columns (5) and (6)): more than 70% are significant
at the 5% level for reverse repo deals. These facts suggest that the special relationships
are mostly driven by bank-to-bank effects.
[Table 3.12 about here]
Test 6 (portfolio repos): Risky assets in a portfolio repo with safe assets have lower
haircut than purely risky asset repos.
To implement this test, we define a dummy equal to one if an asset is a part of portfolio
which contains at least one highest-rated asset (AAA). The coefficient on the dummy
for collateral bundled in a safe-asset portfolio from Table 3.6–Table 3.8 shows that
lower-rated assets in a portfolio with a safe asset have a lower haircut compared to
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the same assets in a standalone arrangement. The estimates from Table 3.7 show that
combining lower-rated asset in a portfolio with a high-rated asset reduces the haircut
by 5-16 bps. A more detailed analysis of the safe-asset portfolios shows that lower-rated
counterparties are more likely to bundle assets in such portfolios. Hedge funds are the
counterparties with the largest fraction of portfolios bundled with a safe asset.
3.5.2 Network effects
The financial crisis has shown the importance of the interconnectedness of the banking
system and the need to analyze risk not by looking at individual institutions in isolation,
but by assessing network structure and interplay between institutions. As a result,
various studies have used network analysis tools to study the interbank and inter-dealer
markets (see, e.g., Denbee et al., 2014; Li and Schürhoff, 2018).
In this part we aim to examine the network structure of the UK repo market using
our data set. We use network centrality measures borrowed from the literature on net-
work analysis and employed by Li and Schürhoff (2018). Table 3.13 provides summary
statistics of these measures (for definitions see Li and Schürhoff, 2018).
[Table 3.13 about here]
Figure 3.9 displays the repo market network plot. The network plot shows the reporting
banks in yellow color and size of the nodes is proportional to total degree measure.
In order to see if the network structure affects haircuts in the repo market, we use
the principal component of the unweighted and weighted centrality measures in the
explanatory regressions. The results are presented in columns (3)–(4) and columns
(5)–(6) of Table 3.6–Table 3.11 for reverse repos and repos. We see that the banks with
higher centrality measures ask for less haircuts on reverse repos and also pay lower
haircuts on repos. The results using weighted or unweighted measures are virtually the
same.
[Figure 3.9 about here]
In unreported regressions we use the entire sample including the CCP deals. None of
the results mentioned above changes significantly, with two notable exceptions. First,
with CCP transactions, the two network measures are not significant in any case, hence
we do not observe any meaningful network effect when CCP transactions are included.
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Second, including CCP transactions attenuates the impact of counterparty concentra-
tion on increasing the haircuts. Overall, given the issues described at the beginning of
the section, it seems that including CCP transactions introduces some noise in the way
that the architecture of the market affects haircuts, and it is to be expected that the
results related to the network measures and counterparty concentration become less
significant.
3.6 Conclusion
In this study we analyze the structure of the UK repo market using a novel data set
collated by the UK regulator. We examine the maturity structure, collateral types
and different counterparty types that engage in this market, and test six theoretical
hypotheses of haircut determination. We aim to answer the question of what vari-
ables determine haircuts using transaction-level data. We find that collateral quality
measured by transaction maturity and VaR have a first order importance in setting
haircuts. Banks charge higher haircuts when they transact with non-bank institutions.
In particular, hedge funds as borrowers receive a significantly higher haircut even after
controlling for measures of counterparty risk. Larger borrowers with higher ratings
receive lower haircuts, but this effect can be overshadowed by collateral quality, be-
cause weaker borrowers try to use higher quality collateral to receive a lower haircut.
Finally, we examine the structure and attributes of the repo market network to assess
if the network structure has an influence over haircuts. We find evidence of impor-
tant borrower-lender relationships. Banks with higher centrality measures ask for more
haircuts on reverse repos and pay lower haircuts on repos.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Currency versus maturity of the contracts for the sample of reverse
repos. The area of each rectangle represents the fraction of contracts (frequency, not
notional values) within a particular maturity-currency group. The area of the entire
square is 100%.
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Figure 3.2: Currency versus maturity of the contracts for the sample of repos. The
area of each rectangle represents the fraction of contracts (frequency, not notional
values) within a particular maturity-currency group. The area of the entire square is
100%.
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of haircuts. The figure shows the density of haircuts.
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Figure 3.4: Zero-haircut sample. Contract maturities. The figure shows the number
of zero-haircut contracts for each maturity. The top panel shows the distribution of
reverse repos, the bottom – of repos.
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Figure 3.5: Zero-haircut network for reverse repos. The size of each node reflects
the number of counterparties with which it has at least one zero-haircut deal. Edge
widths show the total number of zero-haircut trades between two given nodes. For
Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 nodes labeled A, B, D, E, F, G denote the six reporting
banks, and nodes labeled with C and numeric denote their counterparties.
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Figure 3.6: Zero-haircut network for repos. The size of each node reflects the number
of counterparties with which it has at least one zero-haircut deal. Edge widths show
the total number of zero-haircut trades between two given nodes.
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Figure 3.7: Significant relationships in the reverse repo market. The figure shows
the significant bank-counterparty interaction dummies at the 1% significance level
from the OLS regression specification. Red color means the interaction coefficient
is negative (lower haircut if the two nodes form a contract). Blue color means the
coefficient is positive (higher haircut if the two nodes form a contract). Edge width
shows the absolute magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction dummy. The size
of each node reflects the number of significant interactions involving the node.
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Figure 3.8: Significant relationships in the repo market. The figure shows the sig-
nificant bank-counterparty interaction dummies at the 1% significance level from the
OLS regression specification. Red color means the interaction coefficient is negative
(lower haircut if the two nodes form a contract). Blue color means the coefficient
is positive (higher haircut if the two nodes form a contract). Edge width shows the
absolute magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction dummy. The size of each node
reflects the number of significant interactions involving the node.
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Figure 3.9: Network flows plot. The figure shows the flow of money for the sample
of six reporting banks.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: The breakdown of value of contracts by maturity, currency, counterparty
type, and collateral type. The table presents the breakdown of the deals (in bn GBP)
by maturity, currency, counterparty type, and collateral type (Panels A, B, C, and
D, respectively). For each category, it shows the value of the trades in bn GBP and
the percentage of total trades for the reverse repos and repos, respectively. The total
values in Panels A, B, C and D are based on the data from the six reporting banks
that report haircut and collateral information. Discrepancies in row Total between the
Panels are due to missing information.
REVR REPO
Value Percent Value Percent Net
A. Maturity
Overnight 29.7 12.2% -38.1 14.3% -8.5
1 day-3m 140.7 57.6% -130.7 48.9% 10.0
3m-1y 65.8 26.9% -78.1 29.2% -12.3
1y-5y 8.0 3.3% -18.5 6.9% -10.5
5y+ 0.0 0.0% -1.7 0.6% -1.6
Total 244.2 100.0% -267.0 100.0% -22.8
B. Currency
GBP 110.2 45.1% -149.8 56.1% -39.6
EUR 90.6 37.1% -86.7 32.5% 4.0
USD 30.5 12.5% -26.8 10.0% 3.7
JPY 6.0 2.5% -1.6 0.6% 4.4
Other 6.9 2.8% -2.1 0.8% 4.8
Total 244.2 100.0% -267.0 100.0% -22.8
C. Counterparty type
Another reporting bank a 8.2 3.4% -10.2 3.8% -2.0
Other banks 29.3 12.0% -43.6 16.3% -14.3
Broker-dealer b 15.0 6.1% -15.8 5.9% -0.8
Hedge fund 15.1 6.2% -15.5 5.8% -0.4
MMFs 0.0 0.0% -1.9 0.7% -1.9
Other asset managers c 11.5 4.7% -8.3 3.1% 3.2
CCP 145.5 59.6% -131.3 49.3% 14.2
Insurance and pension 9.5 3.9% -8.5 3.2% 1.0
Central bank and government 5.5 2.3% -28.6 10.7% -23.0
Other d 4.4 1.8% -2.8 1.0% 1.6
Total 244.1 100.0% -266.6 100.0% -22.5
D. Collateral type
US govt 10.9 6.0% -5.4 2.9% 5.5
UK govt 83.1 45.8% -111.7 59.1% -28.6
Germany govt 25.5 14.0% -19.1 10.1% 6.4
France govt 16.9 9.3% -7.2 3.8% 9.7
GIIPS e 4.1 2.2% -4.4 2.3% -0.3
Other sovereign 31.6 17.4% -16.0 8.4% 15.7
Corporate debt 7.5 4.1% -11.7 6.2% -4.2
Securitisation 2.0 1.1% -13.5 7.1% -11.5
Other 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0
Total 181.6 100.0% -188.9 100.0% -7.3
a The reporting banks report on a UK-consolidated basis, but counterparties are reported on a global
basis. Therefore, there may be discrepancies between the reverse repos and repos with the reporting
banks.
b Broker-dealers are mostly securities firms that are subsidiaries of large banks. c Non-leveraged non-
MMF mutual funds – asset managers that are not hedge fund or MMF. d Includes corporations, schools,
hospitals and other non-profit organizations. e Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain government
bonds.
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Table 3.2: The breakdown of average haircuts by maturity, currency, counterparty
type, and collateral type. The table presents the breakdown of the deals by maturity,
currency, counterparty type, and collateral type (Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively).
For each category, it shows the average haircut for the reverse repos and repos, re-
spectively. The averages are weighted by the gross notional of the transactions.
REVR REPO
A. Maturity
Overnight 1.9% 0.7%
1 day-3m 3.2% 1.4%
3m-1y 0.6% 0.5%
1-5y 0.0% 0.7%
5y+ 0.0% 0.0%
B. Currency
GBP 1.4% 0.8%
EUR 1.5% 1.4%
USD 2.6% 0.9%
JPY 0.1% 0.0%
Other 0.2% 0.1%
C. Counterparty type
Another reporting bank a 0.1% 0.2%
Other banks 1.9% 1.4%
Broker-dealer b 0.9% 0.6%
Hedge fund 1.4% 0.1%
Other asset managers c 1.0% 0.1%
Insurance and pension 0.3% 0.5%
Central bank and government 0.0% 0.3%
Other d 0.3% 0.0%
D. Collateral type
US govt 0.4% 0.0%
UK govt 1.0% 0.4%
Germany govt 0.1% 0.1%
France govt 0.1% 0.1%
GIIPS e 0.2% 0.1%
Other sovereign 1.1% 0.2%
Corporate debt 1.1% 0.6%
Securitisation 0.5% 0.8%
Other 0.0% –
Overall average 1.2% 0.7%
a The reporting banks report on a UK-consolidated basis, but counterparties are reported on a global
basis. Therefore, there may be discrepancies between the reverse repos and repos with the reporting
banks.
b Broker-dealers are mostly securities firms that are subsidiaries of large banks. c Non-leveraged
non-MMF mutual funds – asset managers that are not hedge fund or MMF. d Includes corporations,
schools, hospitals and other non-profit organizations. e Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain
government bonds.
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Table 3.3: Summary of the zero-haircut sample excluding deals with CCPs. The
table presents breakdown of deals by currency, counterparty and collateral type for
the sample of deals with zero haircut, excluding the deals with CCPs. Percentages
represent frequency of deals.
Category Subcategory REVR REPO
Currency GBP 33.6% 6.3%
USD 22.1% 40.0%
EUR 40.5% 51.0%
JPY 1.6% 0.9%
Other 2.2% 1.9%
Counterparty type Another reporting bank 4.3% 2.2%
Other banks 53.4% 68.7%
Broker-dealer 6.1% 9.5%
Hedge fund 0.9% 0.0%
Other asset managers 6.4% 16.0%
Insurance and pension 11.6% 1.4%
Central bank and govt 2.2% 1.6%
Other 15.2% 0.5%
Collateral type Sovereign 36.7% 44.2%
Corporate debt 63.0% 43.9%
Securitization 0.3% 11.9%
Other 0.0% 0.0%
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Table 3.4: Description of the explanatory variables.
Variable Description
gbp Dummy variable = 1 if transaction is in GBP.
eur Dummy variable = 1 if transaction is in EUR.
jpy Dummy variable = 1 if transaction is in JPY.
othercurrency Dummy variable = 1 if transaction is not GBP, EUR or JPY.
notional Log notional of the transaction in millions GBP.
maturity Maturity of the transaction in years.
collrating Rating of the collateral: 20 is the highest and 1 is the lowest.
collmaturity Maturity of the collateral in years.
corpdebt Dummy variable = 1 if collateral is corporate bond.
securitisation Dummy variable = 1 if collateral is securitisation.
VaR Historical 5-day, 5% Value-at-Risk of the asset.
asset in safe portf Dummy variable = 1 if the asset is in a portfolio with at least one asset
rated AAA.
brokerdealers Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is a broker-dealer.
hedgefund Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is hedge fund.
othermanager Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is other asset manager.
ccp Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is CCP.
insur&pension Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is insurance company or pension fund.
cb&govt Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is central bank or government.
other Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is other type.
nonbank Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is not a bank or broker-dealer.
cptysize Log size of the counterparty in millions GBP.
cptyroa RoA of the counterparty.
cptyrating Rating of the counterparty: 20 is the highest and 1 is the lowest.
cptyleverage Leverage ratio of the counterparty (risk-weighted assets over equity).
cptycds CDS spread of the counterparty.
cptycashratio Cash ratio of the counterparty (cash over short-term debt).
nocptydata Dummy variable = 1 there is no counterparty data.
cptycon Concentration of the counterparty measured by the share of transactions
with that counterparty in total: higher number indicates more concentra-
tion.
collcon Concentration of the collateral measured by the share of transactions
against that collateral in total: higher number indicates more concentration.
cpty&collrating Interaction term between counterparty rating and collateral rating.
pcu Principal component of the network centrality measures for unweighted
network.
pcw Principal component of the network centrality measures for weighted net-
work.
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics for the sample excluding deals with CCPs. The table
shows the summary statistics of variables used in the regressions excluding the deals
with CCPs, for repo and reverse repo transactions. Variables have been winsorized at
0.5% level. Rating scale is 1–20, with 20 being the highest rating.
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min Max Average a
A. REVR
Haircut 8,754 6.25% 10.13% 0.00% 46.15% 6.15%
Notional 10,435 6.25 0.86 3.45 8.32 6.25
Maturity 10,435 0.07 0.14 0.00 3.00 0.06
Collateral maturity 7,085 11.88 10.42 0.22 43.18 12.01
Collateral rating 5,729 14.54 4.83 3.00 20.00 14.60
Ctpy size 6,512 5.17 0.70 3.57 6.25 5.16
Ctpy RoA 6,506 0.29 0.41 -1.26 1.98 0.29
Ctpy leverage 6,469 5.56 1.33 2.97 11.00 5.56
Ctpy CDS 5,593 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
Ctpy cash ratio 6,484 -0.01 5.48 -81.44 4.37 -0.03
Ctpy rating 6,495 14.59 1.28 8.00 20.00 14.60
B. REPO
Haircut 7,386 2.37% 5.82% 0.00% 46.15% 2.36%
Notional 11,896 6.18 0.79 3.45 8.32 6.21
Maturity 11,905 0.08 0.35 0.00 3.00 0.08
Collateral maturity 8,993 7.50 7.81 0.22 43.18 7.50
Collateral rating 8,629 14.34 4.99 3.00 20.00 14.33
Ctpy size 8,380 5.37 0.62 3.57 6.25 5.37
Ctpy RoA 8,367 0.36 0.39 -1.26 1.98 0.36
Ctpy leverage 7,300 5.87 1.42 2.97 11.00 5.86
Ctpy CDS 5,908 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02
Ctpy cash ratio 8,160 0.01 6.63 -81.44 4.37 0.01
Ctpy rating 8,445 15.19 1.94 8.00 20.00 15.19
a Average is weighted by the gross notional of transactions.
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Table 3.6: Reverse repo Tobit regressions excluding CCPs. The table shows Tobit
regression results for reverse repos excluding deals with CCPs, where the Tobit model
with truncation at zero is used. The dependent variable is haircut and explanatory
variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of
explanatory variable. The columns that are labeled with numbers display regression
coefficients for different explanatory variables. All quantitative variables (notional,
maturity, collrating, collmaturity, VaR, cptysize, cptyroa, cptyleverage, cptycds, cpty-
cashratio, cptycon, collcon, cpty & collrating, pcu and pcw) are standardized. Standard
errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One, two and three stars
denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.009∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.019∗∗
maturity 0.157∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
Collateral collrating -0.012∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
var collmaturity -0.0004 0.003 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.001 0.001
corpdebt -0.010∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.030∗∗
securitisation 0.037∗∗∗ 0.013 0.099∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
VaR 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
asset in safe portf -0.009∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
Cpty brokerdealers -0.008 -0.005 -0.048∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
type hedgefund 0.126∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
othermanager 0.030∗∗ -0.011 0.038∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
insur&pension 0.011 -0.022∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
cb&govt -0.019 -0.001 -0.092∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
other 0.033∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.062∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
Cpty cptysize -0.166∗∗ -0.208∗∗ -0.216∗∗
var cptyroa -0.006 -0.041∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
cptyrating -0.025∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.010∗∗
cptyleverage 0.127∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
cptycds 0.001 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗
cptycashratio 0.005 -0.016∗∗ -0.009
nocptydata -0.230∗∗ 0.081 -0.040
Misc cptycon 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009 -0.010
collcon 0.005 0.009 0.008
cpty&collrating 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
Network pcu -0.017∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
var pcw -0.060∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Bank-Cty FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,925 3,907 3,925 3,925 3,907 3,907
Pseudo R2 2.893 2.952 2.891 2.891 2.948 2.949
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Table 3.7: Reverse repo OLS regressions excluding CCPs. The table shows OLS
regression results for reverse repos, excluding deals with CCPs. The dependent vari-
able is haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first
column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns that are labeled with
numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. All quan-
titative variables (notional, maturity, collrating, collmaturity, VaR, cptysize, cptyroa,
cptyleverage, cptycds, cptycashratio, cptycon, collcon, cpty & collrating, pcu and pcw)
are standardized. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting bank level.
One, two and three stars denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.003 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
maturity 0.095∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
Collateral collrating -0.008∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
var collmaturity -0.001 0.002 -0.0004 0.001 0.002 0.004∗∗
corpdebt -0.008∗ -0.009∗ -0.013∗ -0.011∗ -0.015∗ -0.012∗
securitisation 0.036∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
VaR 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
asset in safe portf -0.005∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
Cpty brokerdealers 0.003 0.007 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
type hedgefund 0.139∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
othermanager 0.022∗∗ 0.009 0.028∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.022∗∗
insur&pension 0.006 -0.003 -0.026∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
cb&govt 0.008 0.019∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.012∗
other 0.017∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.009∗ -0.003 -0.009 -0.006
Cpty cptysize -0.093∗∗ -0.139∗∗ -0.134∗∗
var cptyroa -0.003 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
cptyrating -0.021∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
cptyleverage 0.079∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
cptycds -0.003 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
cptycashratio 0.006∗∗ 0.001 0.007∗∗∗
nocptydata -0.164∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
Misc cptycon 0.005 -0.001 -0.003
collcon 0.002 0.004 0.005
cpty&collrating 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
Network pcu -0.021∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
var pcw -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Bank-Cty FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,925 3,907 3,925 3,925 3,907 3,907
R2 0.615 0.650 0.637 0.633 0.664 0.658
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Table 3.8: Reverse repo Logistic regressions excluding CCPs. The table shows Lo-
gistic regression results for reverse repos, excluding deals with CCPs. The dependent
variable is logit-transformed haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second
column. The first column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns
that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory
variables. All quantitative variables (notional, maturity, collrating, collmaturity, VaR,
cptysize, cptyroa, cptyleverage, cptycds, cptycashratio, cptycon, collcon, cpty & coll-
rating, pcu and pcw) are standardized. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered
at reporting bank level. One, two and three stars denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels, respectively.
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.084∗ 0.049 0.006∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
maturity 1.480∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗
Collateral collrating -0.134∗∗ -0.144∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
var collmaturity 0.059∗ 0.065∗ -0.0004 0.104∗∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.110∗∗∗
corpdebt -0.009 -0.032 -0.013∗∗ -0.081 -0.131∗ -0.085
securitisation 0.336∗∗ 0.132 0.064∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗
VaR 0.030∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗
asset in safe portf -0.134∗∗ -0.130∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗
Cpty brokerdealers -0.123 -0.275 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.758∗∗∗ -0.561∗∗ -0.751∗∗∗
type hedgefund 1.485∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 1.921∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗
othermanager 0.459∗∗∗ -0.154 0.028∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗
insur&pension 0.106 -0.467∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -1.235∗∗∗ -1.033∗∗∗ -1.304∗∗∗
cb&govt -1.021∗∗∗ -1.361∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -1.944∗∗∗ -2.253∗∗∗ -2.305∗∗∗
other 0.654∗∗∗ 0.024 -0.009∗ -0.089 -0.063 -0.131
Cpty cptysize -2.252∗∗ -2.826∗∗ -2.556∗∗
var cptyroa -0.111 -0.383∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗
cptyrating -0.318∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.035
cptyleverage 1.619∗∗ 1.364∗∗ 0.991∗∗
cptycds 0.082 0.214∗∗ 0.206∗∗
cptycashratio 0.159∗∗ -0.018 0.041
nocptydata -4.268∗∗∗ -0.614 -1.697
Misc cptycon 0.205∗∗∗ -0.008 0.027
collcon 0.133∗∗ 0.134∗ 0.136
cpty&collrating 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Network pcu -0.021∗∗ -0.446∗∗
var pcw -0.374∗∗ -0.368∗∗
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Bank-Cty FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,925 3,907 3,925 3,925 3,907 3,907
R2 0.582 0.617 0.595 0.590 0.643 0.638
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Table 3.9: Repo Tobit regressions excluding CCPs. The table shows Tobit regres-
sion results for reverse repos excluding deals with CCPs, where the Tobit model with
truncation at zero is used. The dependent variable is haircut and explanatory variables
are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of explanatory
variable. The columns that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for
different explanatory variables. All quantitative variables (notional, maturity, collrat-
ing, collmaturity, VaR, cptysize, cptyroa, cptyleverage, cptycds, cptycashratio, cptycon,
collcon, cpty & collrating, pcu and pcw) are standardized. Standard errors (not re-
ported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One, two and three stars denote 10%,
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.004∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.006∗∗
maturity 0.047∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.034∗∗
Collateral collrating −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
var collmaturity 0.002 0.002 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003 0.003
corpdebt 0.004 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005 0.006∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
securitisation 0.008 0.011∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.022∗∗
VaR 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗
asset in safe portf 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011
Cpty brokerdealers −0.044∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗ −0.039∗∗
type hedgefund −0.020 −0.015 0.014 0.007 0.015 0.011
othermanager 0.003 −0.008 −0.035∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.036∗∗
insur&pension 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.107∗∗
cb&govt 0.007 −0.005∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.021∗ −0.022∗
other −0.002 −0.012 −0.056 −0.040 −0.062 −0.044
Cpty cptysize 0.008 0.018 0.004
var cptyroa 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗
cptyrating 0.003 0.003 0.003
cptyleverage −0.049∗∗ −0.012 −0.003
cptycds −0.003 0.002 0.006
cptycashratio 0.005 −0.005 −0.003
nocptydata −0.091 0.025 0.005
Misc cptycon 0.017∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.002
collcon 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗
cpty&collrating −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗ −0.0003∗∗
Network pcu −0.021∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗
var pcw −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Bank-Cty FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,028 2,915 3,028 3,028 2,915 2,915
Pseudo R2 -0.969 -0.933 -0.971 -0.970 -0.932 -0.932
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Table 3.10: Repo OLS regressions excluding CCPs. The table shows OLS regres-
sion results for repos, excluding deals with CCPs. The dependent variable is haircut
and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows
the category of explanatory variable. The columns that are labeled with numbers
display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. All quantitative vari-
ables (notional, maturity, collrating, collmaturity, VaR, cptysize, cptyroa, cptyleverage,
cptycds, cptycashratio, cptycon, collcon, cpty & collrating, pcu and pcw) are standard-
ized. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One, two
and three stars denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
maturity 0.047∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
Collateral collrating -0.001 0.001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.001∗ 0.001∗
var collmaturity 0.002 0.002 0.003∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
corpdebt 0.004 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
securitisation 0.002 0.004 0.009∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
VaR 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
asset in safe portf 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Cpty brokerdealers -0.012∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.011∗∗∗
type hedgefund -0.005 -0.001 0.0004 -0.003 -0.0004 -0.002
othermanager -0.009 -0.015∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
insur&pension 0.096∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
cb&govt -0.009 -0.016∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
other 0.003 -0.005 -0.046 -0.034 -0.050 -0.037
Cpty cptysize 0.023∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.017
var cptyroa 0.002 0.001 0.001
cptyrating 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
cptyleverage -0.025∗∗∗ -0.004 0.003
cptycds 0.0001 0.005 0.007∗∗
cptycashratio 0.001 -0.006∗ -0.005
nocptydata 0.041 0.123∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
Misc cptycon 0.014∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
collcon 0.006∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
cpty&collrating -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
Network pcu -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
var pcw -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Bank-Cty FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,028 2,915 3,028 3,028 2,915 2,915
R2 0.572 0.589 0.572 0.572 0.589 0.589
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Table 3.11: Repo Logistic regressions excluding CCPs. The table shows Logistic
regression results for repos, excluding deals with CCPs. The dependent variable is
logit-transformed haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column.
The first column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns that are
labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables.
All quantitative variables (notional, maturity, collrating, collmaturity, VaR, cptysize,
cptyroa, cptyleverage, cptycds, cptycashratio, cptycon, collcon, cpty & collrating, pcu
and pcw) are standardized. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting
bank level. One, two and three stars denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.320∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
maturity 0.505∗∗∗ 0.262∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.143 0.242∗
Collateral collrating -0.043∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.0001 -0.027∗ -0.012 -0.003
var collmaturity 0.138∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
corpdebt 0.482∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗
securitisation 0.380∗∗ 0.449∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗
VaR 0.331∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.287∗∗
asset in safe portf 0.101 0.139 0.101 0.101 0.139 0.139
Cpty brokerdealers -1.026∗∗∗ -0.901∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -1.146∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗ -0.815∗∗∗
type hedgefund -0.108 -0.116 0.0004 -0.027 0.011 -0.083
othermanager -0.030 -0.174 -0.045∗∗∗ -1.182∗∗∗ -1.313∗∗∗ -1.333∗∗∗
insur&pension 1.440∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.329∗∗∗ 1.167∗∗∗
cb&govt -0.145 -0.404 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.707∗∗∗ -0.794∗∗ -0.839∗∗∗
other 0.133 -0.062 -0.046 -1.839 -2.124 -1.988
Cpty cptysize 0.301 0.715 0.427
var cptyroa 0.090 0.039 0.040
cptyrating 0.033 0.160∗ 0.165∗
cptyleverage -0.500 0.009 0.192
cptycds 0.107 0.236∗ 0.268∗∗
cptycashratio 0.112 -0.141 -0.115
nocptydata -0.609 4.105∗∗∗ 3.748∗∗∗
Misc cptycon 0.273∗∗∗ 0.004 0.040
collcon 0.104∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
cpty&collrating -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
Network pcu -0.013∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗
var pcw -0.276∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Bank-Cty FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,028 2,915 3,028 3,028 2,915 2,915
R2 0.641 0.658 0.641 0.641 0.658 0.658
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Table 3.12: Percentage of significant interactions in the REVR and REPO OLS
regressions. The table presents the percentage of significant bank-counterparty inter-
action dummies in the OLS regressions, column 2 from Table 3.7 and Table 3.10. The
first two columns show the results for the general sample, columns 3 and 4 for the
subsample of hedge funds only, and columns 5 and 6 for the subsample of banks only.
Significance
level
REVR REPO REVR,
HF
REPO,
HF
REVR,
Banks
REPO,
Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
10% 68.1% 57.0% 62.5% 42.1% 77.4% 60.6%
5% 60.6% 50.6% 50.0% 31.6% 71.9% 47.9%
1% 49.7% 34.2% 43.8% 31.6% 65.4% 38.0%
Table 3.13: Centrality measures summary
Network type Measure Mean
Unweighted in degree 66.14
out degree 67.07
eigenvector centrality -0.22
betweenness 15701.22
closeness out 0.19
closeness in 0.05
kcore in 3.67
kcore out 4.17
clustering coefficient 0.04
Weighted in degree (trade number) 151.03
out degree (trade number) 1931.42
in degree (value) 4.09 bn
out degree (value) 38.64 bn
eigenvector centrality (trade number) -0.27
eigenvector centrality (value) -0.24
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3.9 Appendix
Table 3.14: The breakdown of value of contracts by maturity, currency, counterparty
type, and collateral type. Sample of six banks excluding CCPs. The table presents
the breakdown of the deals (in bn GBP) by maturity, currency, counterparty type,
and collateral type (Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively) for the sample of six banks
excluding CCPs. For each category, it shows the value of the trades in billions GBP
and the percentage of total trades for the reverse repos and repos, respectively. The
total values in Panels A, B, C and D are based on the data from the six reporting banks
that report haircut and collateral information. Discrepancies in row Total between the
Panels are due to missing information.
REVR REPO
Value Percent Value Percent Net
A. Maturity
Overnight 23.4 23.7% -33.0 24.4% -9.6
1 day-3m 51.6 52.4% -58.6 43.3% -7.0
3m-1y 21.8 22.1% -27.5 20.3% -5.7
1y-5y 1.8 1.8% -14.5 10.7% -12.7
5y+ 0.0 0.0% -1.7 1.2% -1.6
Total 98.6 100.0% -135.3 100.0% -36.7
B. Currency
GBP 26.9 27.3% -41.0 30.3% -14.2
EUR 31.4 31.9% -65.4 48.3% -33.9
USD 27.4 27.8% -25.2 18.6% 2.2
JPY 6.0 6.1% -1.6 1.2% 4.4
Other 6.9 7.0% -2.1 1.6% 4.8
Total 98.6 100.0% -135.3 100.0% -36.7
C. Counterparty type
Another reporting bank a 8.2 8.3% -10.2 7.6% -2.0
Other banks 29.3 29.7% -43.6 32.2% -14.3
Broker-dealer b 15.0 15.2% -15.8 11.7% -0.8
Hedge fund 15.1 15.3% -15.5 11.5% -0.4
Other asset managers c 11.5 11.7% -8.3 6.2% 3.2
Insurance and pension 9.5 9.7% -8.5 6.3% 1.0
Central bank and government 5.5 5.6% -28.6 21.1% -23.0
Other d 4.4 4.5% -2.8 2.1% 1.6
Other 0.0 0.0% -1.9 1.4% -1.9
Total 98.6 100.0% -135.3 100.0% -36.7
D. Collateral type
US govt 10.2 15.3% -5.4 6.7% 4.8
UK govt 14.5 21.7% -17.6 21.9% -3.1
Germany govt 5.4 8.0% -12.9 16.0% -7.5
France govt 4.9 7.3% -4.7 5.9% 0.1
GIIPS 3.9 5.8% -3.9 4.8% 0.0
Other sovereign 18.9 28.4% -10.8 13.4% 8.2
Corporate debt 7.0 10.5% -11.7 14.5% -4.7
Securitization 1.9 2.9% -13.5 16.8% -11.6
Other 0.0 0.1% 0.0 0.0% 0.0
Total 66.7 100.0% -80.4 100.0% -13.8
a The reporting banks report on a UK-consolidated basis, but counterparties are reported on a global
basis. Therefore, there may be discrepancies between the reverse repos and repos with the reporting
banks.
b Broker-dealers are mostly securities firms that are subsidiaries of large banks. c Non-leveraged non-
MMF mutual funds – asset managers that are not hedge fund or MMF. d Includes corporations, schools,
hospitals and other non-profit organizations. e Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain government
bonds.
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Table 3.15: The breakdown of reverse repos. This table exhibits a finer breakdown
of the reverse repo contracts. The numbers are in percentage points and indicate the
percentage of notional value in each category. The data is double sorted by counter-
party type (columns) and maturity, currency and collateral type in Panels A, B, and
C, respectively. Columns 1–8 refer to the following counterparty types:
1. Another reporting bank
2. Other banks
3. Broker-dealer
4. Hedge fund
5. Other asset managers
6. Insurance and pension
7. Central bank & govt, and 8. Other
Counterparty type
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
A. Maturity
Overnight 1.4 18.8 8.0 4.0 2.0 2.1 0.0 2.2 38.4
1 day-3m 0.81 17.5 9.3 10.1 5.6 5.5 2.6 2.2 53.9
3m-1y 0.3 1.7 0.3 0.3 2.5 1.6 0.5 0.5 7.6
1-5y 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
5y+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 2.5 38.2 17.7 14.4 10.1 9.2 3.1 4.9 100.0
B. Currency
GBP 1.1 2.8 1.5 2.6 6.3 5.8 0.1 2.6 22.8
EUR 0.6 16.1 2.9 6.3 1.4 3.0 1.3 1.2 32.6
USD 0.7 15.6 11.1 4.0 2.2 0.2 0.7 0.9 35.6
JPY 0.0 1.5 0.9 1.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.0
Other 0.1 2.3 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 5.0
Total 2.5 38.2 17.7 14.4 10.1 9.2 3.1 4.9 100.0
C. Collateral type
US govt 0.2 3.1 6.2 0.9 1.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 13.0
UK govt 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.3 7.4 4.9 0.2 2.4 16.8
Germany govt 0.3 1.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.1 4.9
France govt 0.0 1.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.1 0.1 0.2 4.0
GIIPS 0.0 0.2 0.0 3.6 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 4.6
Other sovereign 0.6 14.2 3.9 1.5 1.1 0.6 1.7 0.9 24.4
Corporate debt 1.0 10.9 3.3 4.8 1.8 1.9 0.1 2.6 26.4
Securitization 0.1 1.7 1.4 1.4 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 5.5
Other 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Total 2.3 33.7 16.5 13.6 12.9 9.6 4.5 6.8 100.0
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Table 3.16: The breakdown of repos. This table exhibits a finer breakdown of the
repo contracts. The numbers are in percentage points and indicate the percentage
of notional value in each category. The data is double sorted by counterparty type
(columns) and maturity, currency and collateral type in Panels A, B, and C, respec-
tively. Columns 1–8 refer to the following counterparty types:
1. Another reporting bank
2. Other banks
3. Broker-dealer
4. Hedge fund
5. Other asset managers
6. Insurance and pension
7. Central bank & govt, and 8. Other
Counterparty type
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
A. Maturity
Overnight 3.5 25.6 10.7 4.8 5.8 1.0 1.7 0.4 53.2
1 day-3m 0.8 10.3 5.8 7.3 2.7 3.9 4.4 0.8 36.3
3m-1y 0.2 2.4 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.5 2.1 0.0 6.7
1-5y 0.3 1.7 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 3.8
5y+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 4.8 40.0 18.8 12.6 8.7 5.7 8.2 1.2 100.0
B. Currency
GBP 0.6 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.8 2.2 0.4 15.1
EUR 1.4 20.9 7.3 6.8 4.5 0.9 4.9 0.5 46.9
USD 2.0 15.5 8.3 3.0 1.8 2.0 0.9 0.3 33.6
JPY 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
Other 0.0 1.5 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.9
Total 4.8 40.0 18.8 12.6 8.7 5.7 8.2 1.2 100.0
C. Collateral type
US govt 0.5 1.9 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 3.7
UK govt 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.7 2.0 1.0 1.9 0.4 7.9
Germany govt 0.4 4.1 0.6 1.9 0.5 0.0 2.2 0.1 10.0
France govt 0.1 2.0 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.0 4.4
GIIPS 0.0 1.0 0.5 2.4 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 5.0
Other sovereign 2.2 8.3 4.1 2.5 0.8 0.3 2.1 0.3 20.5
Corporate debt 1.3 15.6 7.5 2.9 5.2 3.8 1.0 0.1 37.1
Securitization 0.6 6.5 2.9 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 11.4
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 5.3 40.0 16.6 11.7 10.8 5.5 9.2 0.9 100.0
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Table 3.17: Reverse repo OLS regressions excluding CCPs with nonbank dummy. The
table shows OLS regression results for reverse repos, excluding deals with CCPs. The
dependent variable is haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column.
The first column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns that are
labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables.
All quantitative variables (notional, maturity, collrating, collmaturity, VaR, cptysize,
cptyroa, cptyleverage, cptycds, cptycashratio, cptycon, collcon, cpty & collrating, pcu
and pcw) are standardized. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting
bank level. One, two and three stars denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.003 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
maturity 0.095∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
Collateral collrating -0.008∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
var collmaturity -0.001 0.002 -0.0004 0.001 0.002 0.004∗∗
corpdebt -0.008∗ -0.009∗ -0.013∗ -0.011∗ -0.015∗ -0.012∗
securitisation 0.036∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
VaR 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
asset in safe portf -0.005∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
Cpty nonbank 0.090∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.090∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.131∗∗
Cpty cptysize -0.093∗∗ -0.139∗∗ -0.134∗∗
var cptyroa -0.003 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
cptyrating -0.021∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
cptyleverage 0.079∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
cptycds -0.003 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
cptycashratio 0.006∗∗ 0.001 0.007∗∗∗
nocptydata -0.164∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
Misc cptycon 0.005 -0.001 -0.003
collcon 0.002 0.004 0.005
cpty&collrating 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
Network pcu -0.021∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
var pcw -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Bank-Cty FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,925 3,907 3,925 3,925 3,907 3,907
R2 0.615 0.650 0.637 0.633 0.664 0.658
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Table 3.18: Repo OLS regressions excluding CCPs with nonbank dummy. The table
shows OLS regression results for repos, excluding deals with CCPs with. The dependent
variable is haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first
column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns that are labeled with
numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. All quan-
titative variables (notional, maturity, collrating, collmaturity, VaR, cptysize, cptyroa,
cptyleverage, cptycds, cptycashratio, cptycon, collcon, cpty & collrating, pcu and pcw)
are standardized. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting bank level.
One, two and three stars denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
maturity 0.047∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
Collateral collrating -0.001 0.001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.001∗ 0.001∗
var collmaturity 0.002 0.002 0.003∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
corpdebt 0.004 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
securitisation 0.002 0.004 0.009∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
VaR 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
asset in safe portf 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Cpty nonbank 0.080∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
Cpty cptysize 0.023∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.017
var cptyroa 0.002 0.001 0.001
cptyrating 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
cptyleverage -0.025∗∗∗ -0.004 0.003
cptycds 0.0001 0.005 0.007∗∗
cptycashratio 0.001 -0.006∗ -0.005
nocptydata 0.041 0.123∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
Misc cptycon 0.014∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
collcon 0.006∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
cpty&collrating -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
Network pcu -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
var pcw -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Bank-Cty FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,028 2,915 3,028 3,028 2,915 2,915
R2 0.572 0.589 0.572 0.572 0.589 0.589
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